On Globalization

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List of Readings

Michael Nerlich, "The Business of the Adventurer,"
from The Ideology of Adventure (1977)

Hugo Grotius, from The Freedom of the Seas (1608)

Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power,"
from The Interest of America in Sea Power (1897)

John Locke, "Of Property,"
from Of Civil Government: Second Treatise (1689)

Vadana Shiva, "Biodiversity and People's Knowledge,
from Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge (1997)

Subcomandante Marcos, "A Storm and a Prophecy" (1992)

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Bourgeois and Proletarians,"
from The Communist Manifesto (1848)

Chalmers Johnson, "Blowback" (2000).

Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations" (1993)

Edward Said, "The Clash of Ignorance" (2001)

Thomas Friedman, "Backlash"
from The Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000)

Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Cold War and the Third World: The Good Old Days?"
from After Liberalism (1991)

Naomi Klein, "A Tale of Three Logos,"
From No Logo (1999)

Christopher Connery, "The Oceanic Feeling and the Regional Imaginary" (1996)

Allan Sekula, "Between the Net and the Deep Blue Sea" (2001)

Michael Nerlich, The Ideology of Adventure: Studies in Modern Consciousness 1100-1750. [1977], trans. from the German by Ruth Crowley (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1987)

Chapter 5
The Business of the Adventurer

The Economic Adventure

Scholarship has ignored the fact that the *chevalier* of the courtly romance who goes out to look for *aventure* does not hit on the idea of calling himself *aventurier,* "adventurer."[1] This is of course not surprising because, as we have established, the glorification of *aventure* in the courtly romances of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was only a pretext. What was really sought after was the opposite, a secure society, peace, and order—basically the bureaucratization of the court (hence the constant appeals to the *largesse,* the generosity, of the king).

Let us return once more to the concept of *aventure.* Elena Eberwein says, with respect to her own definition of the concept of *aventure* in the *Lais* of Marie de France: "Not only did I have to make a selection among the purely lexicographical choices: for instance, purely legal meanings were not considered, because they would in part have led too far afield, or in part they contributed nothing new."[2] Whether these are her actual reasons (and their dubiousness becomes obvious when one considers that she, like the other interpreters of the courtly ideology of *aventure,* did not even test whether the "legal" meaning was sometimes joined with the non-"legal"), or whether she did not simply leave out other meanings of *aventure* so as not to threaten the balance of her own interpretation, her repeated and furious attacks on Frédéric Godefroy[3] call her motives into question. Godefroy's selection of examples of *aventure* in his *Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française* is, to be sure, one-sided, but it is of particular interest to us because his examples are almost exclusively of legal or economic meanings, with the first examples going all the way back to the late thirteenth century. Alongside the meaning of "output, earnings, income"

("Tous les droiz, *aventures,* emolumenz, seignouries," 1305; "Et tous les profiz, esploiz, *aventures,* et esmolumanz du dit cenz ou rente," 1345), the word *aventure* also occurs with the meaning of "catch, booty, or harvest," which is to be expected (Godefroy circumscribes this meaning himself, somewhat inexactly, with "produit éventuel"): "Aulcuns pescheurs avoient jectet en mer leurs roits, ung illec present acheta l'*aventure* de ce cop" [Some fishers had cast their nets in the sea; one of them who was present bought the (expected) catch]. Or: "Dont acheta l'*aventure* future des oliviers" [(he) bought the expected olive harvest].[4]

Of course, we must guard against overhasty conclusions, but we may still determine that it is unlikely that at this time, when the ideology of the knight adventurer was still in the very center of courtly thinking and courtly production of romances, that is, when it was still weighted down with all the ideological ballast of meaning, the term should suddenly be used in a sense which seems to contain nothing at all of the courtly ideology (and which in fact contains nothing of it), unless it had already long been used in this sense. That *aventure* is first attested in a literary text (and hence also in a literary context) that has nothing to do with legal or economic terminology is simply a result of the fact that legal texts were written in Latin until the year 1200. Only after that were legal or "economic" texts composed in the vulgate as well. Thus it seems probable that *aventure* in this sense was already in use in colloquial language. Despite all theories about *eventus,* etc., I believe that this is the original meaning, since it is difficult to see why an **ad-ventura* would have had to be invented when *eventus* already covered the meaning. This conviction is strengthened by the fact that *aventure* in the sense of "yield, profit, or booty" not only coincides completely with the way the knight adventurers earned their living, but also could throw some light on many obscure examples of *aventure* in courtly literature.[5] It cannot be denied that *aventure* could have this meaning at least in the literature of the Crusades; we saw this in the case of Villehardouin.

Li borjois chevalier

It is probable that the existence of *aventure* in a legal and economic sense (or in the sense of booty, catch) and the simultaneous idealization of *aventure* in the courtly sense delayed the origin of the concept *aventurier* or at least impeded the acceptance of this term in courtly literature; but there is not currently enough documentary evidence to decide the question. It is, however, noteworthy that the first attestations all come from the fifteenth century, when the term crops up not only in French, but also in German (*ofenthürer* and similar words), in Spanish and Italian (*aventurero, avventuriero*), and in English as well ("adventurer"). The term never refers to a knight, but instead (in a pejorative sense) to a bandit and (in a positive sense) to a soldier or—and this will be our main focus of interest—a merchant.

Compared with England, where the concept "adventurer" indicates a new epoch of humanity, the use of the concept *aventurier* for merchant is relatively

infrequent in France; this must be seen as a result of social conditions. Let us return again to the time of the courtly ideology of adventure and remind ourselves how aggressive the courtly ideologues were against *li vilains* or *li borjois*; we explained this aggression on the basis of class oppositions. This hostility vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie began at the moment when they began to pass the petty nobility in economic and partly also in political importance, at the moment when the (petty or knightly) nobility had, except for its knightly military abilities, nothing more to throw in the balance than its courtly ideology. It began the battle for a worldview against the bourgeoisie, which to be sure had many facets and was certainly not present in all (literary) documents.

The epic *Le Moniage Guillaume* (William's Monkhood), for instance, part of the William cycle—the *chansons de geste* about William of Aquitaine (d. 812) who fought the Arabs in the south of France and in Spain among other things—was written in 1180, at the same time as the courtly romances of Chrestien de Troyes. It contains important scenes which blatantly contradict the courtly antibourgeois passion. In the fish market, a free burgher ("un frans bourjois") spots William, disguised (and derided) as a monk, and invites him to eat with him at home. If William accepts the invitation, the burgher says, he would feel greatly honored ("jou meisme en serai honorés"). William and his servant (Famulus) go along ("voluntiers et de gré"—"with greatest pleasure"), are shown lavish hospitality, and want to pay after the meal, which greatly angers their host ("mout en est aires"). He had recognized William despite his monk's habit and explains that he himself had received many blessings from William and is now happy to be able to help William in turn. William then calls him "brave and wise" and makes himself fully known. When he leaves, he thanks his host for the honor ("ounor") he has done him with the invitation. The burgher offers to accompany him to protect him from bandits: "G'irai o vous, se vous le comandés" (I will go with you, if you order it), but William does not allow this.[6] This scene shows a different relation to the bourgeoisie, which also corresponds to historical reality: the good relation between prince or king and the rich urban bourgeoisie. The *frans borjois* is the burgher whom the king plays off against the refractory feudal nobility and who managed to prevail despite attempts by the nobles to contain him. There is another scene as important as the one between William and the free urban burgher, one in which Landris, William's cousin, poses as a merchant shipper and probably functions as one as well. To the heathen king Synagon, who has captured his ship, he explains:

> Lord, I will not lie to you. We are traveling over the sea to Sicily and live from our wares, from the silk cloth and materials from Almería. We often sell alum, Brazil wood, and wax, . . . cinnamon, incense, and licorice, pepper and caraway and other good spices. We are merchants.[7]

Although Ernst Robert Curtius goes too far in claiming that Landris *is* a merchant,[8] he did recognize the importance of this scene, which together with the

one mentioned above proves that there was also a noble probourgeois ideology opposed to the courtly antibourgeois ideology: Landris has absolutely no moral scruples about passing himself off as a sea trader and acting as one. This would not occur to a "conservative" courtly knight.

These two scenes characterize the two essential poles of the positive relations between king/great nobility and bourgeoisie: while the king at first enters into a relation of positive interest with the urban bourgeoisie,[9] the Crusade nobility forms an alliance with the sea traders, which is exactly what happened in historical reality. From the early Middle Ages, the Mediterranean was aswarm with merchant voyagers and trading companies,[10] on which the Crusaders were dependent from the very beginning for transport and nourishment. Very soon the crusading knights and the shippers joined together or the knights themselves took over the function of the shippers, turned into ship captains and merchants—a process that we can read most impressively in the texts of Villehardouin and Martorell, which we have excerpted earlier: "If the Crusaders are the great losers in the Christian expansion of the twelfth century," writes Le Goff, "then the great winners in the end are the traders, who ventured ever further from their western point of departure."[11] Nobles had a share in this (especially the urban aristocracy of Italy, but also that of Catalonia); and many burghers rose via the shipping trade into the ranks of the nobility.[12]

The position of the front is by no means as clear as Italo Siciliano claimed in 1968.[13] In judging the relations between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, the various factions must be carefully distinguished and judged in a differentiated way. The greatest hostility was doubtless found where the king played off the urban bourgeoisie against the feudal nobility in order to establish the royal power. In this process the king also elevated burghers (especially in France) to the aristocracy or granted them privileges that put them on equal footing with the aristocracy and contributed in an essential way to the formation of the group of urban patricians.[14] This fact also explains the success that courtly culture and courtly literature enjoyed among the *frans borjois* of France: it continued until the time of Molière's *Bourgeois gentilhomme* and beyond.[15]

The *Chevaliers du Commerce*

Merchants in France had of course always had to endure *aventures* in in the sense of troubles that befell them, on water and on land. For that reason they soon banded together in *compaignies,* "defensive alliances" or "guilds": as early as the ninth century, a *confrérie des marchands de l'eau* (brotherhood of marine merchants) was in existence.[16] The formation of cities, of *communes* with their commitments to mutual assistance which the *borjois* exchanged, contributed significantly to the formation of such organizations.[17] Thus as early as from 1072 to 1083, guilds or Hansas of *marchands* were formed in Paris that gave each other

mutual protection on water and on land with their transport of goods; their armaments were prescribed in great detail, and violation of these ordinances was a punishable offense.[18] These defensive alliances changed at the latest in the thirteenth century, in the process of the development of the cities and of the cooperation between king and the bourgeoisie that was rising into the nobility or to the noblelike patriciate. "The guilds now become aristocratic alliances and isolate themselves [from the artisans and other cooperatives—M. N.]."[19] The economic stagnation of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the time of great famines and plague epidemics as well as of the Hundred Years' War, intensified this development: "The great burghers, grown rich, from now on live from revenues or else buy feudal properties and imitate the feudal lords."[20]

E. Coornaert gives an impression of this process:

> In the north, the guild members relatively early became patricians: in Valenciennes and in Tournai (the citizens of these cities were noble) the cloth merchants formed a chevalerie. Arras had a "prince of the wine-trade" around 1430, and in Reims the great merchants were called the "knights of the nation of Reims." The merchant-"knights" of Languedoc, who were registered in the "military militia of the Order of Traded Goods," had the clear right to regard themselves as members of an aristocracy. The Six Corporations of Paris had constituted such an aristocracy since the fifteenth century—had not the goldsmiths among them received from Philippe de Valois the right to have coats of arms?... Soon the members of "commerce" were commonly called "nobles" ["nobles hommes"].[21]

This more or less intensive assimilation of the commercial bourgeoisie into the nobility (together with the striving for the *noblesse de robe,* the "nobility of magistrates") was to remain a decisive characteristic of the development of the bourgeoisie in France.

Hallowed Risk

The decisive turning point in the history of the ideology of adventure was initiated in England. In France, the rising bourgeoisie was assimilated to the (upper) nobility or to the nobility of magistrates (in either case, it imitated the noble way of life and largely adopted the courtly ideology); in England, the bourgeoisie began to follow its path to world-historical significance, to the success of its economic system, to capitalism, in opposition to the upper nobility and the clergy but in alliance with the petty nobility. One of its weapons was adventure. As early as the fourteenth century, Chaucer wrote in the *Canterbury Tales:*

> Us moste putte oure good in aventure.
> A marchaunt, truly, may not ay endure,

Truste me wel, in his prosperitye,
Some tyme his good is drowned in the see,
And some tyme cometh it sauf unto the londe.[22]

We have to run risks with our wares. Believe me: a merchant doesn't necessarily keep his possessions. Sometimes his wares sink in the sea and sometimes they come safe to land.

There is a clear echo of Thomas Aquinas in these lines: "Sicut navis undis marinis jactatur in altum nunc, & nunc in profundis; sic homo per fortunam nunc in prosperitate levatur, nunc in adversitate dejicitur."[23] [As a ship is sometimes carried high by the waves of the sea and sometimes plunged downward, thus the human being is sometimes raised to riches by Fortuna and sometimes plunged into misery.] This is all the more understandable, since *fortuna* as a concept (fate, luck) and as allegory (Dame Fortune) was used quite early as a synonym for *aventure,* as the example in Watriquet de Couvin's *Li miroir as Dames* (Mirror of the Ladies) shows. Fortuna here introduces herself: "Brothers, call me Aventure, / God put me to work on earth."[24] In the English version of the Alexius song from around 1400, there is talk of "dame auenture," and in a glossary from 1440 we read: "Awntyr... or happe: Fortuna fortuitis."[25]

Chaucer does not depart from this context of meaning in the passage above when he talks about the risks a merchant runs.[26] A merchant runs risks, and he can do so with pride; not only did Jesus himself "adventure" (by risking his life), as William Langland wrote also in the fourteenth century,[27] but the church as well had emphatically sanctified the risk involved in financial operations or commerce. That may sound paradoxical, but it is comprehensible.[28] The church had banned usury, moneylending against interest, quite early. But it by no means put a ban on changing money from one currency into another.[29] The original bankers (in northern Italy) were thus at first primarily (officially) moneychangers. "In the Middle Ages, fare il banco [to bank] and fare il cambio [to change money] were synonyms.[30] The theologians, like Thomas Aquinas, legitimized these exchange operations: they allowed bankers to invest their money so as to earn a profit as long as this involved a risk, namely the exchange from one currency into another, so that there were no grounds for the charge of usury against the moneychangers.[31]

Money was changed by the merchants, the "marcheants" of whom *Le Moniage Guillaume* speaks and who quite early on were engaging in long-distance trade on water and land. When the exchange system developed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the "ambulatory" character of trade had already been given an international organizational framework with the traveling merchants and their guilds and Hansas. Various currencies therefore had to be used in trade, which gave the bankers the opportunity for hidden loan or usury operations.[32] To be sure, such operations (*mutuum in fraudem usurarum,* "exchange

for usurious purposes") were officially forbidden by the church, but it was very difficult to trace them (should that even have been desirable).

The cover for this usury was the officially permitted exchange of money: *Cambium non est mutuum* (exchange of money is not usury), the church had decided, because the *cambium* in contrast to *mutuum* contained an (actual) risk for the moneychanger. Moneychanging was understood as moving currency from one place to another.[33] In principle, that usually meant that a trader had a certain sum of money paid out at a certain place in the currency valid there. This sum was to be paid back at a predetermined place in the currency valid there, with a profit for the moneychanger (the banker), because he had undergone the risk of losing his money (the trade routes were unsafe, the distances sometimes huge, so that it could be quite a long time before the banker got his money back).

It was in fact possible to cloak this process in Christian love of neighbor. For instance, a traveler in a foreign land could be in need, so that it was only Christian charity to help him out of his need by giving him money so he could return home; he then would repay the money lent him. And this was in fact how it was done, with the fine, crucial distinction that the borrower was normally no traveler in need but rather a merchant who used the borrowed money to buy goods abroad, loaded them on his wagon or ship, traveled with them to a predetermined place, sold his goods there for a profit, and financed his expenses and his living (or increased his wealth) and also paid the banker's profit (the hidden interest) from the realized profit. As primitive or complicated as these financial transactions were—and they corresponded to the complicated nature of commercial transactions in general at that time—they were not only the beginning of the modern financial transactions of commercial capitalism, they also gave a fitting name to a certain type of trade: *aventure* trade, which lasted in a rudimentary way until into the nineteenth century.[34]

The Merchant Adventurers

In France, the courtly ideology of adventure, supported by both the nobility and often by the rising or arrived bourgeoisie, seems to have if not prevented, then at least severely limited, the positive use of *aventurier* (instead of *chevalier*) for trader, merchant. In Germany, however, the term *aventure,* in its different dialect variants, was part of the common terminology of trade. Its widest spread was in the sense of risk (which was also called *angst*):[35] as early as 1300 it occurred in this sense in Braunschweig,[36] and in the Hanseatic trade contracts it is quite common: "Trade contracts are drawn up in Lübeck between two partners *up user twiger aventhure* (the adventure of the two of us), in Königsberg among three partners *up user 3 eventuer.*"[37] But "adventure" can also be the profit itself, as Erich Maschke proves with documents from the Ravensburg Society: "In 1479 the Valencia branch expected good *abentyr* in the sugar business, and *auben-*

türiger saffra is profitable saffron."[38] Goods themselves can be called "adventure," and the merchant finally applies the title of adventurer to himself: "In this context, traveling merchants and especially jewel dealers are called adventurers, with no negative connotations," as Werner Welzig writes. "Rather, it is a regular professional title. Thus the Strassburg municipal council decreed in 1482 an 'Ordnung der Goltschmiede und Ofentürer' [Order of Goldsmiths and Adventurers]."[39] And in fact, it would have been more than strange if the concept "adventurer" as the designation for a merchant had had "negative connotations," given the courtly ideology of adventure and the church's sanctification of risk. If even "jewel dealers," as Welzig says, or goldsmiths called themselves adventurers from time to time, that was based on the fact that they are also, and primarily, moneychangers or moneylenders (in England, the term "goldsmith" was synonymous with banker well into the eighteenth century) and were involved in the *aventure* trade (that is, underwent risks) through this activity. Thus it was not "especially jewel dealers" who called themselves adventurers, but the long-distance merchants. As Bruno Kuske writes:

> The narrowing of the concept "adventure" to the economic context and in that context to capital risk was of importance from the Middle Ages on. A distinction was made between *aventiure* trade and the sale to known customers. *Aventiure* trade covered those cases in which the merchant set off with his goods without knowing exactly what market he would find for them or in which he sent them off to representatives or agents. Quite a variety of practices developed in these cases—especially in the agreements of trading companies or of contracting parties. "Aventiure" was reserved for certain amounts of common sales, for limited stretches of the trade routes.... On an order, say, from the Lower Rhine to Venice, merchants retained the right to carry only half of the *eventure* and to assign the other half to a partner.... The long-distance trader who was also able and had enough capital to undertake the risk of getting his goods to their destination therefore self-confidently called himself an "adventurer" by profession in the Middle Ages.[40]

The term gains world-historical importance in England, where it was the proud professional designation for "that corporation of English merchants whose long-distance trade was especially risky."[41] The first occurrences of merchants calling themselves adventurers are from 1443/44 ("Adventurers of the Mercery"; for the sake of comparison, in France the stay-at-home traders called themselves *chevaliers de la mercerie*). Already toward the end of the fifteenth century, adventurers, as merchant adventurers, figure in the London *City Book*.[42] The awareness of undertaking risks played an important role in this self-designation. The Guild of St. George in Hull admitted as members only those who had no other means of support than "by grete aventoure." That meant

primarily the risk of sea trade, as an occurrence in the year 1439 shows: "Maistres and Mariners of certein Schippes and Vesseles ... aswell of aventure of Wynde and of the See, as by rekelesnesse ... have hert and brused other Schippes and Vesseles."[43] [Owners and sailors of certain ships and boats have, both for reason of dangers of wind and sea and out of carelessness, rammed and destroyed other ships.]

The formation of the merchant adventurer associations was connected with the increasing importance of the English wool and cloth manufacture and the related shipping trade in the fifteenth century, although the beginnings were at first quite modest; until well into the sixteenth century the lion's share of the sea trade with English wool and cloth was carried on by the Hanseatic League, which had its headquarters in London in the famous Steelyard. "The increasing volume of overseas trade handled by English men of affairs was reflected in the growing importance in English society of merchants specializing in foreign commerce, particularly in the marketing of cloth," writes E. M. Carus-Wilson.[44] The cloth merchants, the merchant adventurers, were to be distinguished from the wool traders, the merchant staplers, who belonged to the Company of Staple and were allowed only to transport their raw material, wool, as far as Calais.

> As shippers of cloth they were bound to no one company and to no one port, nor were they assured of a sale for their wares. Despatching them north, south, east and west, wherever they could find an opening, they strove to capture from foreign manufacturers markets which at any moment might be closed against them by war or diplomacy; hazarding their goods, and sometimes their persons, on voyages to alien and not always welcoming lands. Venturers in fact, they became venturers in name. As "venturers" or "adventurers" they became individually distinguished both from the Merchant Staplers and from the stay-at-home traders.[45]

To assert their interests, the merchant adventurers were soon forced to form organizations, since otherwise the predominance of the other domestic and foreign sea traders who were organized into fellowships (the so-called nations) would have been too great. As "'fellowships of adventurers,' drawn together by common interests, they associated into groups both at home and abroad,"[46] although the principle of association actually seems to run counter to the commitment to risk-filled adventure. The fellowship was supposed to remove adventure as far as possible from any incalculable risk (an internal contradiction to which we will return later).

The development of the adventurer associations was a decisive event for all of English sea trade. In 1457 the "felyship adventurers" already had permission to collect duty on every cloth shipment brought to England on certain ships.[47] To the dismay of other traders, a special jurisdiction was formed, administered

by the Court of Adventurers,[48] which led to tensions (and sometimes to murder) between the mercer adventurers and other "divers felyshippes aventerers."[49] In 1489 we find an exact list of these other "Fellowship Adventurers" of the City (London), organized in the "Courte of the felishippes aventerers": drapers, grocers, skinners, and others "as well as oure Compeny of the Mercery."[50] But haberdashers, fish dealers, or tailors could also belong, though they seldom did.[51]

The greatest association of adventurers was doubtless the "Company of Merchant Adventurers of England, trading to Holland, Zealand, Brabant, Hainault and Flanders," later called simply the "Merchant Adventurers of England." It is telling that Holland was named first because in the fifteenth century the sea trade between England and Holland was of prime importance. The headquarters of the "Merchant Adventurers of England" was in Bruges or in Antwerp, while that of the Hanseatic League was in London. The shipping trade was not yet a national affair, but it was drawn into the wake of the formation of the nation-states or of the absolute monarchies. Thus the merchant adventurers began to owe duty to the King of England in exchange for trade charters. With the death of Edward IV at the latest this had become such a burden to the fellowships that they began to resist it and demanded among other things greater privileges for their money.[52] The pressure of competition and shared interests (especially over against the Hanseatic League and hence against all *foreign* competitors) soon led to the consolidation of all adventurer fellowships. This organization became so important to the English economy that the adventurers were forced, and were able, to ask the king for military assistance in their undertakings; this was the impetus for the establishment of a "royal navy."[53] In 1492 adventure ships sailed out under the protection of the navy; this became the rule under Henry VII and Henry VIII.[54] At about the same time the adventurers began to take the offensive against the Hanseatic League, their greatest rivals apart from the staplers.[55] The king soon lent them support in this struggle because he began to see the significance of the policy of a national merchant marine. In the process of forming his mercantile policy, he also increasingly protected his own sea trade to the disadvantage of foreign sea trade, especially of the Hanseatic League, whose privileges Elizabeth I then significantly reduced in the second half of the sixteenth century.

The Rise of the Burgher in Literature

In looking for the reason why the (long-distance) merchant called himself an adventurer, we must not lose sight of the courtly ideology of adventure. The commitment to risk, as an affirmation of the real bourgeois (commercial) adventure, certainly stood in defiant opposition to the courtly ideology of adventure, but on the other hand it was also, whenever possible, cloaked in the forms of courtly

ideology itself. What scholars call the "bourgeois tendency of courtly literature" is a dialectical process. The bourgeoisie, in assimilating courtly culture and ideology, not only won for itself the social privileges of the nobility, it not only changed courtly culture and ideology in its own direction in this assimilation (that is, in the direction of bourgeois interest and the expression of this interest), it also changed itself in this assimilation,[56] became more of a competitor—and that means that it used the cultural and ideological weapons of the nobility (in part unconsciously) in the class struggle against that very nobility.[57]

To be sure, this tactic can be effective in the class struggle only as long as mimicry does not become assimilation to the nobility or identification with it (as happened for instance especially in France, but also in Italy and other places). This danger was not so great in England, because of the economic and political development there,[58] that is, because of the different situation of the class struggle: there never was an English system of knighthood as there was in France or even in Germany or Spain.[59] As early as the fourteenth century there was an economic and political union between the rich urban bourgeoisie and the gentry, who, as the House of Commons, opposed the upper nobility and the upper clergy, as the House of Lords, in Parliament. An unconditional propagation of the courtly ideology that disavowed non-nobles (which the bourgeoisie in France during its rise sometimes fell prey to or even propagated) can have had little appeal to the English bourgeoisie, and in fact the courtly ideology of adventure played a much smaller role in England than in France, whence it was imported. Until well into the fourteenth century French was the language of the English aristocracy and hence the official language of state. The courtly ideology was thus brought to England in the original language of its French products; this circumstance severely limited its reception (especially since at that time texts were only handwritten or circulated orally). There never was a real English knightly romance.[60] When people in England began to write English novels, the time of knighthood was already past, and there was already a need for another kind of literature which was no longer exclusively that of knighthood. Quite the contrary: the exclusively courtly-knightly literature written after the beginning of the fourteenth century exhibited thoroughly "counterrevolutionary" traits in the forms of the time.

Nonetheless, we may not see the historical development in England as a disconnected sequence of different classes and their (far from unified, in fact highly contradictory) ideological systems, and this is also true for the relation of the medieval English bourgeoisie to courtly literature. This bourgeoisie (of which the merchant adventurers were merely an avant-garde), like that of France, Germany, or elsewhere, did not at first erect a world view radically opposed to courtly ideology. Instead, it gradually "re-functioned" courtly ideology before going on the offensive against it (with weapons in part won in the refunctioning, that is, from the assimilated and altered culture). That occurred on various

levels. The bourgeoisie made courtly literature or ideology bourgeois in a linguistic, formal, and ideological sense—whether courtly literature was parodied, whether the bourgeois world was introduced as background, whether active characters appeared as representatives of the bourgeoisie, the boundaries and transitions were fluid and corresponded to the changing, contradictory, or convergent interests of the different classes.

This dialectical process of making courtly literature or ideology bourgeois and making the rising bourgeoisie courtly began relatively early in England. To be precise, it began as soon as English won out as the official language of state and thereby also became acceptable as a vehicle for literature at court. Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* presents a representative selection of figures from the different classes of society. To be sure, hierarchy is strictly observed, but the "parfit gentil knight"[61] who introduces the series of characters can already be distinguished by his social position from the model knight of the French courtly romance. The background for his *aventures* is no fairy-tale world, but instead the precisely detailed topography from Russia to the Mediterranean. But still more important: he is on a pilgrimage in the company of quite uncourtly people, a group of pilgrims whose feeling of community Chaucer emphasizes,[62] and a merchant also belongs to this group of pilgrims; he is presented in detail and with sympathy. But the pilgrim is not the only merchant we meet. In the story told by the mariner, another member of the community of pilgrims, we encounter another (cuckolded and deceived, but thoroughly honorable) merchant as a protagonist. It is interesting for our investigation to note that Chaucer tried to give his readers some understanding of the contemporary system of loans and usury within the framework of this story.

The dialectical process of making courtly literature bourgeois took place with differing intensity in the various countries. We cannot discuss it here in detail but will instead only point out a few central points in the development that are of particular importance for the formation of the ideology of adventure. In general, we can state that besides the courtly literature that was being made bourgeois, a literature was growing up that was an ever more open expression of the rising class, with national differences in development (although it was characterized everywhere by an increasing realism).[63] We see a change in the valuation of the nobility and knightly *aventure* as early as 1275, when Jean de Meun, in his continuation of the *Roman de la Rose,* converts Andreas Capellanus's rules for making a knight courtly into implicit censure of the nobility and an upward revaluation of non-nobles. In imitations of sources from antiquity, he has the allegorical figure of Nature give information about the natural (moral) equality of human beings and determines that no one is a *gentilhomme* except on the basis of the appropriate virtues, and no one is a *vilain* except through lack of these virtues. "Noblesse," he writes, "comes from having the right courage, because nobility of descent alone is nobility worth nothing, unless

a great heart [that is, bravery—M. N.] is joined to it." To learn bravery, the *gentilhomme* should remember the heroic deeds of his predecessors, in which task the *clercs,* that is basically the intellectuals, can be helpful; the *clercs,* who themselves should be noble or noble by virtue of their mental and moral superiority, can as literati transmit the deeds of the ancients. The *clerc,* Jean de Meun writes, "reads in the old stories / the vilenies [shameful deeds—M. N.] of all vilains / and the heroic deeds of the dead heroes: / truly a rich source of courtoisie." Jean de Meun by no means questions the importance and function of the aristocracy or knights, but we cannot overlook his indication that a man who earns his living by working with his hands is not for that reason a *vilain*; nor can we ignore his indication that many heroes of ancient times were of lowly birth. Still more important: he proclaims the principle of the *vita activa,* the "active life." *Paresse,* "laziness," and *noblesse* are incompatible. To be sure, his main concern with respect to the nobility or knights is military activity. However, the truly noble man must emulate Duke Robert d'Artois, the brother of Louis IX, Saint Louis, who was killed during the Seventh Crusade. He must never be idle, must be educated, and must actively practice "largece [*largesse*—M. N.], eneur [honor—M. N.], chevalerie."[64] With this affirmation of the *vita activa,* a polemic directed against the idle aristocracy, the ideological ground is prepared for a critique of the fairy-tale-like, irrational knightly *aventure*; on this ground will grow parodies, such as *Dit d'aventures* (the first parody of the knightly romance, as Mikhail Bakhtin has determined),[65] written as early as the thirteenth century. In this work, literary and bourgeois self-awareness is expressed in implicit and explicit criticism of the courtly ideology of *aventure* from the *Roman de Renart,* in its different variations, all the way down to *Ulenspiegel* (ca. 1478) and *Reinke de Vos* (1498).[66]

If we are kept waiting a rather long time for a positive model of the bourgeois ideal of humanity, that can be attributed to the development of the class struggle, which led to the previously described forms of appropriation of courtly culture. Then too, no group within the bourgeoisie had yet asserted itself as an avant-garde of the rising class or had been recognized by the bourgeoisie as its own avant-garde. The fact that the shipping merchant and the shipping trade played a relatively subordinate role in general can only be attributed to the fractionating of the bourgeoisie in the Middle Ages, to which Armando Sapori correctly calls attention. Sapori distinguishes (in the case of Italy) between the world of the artisans and their apprentices and the world of the avant-garde, as he calls it, the world of the great or long-distance merchants and their trade organizations.[67] If the ideologues of the medieval bourgeoisie viewed the great merchants and their trade organizations with some reservation, that was because they were not yet able to see in them the major representatives of their own interests, because long-distance trade was in fact not yet the power that was to revolutionize all social relations; moreover, the world of large-scale trade (chiefly in Italy, but

also in France) touched the world of the nobles, was allied with it, was in part even identical with it, which brought still other ideological factors into play (characterized by distrust).[68] Not until the great nobility or the princes and kings and the bourgeoisie began to face each other as antagonistic but mutually dependent classes in the battle against the petty nobility and the small feudal lords did the position of the merchant or the long-distance merchant gradually change in the bourgeois consciousness or in the literary articulation of that consciousness.

It is characteristic that the common weal, the good of the country (that is, of the gradually developing nation-states) is in the foreground from the very beginning. Thus we read at the beginning of the fourteenth century, in Gilles de Muisit's *C'est les marchands* (On Merchants):

> No country can hold its own by its own strength;
> For that reason the merchants struggle and strive
> To bring what is lacking in the lands to all lands;
> For that reason one must never drive them out without cause.
> The merchants travel over the sea and back,
> In order to provide for the lands and to be loved by their own kind.
> And good merchants do nothing one could blame them for,
> But rather act so that one loves them and considers them loyal and good.
> They cause care and love to bloom in all lands,
> And for that reason one should rejoice when they become rich.[69]

And we read in *Dit des marchands*

> that one must honor merchants
> More than all other people,
> Because they travel over land and sea
> And into many foreign countries
> To buy gray and many-colored wool
> . . . . . .
> May God protect all merchants from harm
> . . . . . .
> The Holy Church was first founded by merchants,
> And know, that knights are to protect the merchants[70]

because merchants guarantee the necessary luxuries.

Fortunatus

It is relevant that bourgeois self-awareness showed an especially strong develop-

ment where social relations had made the most revolutionary turn toward commercial capitalism, that is, in Italy; bourgeois self-awareness there had developed by delimiting itself from the knightly nobility and its ideology as well as by adapting knightly-courtly thinking or by conserving or imitating noble ways of life (especially where the nobility itself was the carrier of commerical capitalism). It was a self-contradictory mix of ideologemes, as we saw in the case of Machiavelli; that is explained by the anarchic conditions in Italy. We will not go into detail about the Italian development here, because it contributed less to the formation of the modern bourgeois worldview(s) and hence had less effect on the formation of the modern bourgeois ideology of adventure than intellectual history would have had us believe up to now. Its contribution is largely indirect.

To avoid misunderstandings: it is of course impossible to place too high a value on Italy's contribution, and the contribution of the Italian Renaissance from Dante on, to the formation of modern European philosophy, literature, and art, but this contribution lost its preeminence at the latest by the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century. This is a process that began as early as the early sixteenth century, with the formation of the absolutist-bourgeois national cultures or literatures in England and France, but also with the later interrupted development in Germany as well as in Portugal and Spain. The reasons for this are not to be found in philosophy, in art, or in literature. The movement of the superstructure, its development, is dependent on the development of the ensemble of social relations, and that means on the development of the human being, and in the "final" (or first) analysis, that is determined by economic development, the development of the forces of production and of the relations of production or social relations that are changed or revolutionized thereby. But toward the end of the fifteenth century at the latest, from the time of the discovery of the New World and of the European-East Indian trade route around the Cape of Good Hope, the center of the capitalist means of production shifted from Italy and the Mediterranean to Portugal, Spain, England, the Netherlands, and France (the development in Germany was also decisively affected by this historical event). That means that in areas which were somewhat backwards compared to Italy, the development of the forces of production was continued beyond the Italian relations of production; in other words, it was in these areas, and not in Italy, that the foundations of modern capitalism were laid (after the decline of Portugal and Spain in the second half of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth ceutury, this occurred especially in England, the Netherlands, and France). The development of the forces of production and the revolution in the relations of production it entailed in these countries called for norms and methods of intellectual discussion, of knowledge, of orientation, which could not develop in Italy or could develop only in rudiments because of the lack of a corresponding material development and hence of the necessity for dealing with it intellectually. The (very dynamic) relationship of the revolutionary

class, the bourgeoisie, in the countries where modern capitalism prevailed was therefore that of a beneficiary vis-à-vis Italy and its culture. That is, the economic and political development of Italy until the sixteenth century was more advanced, had gone further in the direction of capitalism and the breaking of feudal bonds than all other European countries, and had therefore produced a correspondingly progressive superstructure. But as soon as this development was not only overtaken by the other countries but also began to stagnate, these other countries were able to become the cultural, ideological, political heirs of Italy (and that means of the Italian Renaissance). Of course the intellectual development of Italy (like its economic development) did not come crashing to a halt, but from the end of the seventeenth century on Italy has been one of the economic-political, as well as intellectual, provinces of Europe. Italy's contribution to the formation of the modern worldview from the middle or end of the seventeenth century on is relatively insignificant (this changes somewhat only in the twentieth century); its important share lies in the Renaissance, whose accomplishments were passed on into the modern age by the bourgeoisie in the developed capitalist states before the working class began to appropriate and preserve them for itself (as has been shown by Gramsci, for instance).

The beginning of this (world-historical) shift of the center of European economic and intellectual development from the Mediterranean area to the west and northwest of Europe is reflected in a small novel that has only recently started to receive more attention but whose overall importance still has not, I believe, been properly appreciated. This novel is the anonymous *Fortunatus*, published in 1509 in Augsburg and doubtless written immediately before;[71] its title already expresses the changed consciousness of the modern European bourgeoisie as compared to the (commercial) bourgeois thought of the Italian Renaissance.

In order to illuminate the dimensions of this change in consciousness, we shall use Leon Battista Alberti's treatise *Della Famiglia* (1434) as an example. Alberti's work is informed by his zeal to deliver proof of the social and moral importance of his family. According to his presentation, this family has every imaginable quality and virtue, is decent, diligent, socially minded, and conscious of its duty to the nation. The ideal burgher whom Alberti draws in *Della Famiglia* is the exact counterpart of Machiavelli's ideal prince: knightly virtues (the affirmation of physical preparation for battle as part of the education of children and youths by means of such activities as archery and riding) are joined with nonknightly ideals (thrift, endurance, diligence, and bookkeeping). The remarks of Gianozzo Alberti are characteristic of this ambivalent attitude toward these spheres of ideal social virtues that basically reflect class antagonisms. In the dialogue he answers with a genealogical enumeration the question whether all the Albertis were knights by birth (or whether they were simply called knights because of their merits): "But enough of this genealogy which has nothing to do with our discussion of good management."[72]

Alberti's efforts to prove the value and importance of his family are augmented by the fear that it could lose that importance, could disappear from history like so many famous families before it. According to Alberti, the fault for this would then lie exclusively with bad luck, fate, accident—in short, with fickle Fortuna. In fact, in the concept of Fortuna is concentrated the whole self-understanding of the (commercial) burgher of the Italian Renaissance with respect to this world and the next and to social relations, especially to the historical class antagonisms in Italy.[73] From the viewpoint of the (commercial) burgher of the Italian Renaissance, the human being (that is, himself, the burgher) is subject to the will of blind Fortuna, the planetary constellations, accident (of unstable relations), the will of God (or that of the relevant prince).[74] The burgher is still fundamentally passive over against Fortuna (that is, he does not yet fully dominate society). Alfred Doren is correct in stating that Alberti's *Della Famiglia* is an

> attempt to protect himself and others from the seductive demons who again and again enticed one onto the dangerous paths of the world, of the incalculable, of adventure, and in this attempt he seemed, at least in literature, to confine the endangered ego to a stuffy, closed room, protected from any kind of draft, which was broken open over and over by the lively, active human being.[75]

This does not, to be sure, exhaust all of Alberti, because in *Della Famiglia* he also gives instructions on how to subjugate Fortuna (which also give a clear indication of his fear of her), and in other writings he expresses himself in a still more aggressive and derogatory way about her (he even speaks of her weakness when one confronts her decisively).[76] Other documents of the time doubtlessly also show a more decisive, daring attitude toward Fortuna,[77] in accordance with which the "new entrepreneur [is] at once a world conqueror and a carefully alert, cautiously pondering paterfamilias, trusting to Fortuna's favor, who fills his sails with wind as he, a virtuoso of life, his hand firmly on the tiller, guides the little boat of his fate and his business enterprises through stormy waves."[78] But this new orientation, present at first only in its bare beginnings, comes too late, from a world-historical point of view. It is not the Italian bourgeoisie but that of other countries that will conquer the world and thus subjugate Fortuna, a process the anonymous author of *Fortunatus* portrays in a fairy tale (which seems naïve to its interpreters of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).

As we have mentioned, the changed consciousness of the bourgeoisie active in large-scale European trade, its consciousness of being definitively superior to the petty nobility, the knights, of interacting as near equals with the representatives of the upper nobility, of if not dominating the king, at least manipulating him, is expressed by the name of the protagonist and in the novel's title: Fortunatus, "Fortuna's chosen." Fortuna in (allegorical) person plays only a

relatively modest role in the novel. She shows herself once for a short time to the active, daring man who earns her favor, since she needs to reveal herself and give herself only once to the bourgeois(ie), because her appearance (in the novel or in the history of the class struggle) is no longer necessary. The burgher has control of her, rules her in his activity, knows how he can constantly "exploit" her anew: she is present in all his actions, and where she evades him, this is not because of some obscure, impenetrable error of blind Fortuna but because of demonstrable practical errors made by the burgher or the bourgeoisie.

But let us proceed systematically: Fortunatus—the son of bourgeois, rather well-to-do parents who have lost their fortune through the carelessness of the father, who wanted to live too high in knightly fashion—sees no future for himself in his hometown, Famagusta on Cyprus. He sets out for distant lands, after many adventures arrives in London, is exiled from that country, arrives in France, gets lost in a deep wood in Brittany, there meets Fortuna who gives him a "little moneybag"; he wanders throughout Europe, settles again in Famagusta, and starts a family. After a while he sets out again, leaving his wife and his two sons, Ampedo and Andolosia, behind, heading for Greece, Asia Minor, and India. He returns after having stolen a "wishing cap" from King Soldan of Alexandria, which lets him wish himself to anyplace he wants. Fortunatus dies; contrary to his will, which stated that moneybag and wishing cap should never be separated, his sons fight about the inheritance. The outcome is that Ampedo stays in Famagusta with the cap and Andolosia, who wants to travel, sets off on adventures with the moneybag. He promises to return after six years and then give his brother the magic purse for the same amount of time. Andolosia arrives in London on his travels, where the royal princess Agrippina steals his bag. Andolosia returns to Cyprus, steals the wishing cap, and wishes himself back to London. There he at first loses the wishing cap to Agrippina as well, but then with trickery and magic he regains the magic cap and the magic purse and becomes so indispensable to the King of England that he himself arranges the marriage of Agrippina to the "young king of Cyprus." After the wedding, however, he is captured by two counts and murdered. But the magic of the moneybag is tied to Fortunatus or his biological heirs. Thus, the magic purse loses its power because in the meantime Andolosia's brother has died of chagrin; before his death he destroyed the wishing cap. The king orders the two counts, who have betrayed themselves, executed and buries Andolosia with full ceremony in Famagusta.

We will not examine all the details of this work, which was among the most widely read novels from the sixteenth into the eighteenth century,[79] but some aspects of it are very significant for our theme. *Fortunatus*, as recent scholarship (non-Marxist as well) unanimously agrees, has "torn away from the family its sentimental veil and has reduced the family relation" and all other human feelings and ties "to a mere money relation."[80] The "nexus between man and

man" is nothing other than "naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment,'"[81] about which both Fortunatus and Andolosia speak.[82] Where there is no money, "all love is gone."[83]

In this undisguised equation of human relationships and "cash payment" relations in *Fortunatus*, we see the relative helplessness on the part of the anonymous author, who does not really understand the actual monetary and exchange economy of his epoch and merely diagnoses its magical effect. Moneychanging is mentioned in only two places, once in a polemical way: a young Florentine merchant deceives his father with the uncanny means of exchange,[84] and once in a mystifying, fairy-tale way: the moneybag has been stolen from Fortunatus, and in looking for it, he says, "I care more about the bag than about the money I've lost. There is a little letter of exchange in it that no one can get a pennyworth of use from."[85] Even the "place where the moneychangers and purchasers were"[86] serves only as background for a new draw of money from the inexhaustible magic purse. From this perspective we can understand why the anonymous author had recourse to the fairy tale of the magic bag, although at the same time one must assume (the "wishing cap" theme suggests this too, as we will see) that he is consciously using mystification, since the author is obviously not in a position to cloak and to justify what he verifies as the importance and effect of early capitalist monetarism with an adequate bourgeois ethic.

The Pimp as Financial Expert

If we start by observing only the path of Fortunatus's life, we will see that the decisive events of his life have to do with shipping and take place in harbor towns,[87] from his birth in the harbor town of Famagusta to London, Venice, Alexandria, back to Famagusta, where he dies. But the development of social relations that the anonymous author tries to present begins before the birth of Fortunatus. His father, Theodorus, is a well-to-do burgher who lives from land rents. We are not told how his ancestors acquired property, but Theodorus, who leads a life of leisure, imitates the life style of the nobility, with "jousting, tilting, many squires, expensive horses," which leads to the sale of his inheritance and hence to his ruin. Fortunatus tries to evade poverty and goes to sea: "a ship was just in port, a ship from Venice that was carrying pilgrims to Jerusalem."[88]

The importance of the Crusades for the development of trade has already been mentioned; the beginning of the (individual) rise of Fortunatus is logically embedded in this historical context of the origin of long-distance trade. It is important for our purposes that it is not a vague desire to see distant lands that drive Fortunatus into the world, but instead the wish for a better life: "I am young, strong, and healthy, I want to go to foreign lands and serve. There is still much fortune in this world, I hope to God, I will get my share of it."[89] His course lead

him to London, "where merchants from all over the world are now located, plying their trade."[90] There Fortunatus enters the service of a Florentine merchant, who hires him immediately. "He was to load goods into the ships and when ships came, to unload them."[91]

Fortunatus is then exiled from the land because of a murder in which he is indirectly involved, through his connection to a business friend of his master. He has already learned the essential thing: that it is not so much a matter of possession, not even the possession of money, but of the increase of this possession. Every time he earns money, he spends it and is ruined, so that the pimp of the prostitute with whom Fortunatus ran through his money gives him this lesson: "What kind of fool are you, who had five hundred kroner and didn't invest them in another merchant treasure, but instead spent them on the stupid woman."[92]

The Magic Purse of Fortunatus

We can sum up as follows: to the anonymous author of *Fortunatus* two things are clear, though of course not in this terminology nor with this sharp focus. First, "Greed as such is impossible without money; all other kinds of accumulation and mania for accumulation appear as primitive, restricted by needs on the one hand and by the restricted nature of products on the other."[93] This restricted nature is what caused the downfall of the nobility, as well as that of Fortunatus's father, who imitated the nobility. Second, the exclusive accumulation of gold and silver, of money, while it puts one in the position to be able to spend, "is the first historic appearance of the gathering-together of capital and the first great means thereto,"[94] but the wealth so gathered together always tends to decrease unless it is constantly increased (at least by the amount of expenditures). "For that, the reentry of what has been accumulated into circulation would itself have to be posited as the moment and the means of accumulation."[95]

This is precisely the lesson that the pimp gave Fortunatus. Fortunatus understands that money must breed money, and since he is the product of his author, we can conclude that the author knows that money as commercial capital breeds money. He even knows with what means one must operate in buying and selling goods in order to receive the highest profits. He seems not to know or not to want to know only one thing: how it is possible at the time of writing *Fortunatus* to earn more money than one needs to live, in order to invest it. The conversion of money as a means of exchange into money as capital is a mystery to the author. He sends Fortunatus to the fairy-tale Breton wood, where he meets the "lady of luck," Fortuna, who gives him the magic purse: "Take this little bag and whenever you reach into it (in whatever country you are or travel to, whatever currency is used in that country), you will find ten pieces of gold in the currency of that same country."[96]

(Assuming the anon author is an absolute authority.)

From the Mad Capitalist to the Rational Miser

The anonymous author of *Fortunatus* killed two flies with one blow by reaching into the chest of fairy tales: first, the magic purse obviates the difficult explanation of economic interconnections; second, it allows him to use a fairy-tale justification for the (bourgeois) wealth of a few and thus—since it is a gift of fate, of Fortuna—the poverty of many. The wealth of the burgher Fortunatus is explained by a fairy tale: he travels throughout Europe with an adviser named Lüpoldus and a train of servants, visiting especially trading and harbor cities. If we ask ourselves what burghers of that time actually traveled in this manner and with this kind of accompaniment through Europe, we will find that it was the merchants who did so and that Fortunatus therefore represents the medieval merchant, who was still running risks in person and enduring adventures.[97]

As corresponds to the general development of the rising (continental) bourgeoisie in the early Middle Ages, Fortunatus sees social equality with the upper nobility as a worthwhile goal. While his father wasted his property in competition with the petty or knightly nobility, Fortunatus employs his (inexhaustible) fortune to build magnificent spiritual and temporal edifices in his home town, Famagusta, to which he had returned.[98] He decides to marry, and here too we see the historical sense of the anonymous author: the rising bourgeoisie is of greatest importance for the country's prince or king, who gives it privileges which are in no way inferior to those of the nobility or who elevates it into the nobility. The King of Cyprus insists that Fortunatus marry into the nobility and mediates the marriage with Cassandra, daughter of an impoverished count. The marriage meets considerable resistance in the count's family, which distrusts the modern sign of wealth, money.[99] In recounting this resistance, the count gives voice to economic reason (of the past): "He has neither land nor retinue," the count says to the King of Cyprus, "whether he had or has much money, you see that he has spent a great deal on buildings that do no good, so he might lose what he has and become poor, as his father did, for it happens very quickly that a large amount of money disappears."[100] That is correct in principle, but the means of prevention that especially the countess, the mother-in-law, demands,[101] is not very clever: Fortunatus is to buy "land and retinue," that is, he is to become a feudal lord. In reality, however, "land and retinue" at that time (with regional variations in development) had become a millstone around the neck of the nobility, pulling it down in its competition with the bourgeoisie. The proof—apart from the poverty of the countess herself—is evident in Fortunatus's buying the property of the Count of Ligorno because the Count "is in need and has to have money."[102]

Thus it is by no means "highly illogical," as Dieter Kartschoke believes,[103] that Fortunatus lets his money "work," that is, invests it in traded goods although he has an inexhaustible magic moneybag; on the contrary, it could b

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Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas
(Mare Liberum) [1608]
trans. Ralph van Deman Magoffin.
(NY: Oxford U. Press, 1916)

CAPVT I

Iure gentium quibusvis ad quosvis liberam esse navigationem

Propositum est nobis breviter ac dilucide demonstrare ius esse Batavis, hoc est, Ordinum Foederatorum Belgico-Germaniae subditis ad Indos, ita uti navigant navigare, cumque ipsis commercia colere. Fundamentum struemus hanc iuris gentium, quod primarium vocant regulam certissimam, cuius perspicua atque immutabilis est ratio; licere cuivis genti quamvis alteram adire, cumque ea negotiari.

Deus hoc ipse per naturam loquitur, cum ea cuncta quibus vita indiget, omnibus locis suppeditari a natura non vult: artibus etiam aliis alias gentes dat excellere. Quo ista, nisi quod voluit mutua egestate et copia humanas foveri amicitias, ne singuli se putantes sibi ipsis sufficere, hoc ipso redderentur insociabiles? Nunc factum est ut gens altera alterius suppleret inopiam, divinae iustitiae instituto, ut eo modo (sicut Plinius dicit[1]) quod genitum esset uspiam, apud omnes natum videretur. Poetas itaque canentes audimus:

Nec vero terrae ferre omnes omnia possunt.[2]

Item:

Excudent alii,

et quae sequuntur.[3]

[1] Panegyricus 29, 2: quod genitum esset usquam, id apud omnes natum esse videtur.
[2] Vergil, Georgica II, 109.
[3] Vergil, Aeneis VI, 847-853.

CHAPTER I

By the Law of Nations navigation is free to all persons whatsoever

My intention is to demonstrate briefly and clearly that the Dutch—that is to say, the subjects of the United Netherlands—have the right to sail to the East Indies, as they are now doing, and to engage in trade with the people there. I shall base my argument on the following most specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.

God Himself says this speaking through the voice of nature; and inasmuch as it is not His will to have Nature supply every place with all the necessaries of life, He ordains that some nations excel in one art and others in another. Why is this His will, except it be that He wished human friendships to be engendered by mutual needs and resources, lest individuals deeming themselves entirely sufficient unto themselves should for that very reason be rendered unsociable? So by the decree of divine justice it was brought about that one people should supply the needs of another, in order, as Pliny the Roman writer says,[1] that in this way, whatever has been produced anywhere should seem to have been destined for all. Vergil also sings in this wise:

"Not every plant on every soil will grow," [2]

and in another place:

"Let others better mould the running mass
Of metals," etc.[3]

[1] Panegyric 29, 2.
[2] Georgics II, 109 [Dryden's translation, II, 154].
[3] Aeneid VI, 847-853 [Dryden's translation, VI, 1168-1169].

Hoc igitur qui tollunt, illam laudatissimam tollunt humani generis societatem, tollunt mutuas benefaciendi occasiones, naturam denique ipsam violant. Nam et ille quem Deus terris circumfudit Oceanus, undique et undique versus navigabilis, et ventorum stati aut extraordinarii flatus, non ab eadem semper, et a nulla non aliquando regione spirantes, nonne significant satis concessum a natura cunctis gentibus ad cunctas aditum? Hoc Seneca [1] summum Naturae beneficium putat, quod et vento gentes locis dissipatas miscuit, et sua omnia in regiones ita descripsit, ut necessarium mortalibus esset inter ipsos commercium. Hoc igitur ius ad cunctas gentes aequaliter pertinet: quod clarissimi Iurisconsulti [2] eo usque producunt, ut negent ullam rempublicam aut Principem prohibere in universum posse, quo minus alii ad subditos suos accedant, et cum illis negotientur. Hinc ius descendit hospitale sanctissimum: hinc querelae:

Quod genus hoc hominum? quaeve hunc tam barbara morem
Permittit patria? hospitio prohibemur harenae. [3]

Et alibi

. . . . . *litusque rogamus*
Innocuum et cunctis undamque auramque patentem. [4]

Et scimus bella quaedam ex hac causa coepisse, ut Me-

[1] Naturales Quaestiones III, IV.
[2] Institutes II, 1 (De rerum divisione, § 1); Digest 1, 8, 4 (eod. tit., L. Nemo igitur); cf. Gentilis, De jure belli I, 19; cf. Code IV, 63, 4 (De commerciis, L. Mercatores).
[3] Vergil, Aeneis I, 539-540.
[4] Vergil, Aeneis VII, 229-230.

Those therefore who deny this law, destroy this most praiseworthy bond of human fellowship, remove the opportunities for doing mutual service, in a word do violence to Nature herself. For do not the ocean, navigable in every direction with which God has encompassed all the earth, and the regular and the occasional winds which blow now from one quarter and now from another, offer sufficient proof that Nature has given to all peoples a right of access to all other peoples? Seneca [1] thinks this is Nature's greatest service, that by the wind she united the widely scattered peoples, and yet did so distribute all her products over the earth that commercial intercourse was a necessity to mankind. Therefore this right belongs equally to all nations. Indeed the most famous jurists [2] extend its application so far as to deny that any state or any ruler can debar foreigners from having access to their subjects and trading with them. Hence is derived that law of hospitality which is of the highest sanctity; hence the complaint of the poet Vergil:

"What men, what monsters, what inhuman race,
What laws, what barbarous customs of the place,
Shut up a desert shore to drowning men,
And drive us to the cruel seas again." [3]

And:

"To beg what you without your want may spare—
The common water, and the common air." [4]

We know that certain wars have arisen over this very matter; such for example as the war of the Megarians against the

[1] Natural Questions III, IV.
[2] Institutes II, 1; Digest I, 8, 4; cf. Gentilis, De jure belli I, 19; cf. Code IV, 63, 4 [Grotius refers particularly to his famous predecessor Albericus Gentilis (1552-1608), an Italian who came to England and was appointed to the chair of Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford. He published his De Jure Belli in 1588].
[3] Aeneid I, 539-540 [Dryden's translation, I, 760-763].
[4] Aeneid VII, 229-230 [Dryden's translation, VII, 313-314].

arensibus in Athenienses,[1] Bononiensibus in Venetos,[2] Cas-
llanis etiam in Americanos has iustas potuisse belli causas
se, et ceteris probabiliores Victoria putat,[3] si peregrinari
; degere apud illos prohiberentur, si arcerentur a partici-
atione earum rerum quae iure gentium aut moribus com-
unia sunt, si denique ad commercia non admitterentur.

Cui simile est quod in Mosis[4] historia et inde apud
ugustinum legimus,[5] iusta bella Israelitas contra Amor-
aeos gessisse, quia innoxius transitus denegabatur; qui
VRE HVMANAE SOCIETATIS aequissimo patere
ebebat. Et hoc nomine Hercules Orchomeniorum, Graeci
ib Agamemnone Mysorum Regi arma intulerunt,[6] quasi
bera essent naturaliter itinera, ut Baldus dixit.[7] Accusan-

[1] Diodorus Siculus XI; Plutarch, Pericles XXIX, 4.
[2] Sigonius, De regno Italiae.
[3] Victoria, De Indis II, n. 1-7; Covarruvias, in c. Peccatum, § 9, n. 4, ibi
inta.
[4] Numbers XXI, 21-26.
[5] Augustinus, Locutionum IV (de Numeris), 44; Et Estius, c. ult. 23, 4, 2.
[6] Sophocles, Trachiniae.
[7] Baldus de Ubaldis, Consilia III, 293.

Athenians,[1] and that of the Bolognese against the Venetians.[2] Again, Victoria [3] holds that the Spaniards could have shown just reasons for making war upon the Aztecs and the Indians in America, more plausible reasons certainly than were alleged, if they really were prevented from traveling or sojourning among those peoples, and were denied the right to share in those things which by the Law of Nations or by Custom are common to all, and finally if they were debarred from trade.

We read of a similar case in the history of Moses,[4] which we find mentioned also in the writings of Augustine,[5] where the Israelites justly smote with the edge of the sword the Amorites because they had denied the Israelites an innocent passage through their territory, a right which according to the Law of Human Society ought in all justice to have been allowed. In defense of this principle Hercules attacked the king of Orchomenus in Boeotia; and the Greeks under their leader Agamemnon waged war against the king of Mysia [6] on the ground that, as Baldus [7] has said, high roads were free

[1] Diodorus Siculus XI; Plutarch, Pericles XXIX, 4. [The Athenian decree prohibiting the Megarians from trading with Athens or any part of the Athenian Empire was one of the leading causes of the Peloponnesian War.]
[2] Carlo Sigonio [(1523-1584), an Italian humanist, in his work] On the Kingdom of Italy.
[3] Victoria, De Indis II, n. 1-7; Covarruvias, in c. Peccatum, § 9, n. 4, ibi Quinta [Franciscus de Victoria (1480-1546), the famous Spanish Scholastic, a Dominican, and Professor of Theology at Salamanca from 1521 until his death. His thirteen Relectiones (De Indis is no. V) were published ('vitiosa et corrupta') in 1557 after his death; the 1686 Cologne edition is held to be the best.
Diego Covarruvias (1512-1577), styled the Bartolo of Spain. He should probably be credited with formulating the reform decrees of the Council of Trent. The 5 vol. Antwerp 1762 edition of his works is the best.]
[4] Numbers XXI, 21-26.
[5] Locutionum IV (on Numbers), 44; Estius, c. ult. 23, 4, 2 [Estius (?-1613) was a Dutch commentator on the Epistles of St. Paul and on the works of St. Augustine].
[6] [Grotius refers to the Trachiniae of Sophocles, but probably from memory, for there is no such reference in that play.]
[7] Baldus de Ubaldis, Consilia III, 293 [Baldus (1327-1406) was a pupil of the great Bartolus].

turque a Germanis apud Tacitum[1] Romani, quod colloquia congressusque gentium arcerent, fluminaque et terras et coelum quodam modo ipsum clauderent. Nec ullus titulus Christianis quondam in Saracenos magis placuit, quam quod per illos terrae Iudaeae aditu arcerentur.[2]

Sequitur ex sententia Lusitanos etiamsi domini essent earum regionum ad quas Batavi proficiscuntur, iniuriam tamen facturos si aditum Batavis et mercatum praecluderent.

Quanto igitur iniquius est volentes aliquos a volentium populorum commercio secludi, illorum opera quorum in potestate nec populi isti sunt, nec illud ipsum, qua iter est, quando latrones etiam et piratas non alio magis nomine detestamur, quam quod illi hominum inter se commeatus obsident atque infestant?

[1] Tacitus, Historiae IV, 64.

[2] Andreas Alciatus, Commentaria VII, 130; Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, p. 2 § 9; Bartolus on Code I, 11 (De paganis, L. 1).

by nature. Again, as we read in Tacitus,[1] the Germans accused the Romans of 'preventing all intercourse between them and of closing up to them the rivers and roads, and almost the very air of heaven'. When in days gone by the Christians made crusades against the Saracens, no other pretext was so welcome or so plausible as that they were denied by the infidels free access to the Holy Land.[2]

It follows therefore that the Portuguese, even if they had been sovereigns in those parts to which the Dutch make voyages, would nevertheless be doing them an injury if they should forbid them access to those places and from trading there.

Is it not then an incalculably greater injury for nations which desire reciprocal commercial relations to be debarred therefrom by the acts of those who are sovereigns neither of the nations interested, nor of the element over which their connecting high road runs? Is not that the very cause which for the most part prompts us to execrate robbers and pirates, namely, that they beset and infest our trade routes?

[1] Histories IV, 64 [In connection with the revolt of Civilis].

[2] Andrea Alciati, Commentaria VII, 130; Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, p. 9 § 9; Bartolus on Code I, 11 [Alciati (1492-1550) was made Comes Palatinus by the Emperor Charles V, and offered a Cardinal's hat by Pope Paul III, which he refused, but he did become a Protonotarius Apostolicus].

[Captain] Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power: Present and Future (1897) (Freeport, NY, 1970).

HAWAII AND OUR FUTURE SEA POWER.

[The origin of the ensuing article was as follows: At the time of the Revolution in Hawaii, at the beginning of 1893, the author addressed to the "New York Times" a letter, which appeared in the issue of January 31. This, falling under the eye of the Editor of the "Forum," suggested to him to ask an article upon the general military — or naval — value of the Hawaiian group. The letter alluded to ran thus: —

To the Editor of the "New York Times": —

There is one aspect of the recent revolution in Hawaii which seems to have been kept out of sight, and that is the relation of the islands, not merely to our own and to European countries, but to China. How vitally important that may become in the future is evident from the great number of Chinese, relatively to the whole population, now settled in the islands.

It is a question for the whole civilized world and not for the United States only, whether the Sandwich Islands, with their geographical and military importance, unrivalled by that of any other position in the North Pacific, shall in the future be an outpost of European civilization, or of the comparative barbarism of China. It is sufficiently known, but not, perhaps, generally noted in our country, that many military men abroad, familiar with Eastern conditions and character, look with apprehension toward the day when the vast mass of China — now inert — may yield to one of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion. The great armies of Europe, whose existence is so frequently deplored, may be

providentially intended as a barrier to that great movement, if it come. Certainly, while China remains as she is, nothing more disastrous for the future of the world can be imagined than that general disarmament of Europe which is the Utopian dream of some philanthropists.

China, however, may burst her barriers eastward as well as westward, toward the Pacific as well as toward the European Continent. In such a movement it would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous issues dependent upon a firm hold of the Sandwich Islands by a great, civilized, maritime power. By its nearness to the scene, and by the determined animosity to the Chinese movement which close contact seems to inspire, our own country, with its Pacific coast, is naturally indicated as the proper guardian for this most important position. To hold it, however, whether in the supposed case or in war with a European state, implies a great extension of our naval power. Are we ready to undertake this?

A. T. MAHAN,
Captain, United States Navy.

NEW YORK, Jan. 30, 1893.]

THE suddenness — so far, at least, as the general public is concerned — with which the long-existing troubles in Hawaii have come to a head, and the character of the advances reported to be addressed to the United States by the revolutionary government, formally recognized as *de facto* by our representative on the spot, add another to the many significant instances furnished by history, that, as men in the midst of life are in death, so nations in the midst of peace find themselves confronted with unexpected causes of dissension, conflicts of interests, whose results may be, on the one hand, war, or, on the other, abandonment of clear and imperative national advantage in order to avoid an issue for which preparation has not been made. By no premeditated contrivance of our own, by the cooperation of a series of events which, however dependent step by step upon human action, were not intended to prepare the present crisis, the United States finds herself compelled to answer a question — to make a decision — not unlike and not less momentous than that required of the Roman senate, when the Mamertine garrison invited it to occupy Messina, and so to abandon the hitherto traditional policy which had confined the expansion of Rome to the Italian peninsula. For let it not be overlooked that, whether we wish or no, we *must* answer the question, we *must* make the decision. The issue cannot be dodged. Absolute inaction in such a case is a decision as truly as the most vehement action. We can now advance, but, the conditions of the world being what they are, if we do not advance we recede; for there is involved not so much a particular

action as a question of principle, pregnant of great consequences in one direction or in the other.

Occasion of serious difficulty, indeed, should not arise here. Unlike the historical instance just cited, the two nations whose interests have come now into contact — Great Britain and the United States — are so alike in inherited traditions, habits of thought, and views of right, that injury to the one need not be anticipated from the predominance of the other in a quarter where its interests also predominate. Despite the heterogeneous character of the immigration which the past few years have been pouring into our country, our political traditions and racial characteristics still continue English — Mr. Douglas Campbell would say Dutch, but even so the stock is the same. Though thus somewhat gorged with food not wholly to its taste, our political digestion has contrived so far to master the incongruous mass of materials it has been unable to reject; and if assimilation has been at times imperfect, our political constitution and spirit remain English in essential features. Imbued with like ideals of liberty, of law, of right, cer-

tainly not less progressive than our kin beyond sea, we are, in the safeguards deliberately placed around our fundamental law, even more conservative than they. That which we received of the true spirit of freedom we have kept — liberty and law — not the one or the other, but both. In that spirit we not only have occupied our original inheritance, but also, step by step, as Rome incorporated the other nations of the peninsula, we have added to it, spreading and perpetuating everywhere the same foundation principles of free and good government which, to her honor be it said, Great Britain also has maintained throughout her course. And now, arrested on the south by the rights of a race wholly alien to us, and on the north by a body of states of like traditions to our own, whose freedom to choose their own affiliations we respect, we have come to the sea. In our infancy we bordered upon the Atlantic only; our youth carried our boundary to the Gulf of Mexico; to-day maturity sees us upon the Pacific. Have we no right or no call to progress farther in any direction? Are there for us beyond the sea horizon none of those essential interests, of those evident

dangers, which impose a policy and confer rights?

This is the question that long has been looming upon the brow of a future now rapidly passing into the present. Of it the Hawaiian incident is a part — intrinsically, perhaps, a small part — but in its relations to the whole so vital that, as has been said before, a wrong decision does not stand by itself, but involves, not only in principle but in fact, recession along the whole line. In our natural, necessary, irrepressible expansion, we are come here into contact with the progress of another great people, the law of whose being has impressed upon it a principle of growth which has wrought mightily in the past, and in the present is visible by recurring manifestations. Of this working, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, Aden, India, in geographical succession though not in strict order of time, show a completed chain; forged link by link, by open force or politic bargain, but always resulting from the steady pressure of a national instinct, so powerful and so accurate that statesmen of every school, willing or unwilling, have found themselves carried along by a tendency which no individuality can resist or greatly modify. Both unsubstantial rumor and incautious personal utterance have suggested an impatient desire in Mr. Gladstone to be rid of the occupation of Egypt; but scarcely has his long exclusion from office ended when the irony of events signalizes his return thereto by an increase in the force of occupation. Further, it may be noted profitably of the chain just cited, that the two extremities were first possessed — first India, then Gibraltar, far later Malta, Aden, Cyprus, Egypt — and that, with scarce an exception, each step has been taken despite the jealous vexation of a rival. Spain has never ceased angrily to bewail Gibraltar. "I had rather see the English on the heights of Montmartre," said the first Napoleon, "than in Malta." The feelings of France about Egypt are matter of common knowledge, not even dissembled; and, for our warning be it added, her annoyance is increased by the bitter sense of opportunity rejected.

It is needless here to do more than refer to that other chain of maritime possessions — Halifax, Bermuda, Santa Lucia, Jamaica — which strengthen the British hold upon the Atlantic,

the Caribbean, and the Isthmus of Panama. In the Pacific the position is for them much less satisfactory — nowhere, perhaps, is it less so, and from obvious natural causes. The commercial development of the eastern Pacific has been far later, and still is less complete, than that of its western shores. The latter when first opened to European adventure were already the seat of ancient economies in China and Japan, furnishing abundance of curious and luxurious products to tempt the trader by good hopes of profit. The western coast of America, for the most part peopled by savages, offered little save the gold and silver of Mexico and Peru, and these were monopolized jealously by the Spaniards — not a commercial nation — during their long ascendency. Being so very far from England and affording so little material for trade, Pacific America did not draw the enterprise of a country the chief and honorable inducement of whose seamen was the hope of gain, in pursuit of which they settled and annexed point after point in the regions where they penetrated, and upon the routes leading thither. The western coasts of North America, being reached only by the long

and perilous voyage around Cape Horn, or by a more toilsome and dangerous passage across the continent, remained among the last of the temperate productive seaboards of the earth to be possessed by white men. The United States were already a nation, in fact as well as in form, when Vancouver was exploring Puget Sound and passed first through the channel separating the mainland of British America from the island which now bears his name. Thus it has happened that, from the late development of British Columbia in the northeastern Pacific, and of Australia and New Zealand in the southwestern, Great Britain is found again holding the two extremities of a line, between which she must inevitably desire the intermediate links; nor is there any good reason why she should not have them, except the superior, more urgent, more vital necessities of another people — our own. Of these links the Hawaiian group possesses unique importance — not from its intrinsic commercial value, but from its favorable position for maritime and military control.

The military or strategic value of a naval position depends upon its situation, upon its

strength, and upon its resources. Of the three, the first is of most consequence, because it results from the nature of things; whereas the two latter, when deficient, can be supplied artificially, in whole or in part. Fortifications remedy the weaknesses of a position, foresight accumulates beforehand the resources which nature does not yield on the spot; but it is not within the power of man to change the geographical situation of a point which lies outside the limit of strategic effect. It is instructive, and yet apparent to the most superficial reading, to notice how the first Napoleon, in commenting upon a region likely to be the scene of war, begins by considering the most conspicuous natural features, and then enumerates the commanding positions, their distances from each other, the relative directions, or, as the sea phrase is, their "bearings," and the particular facilities each offers for operations of war. This furnishes the ground plan, the skeleton, detached from confusing secondary considerations, and from which a clear estimate of the decisive points can be made. The number of such points varies greatly, according to the character of the region. In a mountainous, broken country they may be very many; whereas in a plain devoid of natural obstacles there may be few, or none save those created by man. If few, the value of each is necessarily greater than if many; and if there be but one, its importance is not only unique, but extreme, — measured only by the size of the field over which its unshared influence extends.

The sea, until it approaches the land, realizes the ideal of a vast plain unbroken by obstacles. On the sea, says an eminent French tactician, there is no field of battle, meaning that there is none of the natural conditions which determine, and often fetter, the movements of the general. But upon a plain, however flat and monotonous, causes, possibly slight, determine the concentration of population into towns and villages, and the necessary communications between the centres create roads. Where the latter converge, or cross, tenure confers command, depending for importance upon the number of routes thus meeting, and upon their individual value. It is just so at sea. While in itself the ocean opposes no obstacle to a vessel taking any one of the

numerous routes that can be traced upon the surface of the globe between two points, conditions of distance or convenience, of traffic or of wind, do prescribe certain usual courses. Where these pass near an ocean position, still more where they use it, it has an influence over them, and where several routes cross near by that influence becomes very great, — is commanding.

Let us now apply these considerations to the Hawaiian group. To any one viewing a map that shows the full extent of the Pacific Ocean, with its shores on either side, two striking circumstances will be apparent immediately. He will see at a glance that the Sandwich Islands stand by themselves, in a state of comparative isolation, amid a vast expanse of sea; and, again, that they form the centre of a large circle whose radius is approximately — and very closely — the distance from Honolulu to San Francisco. The circumference of this circle, if the trouble is taken to describe it with compass upon the map, will be seen, on the west and south, to pass through the outer fringe of the system of archipelagoes which, from Australia and New Zealand, extend to

the northeast toward the American continent. Within the circle a few scattered islets, bare and unimportant, seem only to emphasize the failure of nature to bridge the interval separating Hawaii from her peers of the Southern Pacific. Of these, however, it may be noted that some, like Fanning and Christmas Islands, have within a few years been taken into British possession. The distance from San Francisco to Honolulu, twenty-one hundred miles — easy steaming distance — is substantially the same as that from Honolulu to the Gilbert, Marshall, Samoan, Society, and Marquesas groups, all under European control, except Samoa, in which we have a part influence.

To have a central position such as this, and to be alone, having no rival and admitting no alternative throughout an extensive tract, are conditions that at once fix the attention of the strategist, — it may be added, of the statesmen of commerce likewise. But to this striking combination are to be added the remarkable relations, borne by these singularly placed islands, to the greater commercial routes traversing this vast expanse known to us as the Pacific, — not only, however, to those now

actually in use, important as they are, but also to those that must be called into being necessarily by that future to which the Hawaiian incident compels our too unwilling attention. Circumstances, as already remarked, create centres, between which communication necessarily follows; and in the vista of the future all discern, however dimly, a new and great centre that must largely modify existing sea routes, as well as bring new ones into existence. Whether the canal of the Central American isthmus be eventually at Panama or at Nicaragua matters little to the question now in hand, although, in common with most Americans who have thought upon the subject, I believe it surely will be at the latter point. Whichever it be, the convergence there of so many ships from the Atlantic and the Pacific will constitute a centre of commerce, interoceanic, and inferior to few, if to any, in the world; one whose approaches will be watched jealously, and whose relations to the other centres of the Pacific by the lines joining it to them must be examined carefully. Such study of the commercial routes and of their relations to the Hawaiian Islands, taken together with the other strategic con-

siderations previously set forth, completes the synopsis of facts which determine the value of the group for conferring either commercial or naval control.

Referring again to the map, it will be seen that while the shortest routes from the Isthmus to Australia and New Zealand, as well as those to South America, go well clear of any probable connection with or interference from Hawaii, those directed toward China and Japan pass either through the group or in close proximity to it. Vessels from Central America bound to the ports of North America come, of course, within the influence of our own coast. These circumstances, and the existing recognized distribution of political power in the Pacific, point naturally to an international acquiescence in certain defined spheres of influence, for our own country and for others, such as has been reached already between Great Britain, Germany, and Holland in the Southwestern Pacific, to avoid conflict there between their respective claims. Though artificial in form, such a recognition, in the case here suggested, would depend upon perfectly natural as well as indisputable conditions.

The United States is by far the greatest, in numbers, interests, and power, of the communities bordering upon the eastern shores of the North Pacific; and the relations of the Hawaiian Islands to her naturally would be, and actually are, more numerous and more important than they can be to any other state. This is true, although, unfortunately for the equally natural wishes of Great Britain and her colonies, the direct routes from British Columbia to Eastern Australia and New Zealand, which depend upon no building of a future canal, pass as near the islands as those already mentioned. Such a fact, that this additional great highway runs close to the group, both augments and emphasizes their strategic importance; but it does not affect the statement just made, that the interest of the United States in them surpasses that of Great Britain, and dependent upon a natural cause, nearness, which has been admitted always as a reasonable ground for national self-assertion. It is unfortunate, doubtless, for the wishes of British Columbia, and for the communications, commercial and military, depending upon the Canadian Pacific Railway, that the United States

lies between them and the South Pacific, and is the state nearest to Hawaii; but, the fact being so, the interests of our sixty-five million people, in a position so vital to our part in the Pacific, must be allowed to outweigh those of the six millions of Canada.

From the foregoing considerations may be inferred the importance of the Hawaiian Islands as a position powerfully influencing the commercial and military control of the Pacific, and especially of the Northern Pacific, in which the United States, geographically, has the strongest right to assert herself. These are the main advantages, which can be termed positive: those, namely, which directly advance commercial security and naval control. To the negative advantages of possession, by removing conditions which, if the islands were in the hands of any other power, would constitute to us disadvantages and threats, allusion only will be made. The serious menace to our Pacific coast and our Pacific trade, if so important a position were held by a possible enemy, has been mentioned frequently in the press, and dwelt upon in the diplomatic papers which from time to time are given to the public.

It may be assumed that it is generally acknowledged. Upon one particular, however, too much stress cannot be laid, one to which naval officers cannot but be more sensitive than the general public, and that is the immense disadvantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling-station well within twenty-five hundred miles, as this is, of every point of our coast-line from Puget Sound to Mexico. Were there many others available, we might find it difficult to exclude from all. There is, however, but the one. Shut out from the Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown back for supplies of fuel to distances of thirty-five hundred or four thousand miles, — or between seven thousand and eight thousand, going and coming, — an impediment to sustained maritime operations well-nigh prohibitive. The coal-mines of British Columbia constitute, of course, a qualification to this statement; but upon them, if need arose, we might hope at least to impose some trammels by action from the land side. It is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defence of a coast-line — of a sea frontier — is concentrated in a single position; and the circumstance renders doubly

imperative upon us to secure it, if we righteously can.

It is to be hoped, also, that the opportunity thus thrust upon us may not be viewed narrowly, as though it concerned but one section of our country or one portion of its external trade or influence. This is no mere question of a particular act, for which, possibly, just occasion may not have offered yet; but of a principle, a policy, fruitful of many future acts, to enter upon which, in the fulness of our national progress, the time now has arrived. The principle being accepted, to be conditioned only by a just and candid regard for the rights and reasonable susceptibilities of other nations, — none of which is contravened by the step here immediately under discussion, — the annexation, even, of Hawaii would be no mere sporadic effort, irrational because disconnected from an adequate motive, but a first-fruit and a token that the nation in its evolution has aroused itself to the necessity of carrying its life — that has been the happiness of those under its influence — beyond the borders which heretofore have sufficed for its activities. That the vaunted blessings of our economy are not

to be forced upon the unwilling may be conceded; but the concession does not deny the right nor the wisdom of gathering in those who wish to come. Comparative religion teaches that creeds which reject missionary enterprise are foredoomed to decay. May it not be so with nations? Certainly the glorious record of England is consequent mainly upon the spirit, and traceable to the time, when she launched out into the deep — without formulated policy, it is true, or foreseeing the future to which her star was leading, but obeying the instinct which in the infancy of nations anticipates the more reasoned impulses of experience. Let us, too, learn from her experience. Not all at once did England become the great sea power which she is, but step by step, as opportunity offered, she has moved on to the world-wide pre-eminence now held by English speech, and by institutions sprung from English germs. How much poorer would the world have been, had Englishmen heeded the cautious hesitancy that now bids us reject every advance beyond our shore-lines! And can any one doubt that a cordial, if unformulated, understanding between the two chief states of English tradition, to

spread freely, without mutual jealousy and in mutual support, would increase greatly the world's sum of happiness?

But if a plea of the world's welfare seem suspiciously like a cloak for national self-interest, let the latter be accepted frankly as the adequate motive which it assuredly is. Let us not shrink from pitting a broad self-interest against the narrow self-interest to which some would restrict us. The demands of our three great seaboards, the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific, — each for itself, and all for the strength that comes from drawing closer the ties between them, — are calling for the extension, through the Isthmian Canal, of that broad sea common along which, and along which alone, in all the ages prosperity has moved. Land carriage, always restricted and therefore always slow, toils enviously but hopelessly behind, vainly seeking to replace and supplant the royal highway of nature's own making. Corporate interests, vigorous in that power of concentration which is the strength of armies and of minorities, may here withstand for a while the ill-organized strivings of the multitude, only dimly conscious of its wants; yet the latter, however

temporarily opposed and baffled, is sure at last, like the blind forces of nature, to overwhelm all that stand in the way of its necessary progress. So the Isthmian Canal is an inevitable part in the future of the United States; yet one that cannot be separated from other necessary incidents of a policy dependent upon it, whose details cannot be foreseen exactly. But because the precise steps that hereafter may be opportune or necessary cannot yet be foretold certainly, is not a reason the less, but a reason the more, for establishing a principle of action which may serve to guide as opportunities arise. Let us start from the fundamental truth, warranted by history, that the control of the seas, and especially along the great lines drawn by national interest or national commerce, is the chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of nations. It is so because the sea is the world's great medium of circulation. From this necessarily follows the principle that, as subsidiary to such control, it is imperative to take possession, when it can be done righteously, of such maritime positions as contribute to secure command. If this principle be adopted,

there will be no hesitation about taking the positions — and they are many — upon the approaches to the Isthmus, whose interests incline them to seek us. It has its application also to the present case of Hawaii.

There is, however, one caution to be given from the military point of view, beyond the need of which the world has not yet passed. Military positions, fortified posts, by land or by sea, however strong or admirably situated, do not confer control by themselves alone. People often say that such an island or harbor will give control of such a body of water. It is an utter, deplorable, ruinous mistake. The phrase indeed may be used by some only loosely, without forgetting other implied conditions of adequate protection and adequate navies; but the confidence of our own nation in its native strength, and its indifference to the defence of its ports and the sufficiency of its fleet, give reason to fear that the full consequences of a forward step may not be weighed soberly. Napoleon, who knew better, once talked this way. "The islands of San Pietro, Corfu, and Malta," he wrote, "will make us masters of the whole Mediterranean." Vain boast! Within one

year Corfu, in two years Malta, were rent away from the state that could not support them by its ships. Nay, more: had Bonaparte not taken the latter stronghold out of the hands of its degenerate but innocuous government, that citadel of the Mediterranean would perhaps — would probably — never have passed into those of his chief enemy. There is here also a lesson for us.

It is by no means logical to leap, from this recognition of the necessity of adequate naval force to secure outlying dependencies, to the conclusion that the United States would need for that object a navy equal to the largest now existing. A nation as far removed as is our own from the bases of foreign naval strength may reasonably reckon upon the qualification that distance — not to speak of the complex European interests close at hand — impresses upon the exertion of naval strength by European powers. The mistake is when our remoteness, unsupported by carefully calculated force, is regarded as an armor of proof, under cover of which any amount of swagger may be indulged safely. An estimate of what is an adequate naval force for our country may properly

take into account the happy interval which separates both our present territory and our future aspirations from the centres of interest really vital to European states. If to these safeguards be added, on our part, a sober recognition of what our reasonable sphere of influence is, and a candid justice in dealing with foreign interests within that sphere, there will be little disposition to question our preponderance therein.

Among all foreign states, it is especially to be hoped that each passing year may render more cordial the relations between ourselves and the great nation from whose loins we sprang. The radical identity of spirit which underlies our superficial differences of polity surely will draw us closer together, if we do not set our faces wilfully against a tendency which would give our race the predominance over the seas of the world. To force such a consummation is impossible, and if possible would not be wise; but surely it would be a lofty aim, fraught with immeasurable benefits, to desire it, and to raise no needless impediments by advocating perfectly proper acts, demanded by our evident interests, in offensive or arrogant terms.

John Locke, Of Civil Government: Second Treatise [1689] (Chicago: Regnery, 1955)

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Chapter V

Of Property

25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men being once born have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence; or Revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah and his sons, 'tis very clear that God, as King David says, Psalm cxv. 16, "has given the earth to the children of men," given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to have a property in anything. I will not content myself to answer that if it be difficult to make out property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man but one universal monarch should have any property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavour to show how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners.

26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also give them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And

though all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them as they are thus in their natural state; yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit or venison which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, *i.e.*, a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do any good for the support of his life.

27. Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.

28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask, then, When did they begin to be his—when he digested, or when he ate, or when he boiled, or when he brought them home, or when he picked them up? And 'tis plain if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common; that added something to them more than Nature, the common mother of all, had done, and so they became his private right. And will any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons which remain so by compact that 'tis the taking any part of what is common and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut, and the ore I have dug in any place where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property without the assignation or consent of anybody. The labour that was mine removing them out of that common

state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner necessary to any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat which their father or master had provided for them in common without assigning to every one his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of Nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.

30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; 'tis allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the civilised part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind, or what ambergris any one takes up here, is, by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting is thought his who pursues her during the chase. For being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no

man's private possession, whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind as to find and pursue her has thereby removed her from the state of nature wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.

31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the earth, &c., makes a right to them, then any one may engross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too. "God has given us all things richly" (1 Tim. vi. 17), is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has He given it to us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in; whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few spenders, and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and engross it to the prejudice of others—especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use—there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established.

32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself, as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest, I think it is plain

that property in that, too, is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does as it were enclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right to say, everybody else has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot enclose, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when He gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, *i.e.*, improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that, in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.

33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that in effect there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself. For he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst; and the case of land and water, where

there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.

34. God gave the world to men in common; but since He gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed He meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it), not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left for his improvement as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour; if he did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left as that already possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his industry could reach to.

35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other country where there is plenty of people under Government, who have money and commerce, no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent of all his fellow-commoners: because this is left common by compact, *i.e.*, by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the commoners as the

whole was, when they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world it was quite otherwise. The law man was under was rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him, to labour. That was his property, which could not be taken from him wherever he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate. And the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions.

36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men's labour and the convenience of life. No man's labour could subdue or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would still have room for as good and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. Which measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself without injury to anybody, in the first ages of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost by wandering from their company in the then vast wilderness of the earth than to be straitened for want of room to plant in. And the same measure

may be allowed still without prejudice to anybody, as full as the world seems. For supposing a man or family in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the children of Adam or Noah; let him plant in some inland vacant places of America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain or think themselves injured by this man's encroachment, though the race of men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the small number that was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is of so little value without labour, that I have heard it affirmed that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow, and reap, without being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to but only his making use of it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him who by his industry on neglected and consequently waste land has increased the stock of corn which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on, this I dare boldly affirm—that the same rule of propriety, viz., that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world without straitening anybody, since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions and a right to them;

which how it has done I shall by-and-bye show more at large.

37. That is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed that a little piece of yellow metal which would keep without wasting or decay should be worth a great piece of flesh or a whole heap of corn, though men had a right to appropriate by their labour, each one to himself, as much of the things of nature as he could use, yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the same industry.

Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed as many of the beasts as he could; he that so employed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them. But if they perished in his possession without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour's share, for he had no right further than his use called for any of them and they might serve to afford him conveniences of life.

38. The same measures governed the possessions of land, too. Whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up, and made use of before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed and could feed and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he could till and make it his own land, and yet leave enough for Abel's sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve for both their possessions. But as families increased, and industry enlarged their stocks, their possessions enlarged with the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of, till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time to set out the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and their neighbours, and, by laws within themselves, settled the properties of those of the same society. For we see that in that part of the world which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be the best peopled, even as low down as Abraham's time they wandered with their flocks and their herds, which were their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did in a country where he was a stranger: whence it is plain that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that the inhabi-

tants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made use of. But when there was not room enough in the same place for their herds to feed together, they by consent, as Abraham and Lot did (Gen. xiii. 5), separated and enlarged their pasture where it best liked them. And for the same reason Esau went from his father and his brother, and planted in Mount Seir (Gen. xxxvi. 6).

39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion and property in Adam over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one's property be made out from it; but supposing the world given as it was to the children of men in common, we see how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it for their private uses, wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel.

40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear, that the property of labour should be able to overbalance the community of land. For it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on everything; and let any one consider what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common without any husbandry upon it, and he will find that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to say that of the products of the earth useful to the life of

man nine-tenths are the effects of labour; nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expenses about them—what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour—we shall find that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour.

41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything than several nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life, whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty—*i.e.*, a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and delight—yet, for want of improving it by labour, have not one-hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy. And a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England.

42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life through their several progresses before they come to our use, and see how much they receive of their value from human industry. Bread, wine, and cloth are things of daily use and great plenty; yet, notwithstanding, acorns, water, and leaves or skins, must be our bread, drink, and clothing, did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities. For whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk than leaves, skins, or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry: the one of these being the

food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us; which how much they exceed the other in value when any one hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world. And the ground which produces the materials is scarce to be reckoned in as any, or at most but a very small, part of it; so little that even amongst us land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, "waste," and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.

43. An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in America which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are without doubt of the same natural intrinsic value; but yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year is worth £5, and from the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one-thousandth. 'Tis labour, then, which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth anything; 'tis to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products, for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land which lies waste, is all the effect of labour. For 'tis not barely the ploughman's pains, the reaper's and thresher's toil, and the baker's sweat, is to be

counted into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen, who dug and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vast number, requisite to this corn, from its sowing, to its being made bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and received as an effect of that. Nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials as in themselves. 'Twould be a strange catalogue of things that industry provided, and made use of, about every loaf of bread before it came to our use, if we could trace them—iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dyeing drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of in the ship that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the workmen to any part of the work, all which it would be almost impossible—at least, too long—to reckon up.

44. From all which it is evident that, though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself and proprietor of his own person and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.

45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleased to

employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities; and though afterwards, in some parts of the world (where the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value), the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and, by laws within themselves, regulated the properties of the private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which labour and industry began—and the leagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expressly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the other's possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally they had to those countries; and so have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves in distinct parts of the world—yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found which, the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind in the consent of the use of their common money, lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do or can make use of, and so still lie in common; though this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money.

46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of short duration, such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves: gold, silver, and diamonds are things that fancy or agreement have put the value on more than real use and the necessary support of life. Now, of those good things which nature hath provided in common, every one hath a right, as hath been said, to as much as he could use, and had a property in all he could effect with his labour—all that his industry could extend to, to alter from the state nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples had thereby a property in them; they were his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look that he used them before they spoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others; and, indeed, it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to anybody else, so that it perished not uselessly in his possession, these he also made use of; and if he also bartered away plums that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common stock, destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour, or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by

him all his life, he invaded not the right of others; he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased, the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possessions, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it.

47. And thus came in the use of money—some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that, by mutual consent, men would take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life.

48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them; for supposing an island, separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were but a hundred families—but there were sheep, horses, and cows, with other useful animals, wholesome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the island, either because of its commonness or perishableness, fit to supply the place of money—what reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable useful commodities with others? Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to

take; for I ask, what would a man value ten thousand or a hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild common of nature whatever was more than would supply the conveniences of life to be had there for him and his family.

49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so than that is now, for no such thing as money was anywhere known. Find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions.

50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain that the consent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth—I mean out of the bounds of society and compact; for in governments the laws regulate it; they having, by consent, found out and agreed in a way how a man may rightfully and without injury possess more than he himself can make use of by receiving gold and silver, which may continue long in a man's possession, without decaying for the overplus, and agreeing those metals should have a value.

51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive without any difficulty how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it; so that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave. Right and conveniency went together; for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This left no room for controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the rights of others; what portion a man carved to himself was easily seen, and it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed.

Vadana Shiva, Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge (Boston: South End, 1997)

CHAPTER FOUR

BIODIVERSITY AND PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE

The tropics are the cradle of the planet's biological diversity, with a multiplicity of ecosystems beyond compare.[1] A majority of Third World countries are located in the tropics and, thus, endowed with this wealth of biological diversity, which is being rapidly destroyed. The two primary causes for the large-scale destruction of this biodiversity are:

1. Habitat destruction due to internationally financed megaprojects—such as the building of dams, highways, mines, and aquaculture—in areas rich in biological diversity. The Blue Revolution is an example of how coastal areas rich in marine diversity and inland areas rich in agricultural diversity are being destroyed through intensive shrimp farming.

2. The technological and economic push to replace diversity with homogeneity in forestry, agriculture, fishery, and animal husbandry. The Green Revolution is an example of the

deliberate replacement of biological diversity with biological uniformity and monocultures.

Biodiversity erosion starts a chain reaction. The disappearance of one species is related to the extinction of innumerable other species, with which it is interrelated through food webs and food chains. The crisis of biodiversity, however, is not just a crisis of the disappearance of species, which serve as industrial raw material and have the potential of spinning dollars for corporate enterprises. It is, more basically, a crisis that threatens the life-support systems and livelihoods of millions of people in Third World countries.

Biodiversity is a people's resource. While the industrialized world and affluent societies turned their backs to biodiversity, the poor in the Third World have continued to depend on biological resources for food and nutrition, for health care, for energy, for fiber, and for housing.

The emergence of the new biotechnologies has changed the meaning and value of biodiversity. It has been converted from a life-support base for poor communities to the raw material base for powerful corporations. Even though references are increasingly made to global biodiversity and global genetic resources, biodiversity—unlike the atmosphere or the oceans—is not a global commons in the ecological sense. Biodiversity exists in specific countries and is used by specific communities. It is global only in its emerging role as raw material for global corporations.

The emergence of new intellectual property regimes, and new and accelerated potential for exploitation of biodiversity, creates new conflicts over biodiversity—between private and common ownership, between global and local use.

Biodiversity: Whose Resource?

Biodiversity has always been a local common resource. A resource is common property when social systems exist to use it on the principles of justice and sustainability. This involves a combination of rights and responsibilities among users, a combination of utilization and conservation, a sense of coproduction with nature and of gift giving among members of the community.

There are many levels at which resource ownership and the concept of knowledge and access to it differs between private property regimes and common property systems. Common property systems recognize the intrinsic worth of biodiversity; regimes governed by IPRs see value as created through commercial exploitation. Common property knowledge and resource systems recognize creativity in nature. As John Todd, a visionary biologist, has stated, biodiversity carries the intelligence of three and a half billion years of experimentation by life-forms. Human production is viewed as coproduction and cocreativity with nature. IPR regimes, in contrast, are based on the denial of creativity in nature. Yet, they usurp the creativity of emerging indigenous knowledge and the intellectual commons. Further, since IPRs are more a protection of capital investment than a recognition of creativity per se, there is a tendency for ownership of knowledge, and the products and processes emerging from it, to move toward areas of capital concentration and away from poor people without capital. Knowledge and resources are, therefore, systematically alienated from the original custodians and donors, becoming the monopoly of the transnational corporations.

Through this trend, biodiversity is converted from a local commons into an enclosed private property. Indeed, the enclosure of the commons is the objective of IPRs in the areas of life-forms and biodiversity. This enclosure is being universalized through the TRIPs treaty of the GATT and certain interpreta-

tions of the Biodiversity Convention. It is also the underlying mechanism of bioprospecting contracts.

Central to the privatization of knowledge and biodiversity is the devaluation of local knowledge, the displacement of local rights, and simultaneously, the creation of monopoly rights to biodiversity utilization through the claim of novelty. It has sometimes been argued that monopolies exist even in traditional communities. Yet, in the case of agriculture, for example, seeds and knowledge are freely exchanged as gifts. Similarly, knowledge of medicinal plants is a local common resource.

Plant-based systems of healing fall into two categories—folk systems and specialized systems, like Ayurveda, Siddha, and Unani. Even specialized systems, however, depend on folk knowledge. In the Ayurveda classic, *Charaka Samhita*, indigenous medical practitioners are advised:

> By knowing from cowherds, tapasvis, forest dwellers, hunters, gardeners, and by knowing about their form and properties, learn about herbs and medicinal plants.[2]

Ayurvedic knowledge is also part of the everyday knowledge of people. Folk traditions and specialized medical systems support each other, unlike in the pharmaceutical corporation-dominated medical-industrial system, where people do not figure as knowing subjects.

Non-Western medical systems also differ from the medical-industrial system of the West in that indigenous medical practitioners do not exercise a commercial monopoly through their practice. While they might not exchange their knowledge freely, they do freely gift its benefits. They do not use their knowledge to amass limitless private profit and wealth. They practice what we in India call *gyan daan*—the gifting of knowledge.

By their very logic, on the other hand, IPRs exploit knowledge for profit by excluding others from its use during the life of the patent. Since IPRs are often based on local knowledge and on tinkering with biodiversity that has hitherto been in the commons, they amount to an intellectual and material enclosure. Consequently, people lose access to the knowledge and resources vital to their survival and creativity, and to the conservation of cultural and biological diversity.

Two important historical tendencies surround the issue of knowledge. On one side, there is a growing recognition that the Western paradigm of mechanistic reductionism is at the root of the ecological and health crises and that non-Western systems of knowledge are better adapted to respect life. On the flip side, precisely when indigenous systems of knowledge could come into their own, the GATT is using IPRs to reinforce the monopoly of Western systems and devalue indigenous systems, even while exploiting them for setting up IPR monopolies.

Indigenous Knowledge and IPRs

The patenting of products and processes derived from plants on the basis of indigenous knowledge has become a major issue of conflict in the IPR domain. The patenting of neem is but one example.

Neem, *Azarichdita indica*, a beautiful tree native to India, has been used for centuries as a biopesticide and a medicine. In some parts of India, the new year begins with eating the tender shoots of the neem tree. In other parts, the neem tree is worshipped as sacred. Everywhere in India, people begin their day by using the neem *datun* (toothbrush) to protect their teeth with its medicinal and anti-bacterial properties. Communities have invested centuries of care, respect, and knowledge in propagating, protecting, and using neem in fields, field bunds, homesteads, and common lands.

Today, this heritage is being stolen under the guise of IPRs. For centuries, the Western world ignored the neem tree and its properties: the practices of Indian peasants and doctors were not deemed worthy of attention by the majority of British, French, and Portuguese colonists. In the last few years, how-

ever, growing opposition to chemical products in the West, in particular pesticides, has led to a sudden enthusiasm for the pharmaceutical properties of neem. Since 1985, over a dozen U.S. patents have been taken out by U.S. and Japanese firms on formulas for stable neem-based solutions and emulsions—and even for a neem-based toothpaste. At least four of these are owned by W. R. Grace of the United States, three by another U.S. company, the Native Plant Institute, and two by the Japanese Terumo Corporation. Having garnered their patents, and with the prospect of a license from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Grace has set about manufacturing and commercializing its products by establishing a base in India. The company approached several Indian manufacturers with proposals to buy up their technology or to convince them to stop producing value-added products and instead supply Grace with raw material. Grace is likely to be followed by other patent-holding companies. "Squeezing bucks out of the neem ought to be relatively easy," observes *Science Magazine*.[3]

The journal *Ag Biotechnology News* has called W. R. Grace's processing plant the "world's first neem tree-based biopesticide facility." Nearly every home and village in India, however, has biopesticide facilities. The Indian cottage industries' Organization Khadi and the Village Industries Commission have been using and selling neem products for 40 years. Private entrepreneurs, too, have launched neem pesticides, such as Indiara. Neem toothpaste has been manufactured for decades by Calcutta Chemicals, an indigenous company. W. R. Grace's justification for the patents hinges on the claim that their modernized extraction processes constitute a genuine innovation:

> Although traditional knowledge inspired the research and development that led to these patented compositions and processes, they were considered sufficiently novel and different from the original product of nature and the traditional method of use to be patentable.[4]

In short, the processes are supposedly novel, an advance on Indian techniques. This novelty, however, exists mainly in the context of the ignorance of the West. Over the 2,000 years that neem-based biopesticides and medicines have been used in India, many complex processes were developed to make them available for specific use, though the active ingredients were not given Latinized scientific names. Common knowledge and use of neem were the primary reasons given by the Indian Central Insecticide Board for not registering neem products under the Insecticides Act of 1968. The Board argued that neem materials had been in extensive use in India for various purposes since time immemorial, without any known deleterious effects.[5]

Biodiversity has different properties that can be utilized for meeting human needs. In the case of neem, the knowledge that the tree has biopesticidal properties is metaknowledge—knowledge of principles—in the public domain. Given this knowledge, various processes of technology can be used for preparing a variety of products from neem. These are obvious, not novel.

At the level of microknowledge—knowledge involved in tinkering with technical processes—the basis of IPR claims to neem is illegitimate on two grounds. First, it claims nature's creativity and the creativity of other cultures as its own. Second, in the case of neem, this leads to the false claim that the biopesticide property was created by the patentee. It treats petty tinkering as a source of creation, rather than acknowledging that specific species are the source of the creation of specific properties and characteristics, and that communities are the source of the knowledge that allows that property to be utilized.

The issue of IPRs is closely related to the issue of value. If all value is seen as being associated with capital, tinkering becomes necessary to add value. Simultaneously, value is taken away from the source (biological resources as well as indigenous knowledge), which is reduced to raw material.

Tinkering, however, does not create value. The value of the product is dependent on the source—in this case, neem—

not on how it is processed. The same tinkering applied to another species would not produce a pesticide. Society is the source of the knowledge that neem makes a biopesticide, not the inventor of epistemologically petty, but technologically powerful tinkering.

IPRs allow for the privatization of biodiversity and the intellectual commons. "Bioprospecting" is increasingly the word used to describe this new form of enclosure.

Bioprospecting vs. People's Knowledge

Biodiversity has been protected through the flourishing of cultural diversity. Utilizing indigenous knowledge systems, cultures have built decentralized economies and production systems that use and reproduce biodiversity. Monocultures, by contrast, which are produced and reproduced through centralized control, consume biodiversity.

The challenge of biodiversity conservation is to enlarge the scope of economies based on diversity and decentralization, and shrink the scope of economies based on monocultures, monopolies, and nonsustainability. While both kinds of economies use biodiversity as an input, only economies based on diversity produce diversity. Monoculture economies produce monocultures.

When indigenous systems of knowledge and production interact with dominant systems of knowledge and production, it is important to anticipate whether the future options of the indigenous system or the dominant system will grow. Whose knowledge and values will shape the future options of diverse communities?

The World Resources Institute has defined this bioprospecting as the exploration of commercially valuable genetic and biochemical resources.[6] The metaphor is borrowed from the prospecting for gold or oil. While biodiversity is fast becoming the green gold and green oil for the pharmaceutical

and biotechnology industries, suggesting that the use and value of biodiversity lies with the prospector, it is actually held by local indigenous communities. Further, this metaphor suggests that prior to prospecting, the resource lies buried, unknown, unused, and without value. Unlike gold or oil deposits, however, the uses and value of biodiversity are known by the communities from where the knowledge is taken through bioprospecting contracts.

The metaphor of bioprospecting thus hides the prior use, knowledge, and rights associated with biodiversity. Alternative economic systems disappear, and the Western prospector is projected as the only source for medical and agricultural uses of biodiversity. With the disappearance of alternatives, monopolies in the form of intellectual property rights appear natural.

When alternative and freely exchanged knowledge—such as the use of neem or medicinal plants—is eclipsed, corporations with IPR protection appear to be the only source of biological pesticides or the cure for cancer, for example. Their exclusive claims to added value and monopoly rights to production are rendered legitimate in the absence of alternatives, which, even if kept alive, are recognized as illegitimate.

The bias that use and value are only generated by Western corporations is apparent in most Western analyses of bioprospecting. As one proponent states:

> As industry interest in genetic and biochemical resources increases and more research and conservation institutions realize that they must use or face losing their countries' biodiversity, contractual agreements between collectors and suppliers of biological samples, and pharmaceutical and biotech companies, will become more important. Through the relationships they represent, these contracts can ensure that a portion of the value generated from developing genetically or biologically derived products is captured by the country and people who have been biodiversity's custodians.[7]

The concept of adding value through bioprospecting hides the removal and destruction of the value of indigenous plants and knowledge. As the genes of a particular plant gain value, the plant itself becomes dispensable, especially if the genes can be replicated in vitro. As useful characteristics of plants are identified by indigenous communities, the communities themselves—along with their lifestyles and knowledge systems—become dispensable.

It is important to view bioprospecting in the context of markets for patent commodities in the agricultural as well as the health sectors. The same corporations that prospect for commercialization of biodiversity also displace economies based on alternative values and knowledge systems in order to expand their markets for seeds, biopesticides, and pharmaceuticals.

When indigenous communities are asked to sell their knowledge to corporations, they are being asked to sell their birthright to continue to practice their traditions in the future, and to provide for themselves through their knowledge and their resources. This has already happened in the case of seeds in the industrialized world and in the case of plant-based medicines derived from Third World knowledge. Of the 120 active compounds currently isolated from the higher plants and widely used in modern medicine, 75 percent have uses that were known in traditional systems. Fewer than a dozen are synthesized by simple chemical modification; the rest are extracted directly from plants and then purified.[8] The use of traditional knowledge reportedly increases the efficiency of pinpointing plants' medicinal uses by more than 400 percent.

To mask the injustice and immorality of bioprospecting, agreements are made to compensate Third World countries for their contributions. For example, in 1992 Eli Lilly paid Shaman Pharmaceuticals, a major bioprospecting company, $4 million for exclusive worldwide marketing rights to anti-fungal drugs drawn from the knowledge of native healers. The Healing Forest Conservancy, Shaman's nonprofit arm, will return a portion

of its receipts to people and governments in the countries where Shaman works, although how much is never disclosed.

For Western corporations, indigenous systems of knowledge and indigenous rights do not exist. Thus, a publication of the pharmaceutical industry, which depends heavily on indigenous knowledge for many of its plant-based drugs, speaks of Third World biodiversity rights not as intellectual rights of people or as customary rights evolved over centuries, but as a newly asserted property right derived from a geographical accident. The most a developing country can claim for the drugs that are extracted by foreigners from their plants and animals is a geographical fee.[9] Yet, some analysts propose that businesspeople, scientists, and lawyers meet to negotiate agreements. Neither the governments nor the people of countries rich in biodiversity figure in bioprospecting contract thinking.[10]

One of the more publicized efforts was the 1991 agreement between Merck Pharmaceuticals and INBio, the National Biodiversity Institute of Costa Rica. Merck agreed to pay $1 million for the right to keep and analyze plant samples gathered from national Costa Rican rain forest parks by INBio employees. These unconditional rights for prospecting by a multinational corporation with $4 billion a year in revenues in exchange for $1 million paid to a small conservation organization do not respect the rights of local communities or the government of Costa Rica. Moreover, the agreement is not with the people living in or near the national parks; they had no say in the deal nor were they guaranteed any benefits. Nor is it with the national government. The agreement is between a transnational corporation and a conservation group, developed at the initiative of a leading U.S. conservation biologist, Dan Janzen.

The intention of the Merck-INBio agreement is to stop the free flow of resources from the South to the North. As Janzen states, the days of exploration and exploitation without payment of royalties to the host country are over. For Janzen, Costa Rica is a corporation with 50,000 kilometers of land, on which there are 12,000 kilometers of "greenhouses" filled with 500,000

species. This corporation has 3,000,000 stockholders. At present, there is $1,500 worth of gross national product (GNP) per stockholder. Costa Ricans aspire to a standard of living that is normally associated with about $10,000-$15,000 worth of GNP.

With this worldview, INBio views commercial prospecting by multinationals as the solution. Yet those selling prospecting rights never had the rights to biodiversity in the first place, and those whose rights are being sold and alienated through the transaction have not been consulted or given a chance to participate.

Further, while prospecting fees could be used to build scientific capacity in the Third World, what is actually being built is a facility for the corporation. The current value of the world market for medicinal plants derived from leads given by indigenous and local communities is estimated to be $43 billion. Of this, on certain occasions, a tiny fraction is paid as prospecting fees. Such payments are supposed to build research capacity in the source country. But when Merck supplied chemical extraction equipment to the University of Costa Rica, for example, Merck ensured that it would have exclusive commercial use of the facility. The capacity building is thus held captive by the financing corporation and is not available for the wider national interest in the source country.

Another problem with biodiversity prospecting is that collections are often made as part of a scientific exchange in which the scientific bodies involved have links with corporations. Since scientific exchange takes place freely in the public domain, but the commercial interests exploiting the collections and screening have proprietary interests in developing products protected by IPRs, a major asymmetry of rights exists in biodiversity prospecting arrangements.

In other cases, indigenous communities are being asked to patent their knowledge in collaboration with Western corporations. The capital, however, comes from Western institutions and the rights are immediately transferred to powerful commercial interests, who control capital and the market. Drawing

a few isolated groups or individuals into the gold rush for patents on life-forms is becoming essential because the social movements saying "no" to patents in the biodiversity domain are growing.

Does the patenting route protect indigenous knowledge? Protection of indigenous knowledge implies the continued availability and access to it by future generations in their everyday practices of health care and agriculture. If the economic organization that emerges on the basis of patents displaces the indigenous lifestyles and economic systems, indigenous knowledge is not being protected as a living heritage. If we recognize that the dominant economic system is at the root of the ecological crisis because it has failed to address the ecological value of natural resources, expanding the same economic system will not protect indigenous knowledge or biodiversity.

We need a transition to an alternative economic paradigm that does not reduce all value to market prices and all human activity to commerce.

Ecologically, this approach involves the recognition of the value of diversity in itself. All life-forms have an inherent right to life; that should be the overriding reason for preventing species' extinction.

At the social level, the values of biodiversity in different cultural contexts need to be recognized. Sacred groves, sacred seeds, and sacred species have been the cultural means for treating biodiversity as inviolable, and present us with the best examples of conservation. Community rights to biodiversity, and farmers' and indigenous peoples' contributions to the evolution and protection of biodiversity, also need to be recognized by treating their knowledge systems as futuristic, not primitive. In addition, we need to recognize that nonmarket values, such as providing meaning and sustenance, should not be treated as secondary to market values.

At the economic level, if biodiversity conservation is to be aimed at conserving life rather than profits, the incentives given to biodiversity destruction and the penalties that have

become associated with biodiversity conservation have to be removed. If a biodiversity framework guides economic thinking rather than the other way around, it becomes evident that the so-called high production of homogenous and uniform systems is an artificial measure, maintained through public subsidies. Productivity and efficiency need to be redefined to reflect the multiple input and multiple output systems that characterize biodiversity.

In addition, the perverse logic of financing biodiversity conservation by a small percentage of profits generated by biodiversity destruction amounts to licensing destruction, and reduces conservation to an exhibit, not a basis of living and producing.

Neither ecological sustainability nor livelihood sustainability can be ensured without a just resolution of the issue of who controls biodiversity. Until recent times, local communities, especially women, have used, developed, and conserved biological diversity, and have been the custodians of the biological wealth of this planet. Their control, their knowledge, and their rights need to be strengthened if the foundations of biodiversity conservation are to be strong and deep. This strengthening has to be done through local as well as national and global action.

The globalization of patent and IPR regimes is an expansion of the economic paradigm that has caused ecological destruction and contributed to the disappearance of species. When indigenous communities are brought into this paradigm, there is an irreversible destruction of the cultural diversity that could have provided values for another form of economic organization.

Taking knowledge from indigenous communities through bioprospecting is only the first step toward developing an IPR-protected industrial system that must eventually market commodities that use local knowledge as an input, but are not based on the ethical, epistemological, or ecological organization of that knowledge system. Producers of such commodities use biodiversity fragments as raw material to produce biological products protected by patents that displace biodiversity and indigenous knowledge, both of which they have exploited.

The issues of equity, fairness, and compensation need to be assessed in a systemic way, both at the level of taking indigenous knowledge and at the level of later pushing it out through aggressive marketing of industrialized products in medicine and agriculture. Key questions need to be asked. Is it right to displace the sources of alternative production and organization? Can such destruction be fully compensated? Can the planet, and the diverse communities that inhabit it, afford to have biodiversity and alternative lifestyles swallowed up as raw material for a centralized, global corporate culture that can only produce cultural and biological uniformity?

Patents, in the ultimate analysis, are systems of protection for capital investment, without the ability to control capital. As such, they protect neither people nor knowledge systems.

Bioprospecting has no room for respecting the rights of people and communities who do not want the commons enclosed. Yet, for those who do not accept the inevitability of the enclosure of the commons, there are alternatives to bioprospecting.

Recovery of the Biodiversity Commons

There is a growing popular ecological movement to defend agricultural and medicinal biodiversity as well as peoples' knowledge. The protection and recovery of the biodiversity commons is, first and foremost, a political and social movement that recognizes the creativity intrinsic to the diversity of life-forms. It calls for common property regimes in the ownership and utilization of biodiversity. Further, it works toward an intellectual commons—a public domain in which knowledge of biodiversity's utility is not commodified.

The first public demonstration of the positive assertion of the recovery of the biodiversity commons took place in India on Independence Day, August 15, 1993, when farmers declared that their knowledge is protected by *Samuhik Gyan Sanad* (collective intellectual rights). According to the farmers, any company using local knowledge or local resources without the permission of local communities is engaging in intellectual piracy, as in the case of the patents on neem.

The concepts were further developed in 1993 by an interdisciplinary team of experts from the Third World Network, an international group of Third World individuals and organizations. The positive assertion of collective intellectual property rights (CIRs) creates an opportunity to define a sui generis system of rights centered on farmers' role in protecting and improving plant genetic resources. Effectivity needs to be reinterpreted to account for the specific context of different countries. Only then would the diversity of IPR systems become a possibility; legal diversity, in turn, protects the biological and cultural diversity of peasant societies across the Third World. IPR diversity that has room for a plurality of systems, including regimes based on CIRs, would reflect different styles of knowledge generation and dissemination in different contexts. Alongside a positive protection system for farmers' rights as plant breeders, sui generis systems could evolve common rights in the domain of indigenous medical systems.

Additionally, the relationship between CIR systems that reflect Third World peoples' concerns and knowledge, and IPR regimes that have evolved with the Western bias toward individualized and juridical application procedures unsympathetic to rural societies needs to be developed. A sui generis system must effectively prevent the systematic exploitation of Third World biological resources and knowledge, while it maintains the free exchange of knowledge and resources among Third World farming communities.

Sui generis systems that protect CIRs must necessarily be based on biodemocracy—the belief that all knowledge and production systems using biological organisms have equal validity. In contrast, the TRIPs agreement is based on the concept of bioimperialism—the belief that only the knowledge and production of Western corporations need protection. If unchallenged, TRIPs will become an instrument for displacing and dispensing with the knowledge, resources, and rights of Third World peoples, especially those who depend on biodiversity for their livelihoods, and who are the original owners and innovators in the utilization of biodiversity.

Legalizing Biopiracy

The TRIPs agreement of GATT is not the result of democratic negotiations between the larger public and commercial interests or between industrialized countries and the Third World. It is the imposition of values and interests by Western transnational corporations on the diverse societies and cultures of the world.

The framework for the TRIPs agreement was conceived and shaped by three organizations—the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), Keidanren, and the Union of Industrial and Employees Confederations (UNICE). IPC is a coalition of 12 major U.S. corporations: Bristol Myers, DuPont, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, Pfizer, Rockwell, and Warner. Keidanren is a federation of economic organizations in Japan, and UNICE is recognized as the official spokesperson for European business and industry.

The transnational corporations have a vested interest in the TRIPs agreement. For example, Pfizer, Bristol Meyers, and Merck already have patents on Third World biomaterials collected without payment of royalties.

Together, these groups worked closely to introduce intellectual property protection into GATT.

James Enyart of Monsanto, commenting on the IPC strategy, states:

> Since no existing trade group or association really filled the bill, we had to create one....Once created, the first task of the IPC was to repeat the missionary work we did in the U.S. in the early days, this time with the industrial associations of Europe and Japan to convince them that a code was possible....We consulted many interest groups during the whole process. It was not an easy task but our Trilateral Group was able to distill from the laws of the more advanced countries the fundamental principles for protecting all forms of intellectual property....Besides selling our concepts at home, we went to Geneva where [we] presented [our] document to the staff of the GATT Secretariat. We also took the opportunity to present it to the Geneva based representatives of a large number of countries....What I have described to you is absolutely unprecedented in GATT. Industry has identified a major problem for international trade. It crafted a solution, reduced it to a concrete proposal and sold it to our own and other governments....The industries and traders of world commerce have played simultaneously the role of patients, the diagnosticians and the prescribing physicians.[11]

By usurping all these roles from diverse social groups, commercial interests have displaced ethical, ecological, and social concerns from the substance of the TRIPs agreement. Prior to the Uruguay Round of GATT, which concluded in 1993, IPRs were not covered. Each country had its own national IPR laws to suit its ethical and socioeconomic conditions. The major thrust for internationalizing IPR laws was given by the transnational corporations (TNCs). Even though IPRs are only a statutory right, the TNCs have naturalized them. They have then used GATT to protect what they define as their "rights" as owners of intellectual property. As stated in the 1988 industry paper, "Basic Framework for GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property," coauthored by IPC, Keidanren, and UNICE:

> Because national intellectual property protection systems differ, intellectual property right owners spend a disproportionate amount of time and resources to acquire and defend rights. These owners also find that the exercise of intellectual property rights is encumbered by laws and regulations limiting market access or the ability to repatriate profits.[12]

All of the undesirable elements in the Patent (Amendment) Bill are to be found in this 1988 industry paper. These include expanding the life, subject matter, and scope of product patents, while shrinking the requirements for the working of a patent and compulsory licensing. While the Indian Patent Act of 1970 does not allow product patents in pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals, the Patent (Amendment) Bill, introduced in 1995 by the Indian government to implement GATT TRIPs but ultimately rejected, allows product patent applications and granting of exclusive marketing rights. This push for product patents is clearly expressed in the "Basic Framework" paper:

> Some countries which grant protection for mechanical and electrical services deny protection for new substances. In the case of chemicals, pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals, for example, some countries permit only a patent for a specific process of making the product, while others provide protection for the product only when made by the process [product-by-process protection]. Chemical substances, however, can almost always be made in a variety of ways, and it is rarely feasible to patent all such routes. Where the invention resides in a new valuable chemical substance, a process patent is therefore simply an invitation to imitators to manufacture the chemical substance by another route, usually a relatively straightforward exercise for a competent chemist.[13]

Similarly, the Indian Patent Act has strong compulsory licensing clauses to ensure that the fundamental right of the public to food and medicine is not ignored due to the profit motive.

TNCs, however, view this protection of the public interest as discrimination. As they state:

> Grant of an exclusive right is an essential element of an effective patent system. However, some countries subject patents in a particular field to compulsory licensing to third parties on demand. Food, medicines and sometimes agrochemicals are particular targets for this form of discrimination. This results in undue injury to the rights of its owner.[14]

In the TNC approach, the injury caused by exclusive marketing rights and monopolies to the fundamental human rights of citizens to be able to meet their basic needs is of no consequence. The TNCs define all public interest elements in IPR regimes, such as systems of working requirement and compulsory licenses, as an abuse. According to them, commercial reality should be the only consideration. Ethical limits as well as social and economic imperatives are mere barriers to their commercial expansion.

Under the one-sided influence of TNCs, life-forms have been included under the subject matter of patentability. Since most of the companies in IPC have interests in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals, and the new biotechnologies, they demanded the inclusion of biological organisms under patent protection. As stated in the "Basic Framework":

> Biotechnology, the use of micro-organisms to make products, represents a related field in which patent protection has not kept pace with the rapid strides being made in health, agriculture, waste disposal and industry. The products of biotechnology include the building blocks to make genes, hybridomas, monoclonal antibodies, enzymes, chemicals, micro-organisms and plants. Although biotechnology has attracted widespread attention, many countries withhold the effective patent protection needed to justify investment in relevant research and development. Such protection should be afforded for both biotechnology processes and products, including micro-organisms, parts of micro-organisms (plasmids and other vectors) and plants.[15]

The issue of the patentability of life is not merely a trade-related issue: it is primarily an ethical and ecological issue intimately related to the social injustice of biopiracy. If implemented, the TRIPs agreement could have tremendous implications for the health of the environment as well as for the conservation of biodiversity.

Our Word is Our Weapon : Selected Writings
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A Storm and a Prophecy

Chiapas: The Southeast in Two Winds

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The First Wind: The One from Above

ONE

Which narrates how the supreme government, touched by the poverty of the indigenous peoples of Chiapas, lavished the area with hotels, prisons, barracks, and a military airport. It also tells how the beast feeds on the blood of the people, as well as other miserable and unfortunate happenings.

SUPPOSE THAT YOU live in the north, center, or west of this country. Suppose that you heed the old Department of Tourism slogan: "Get to know Mexico first." Suppose that you decide to visit the southeast of your country and that in the southeast you choose to visit the state of Chiapas. Suppose that you drive there (getting there by airplane is not only expensive but unlikely, a mere fantasy: there are only two "civilian" airports and one military one). Suppose that you take the Transístmica Highway. Suppose that you pay no attention to the army barracks located at Matías Romero and that you continue on to Ventosa. Suppose that you don't notice the government's immigration checkpoint near there (the checkpoint makes you think that you are leaving one country and entering another). Suppose that you decide to take a left and head toward Chiapas. Several kilometers farther on you will leave the state of Oaxaca, and you will see a big sign that reads: "WELCOME TO CHIAPAS." Have you found it?

Good, suppose you have. You have now entered by one of the three existing roads into Chiapas: the road into the northern part of the state, the road along the Pacific coast, and the road by which you entered are the three ways to get to this southeastern corner of the country by land. But the state's natural wealth doesn't leave just by way of these three roads. Chiapas loses blood through many veins: through oil and gas ducts, electric lines, railways; through bank accounts, trucks, vans, boats, and planes; through clandestine paths, gaps, and forest trails. This land continues to pay tribute to the imperialists: petroleum, electricity, cattle, money, coffee, banana, honey, corn, cacao, tobacco, sugar, soy, melon, sorghum, mamey,

mango, tamarind, avocado, and Chiapaneco blood all flow as a result of the thousand teeth sunk into the throat of the Mexican Southeast. These raw materials, thousands of millions of tons of them, flow to Mexican ports, railroads, air and truck transportation centers. From there they are sent to different parts of the world—the United States, Canada, Holland, Germany, Italy, Japan—but all to fulfill one same destiny: to feed imperialism. Since the beginning, the fee that capitalism imposes on the southeastern part of this country makes Chiapas ooze blood and mud.

A handful of businesses, one of which is the Mexican state, take all the wealth out of Chiapas and in exchange leave behind their mortal and pestilent mark: in 1989 these businesses took 1,222,669,000,000 pesos from Chiapas and only left behind 616,340,000,000 pesos worth of credit and public works.[1] More than 600,000,000,000 pesos went to the belly of the beast.

In Chiapas, Pemex[2] has eighty-six teeth sunk into the townships of Estación Juárez, Reforma, Ostuacán, Pichucalco, and Ocosingo. Every day they suck out 92,000 barrels of petroleum and 517,000,000,000 cubic feet of gas. They take away the petroleum and gas and, in exchange, leave behind the mark of capitalism: ecological destruction, agricultural plunder, hyperinflation, alcoholism, prostitution, and poverty. The beast is still not satisfied and has extended its tentacles to the Lacandon Jungle: eight petroleum deposits are under exploration. The paths are made with machetes by the same campesinos who are left without land by the insatiable beast. The trees fall and dynamite explodes on land where campesinos are not allowed to cut down trees to cultivate. Every tree that is cut down costs them a fine that is ten times the minimum wage, and a jail sentence. The poor cannot cut down trees, but the petroleum beast can, a beast that every day fells more and more into foreign hands. The campesinos cut them down to survive, the beast cuts them down to plunder.

Chiapas also bleeds coffee. Thirty-five percent of the coffee produced in Mexico comes from this area. The industry employs 87,000 people. Forty-seven percent of the coffee is for national consumption, and 53 percent is exported abroad, mainly to the United States and Europe. More than 100,000 tons of coffee are taken from this state to fatten the beast's bank accounts: in 1988 a kilo of pergamino coffee was sold abroad for 8,000 pesos. The Chiapaneco producers were paid 2,500 pesos or less.

After coffee, the second most important plunder is beef. Three million head of cattle wait for middlemen and a small group of businessmen to take them away to fill refrigerators in Arriaga, Villahermosa, and Mexico City. The cattle are sold for 400 pesos per kilo by the poor farmers and resold by the middlemen and businessmen for up to ten times the price they paid for them.

The tribute that capitalism demands from Chiapas has no historical parallel. Fifty-five percent of national hydroelectric energy comes from this state, along

with 20 percent of Mexico's total electricity. However, only a third of the homes in Chiapas have electricity. Where do the 12,907 kilowatts produced annually by hydroelectric plants in Chiapas go?

In spite of the current trend toward ecological awareness, the plunder of wood continues in Chiapas' forests. Between 1981 and 1989, 2,444,777 cubic meters of precious woods, conifers, and tropical trees were taken from Chiapas to Mexico City, Puebla, Veracruz, and Quintana Roo. In 1988, wood exports brought a revenue of 23,900,000,000 pesos, 6,000 percent more than in 1980.

The honey that is produced in 79,000 beehives in Chiapas goes entirely to the United States and European markets. The 2,756 tons of honey produced annually in the Chiapaneco countryside is converted into dollars that the people of Chiapas never see.

Of the corn produced in Chiapas, more than half goes to the domestic market. Chiapas is one of the largest corn producers in the country. Sorghum grown in Chiapas goes to Tabasco. Ninety percent of the tamarind goes to Mexico City and other states. Two-thirds of the avocados and all of the mameys are sold outside of the state. Sixty-nine percent of the cacao goes to the national market, and 31 percent is exported to the United States, Holland, Japan, and Italy. The majority of the bananas produced are exported.

What does the beast leave behind in exchange for all it takes away?

Chiapas has a total area of 75,634.4 square kilometers, some 7.5 million hectares. It is the eighth largest state in Mexico and is divided into 111 townships. For the purposes of looting, it is organized into nine economic regions. Forty percent of the nation's plant varieties, 36 percent of its mammal species, 34 percent of its reptiles and amphibians, 66 percent of its bird species, 20 percent of its freshwater fish, and 80 percent of its butterfly species are found in Chiapas. Seven percent of the total national rainfall falls in Chiapas. But its greatest wealth is the 3.5 million people of Chiapas, two-thirds of whom live and die in rural communities. Half of them don't have potable water, and two-thirds have no sewage service. Ninety percent of the rural population pays little or no taxes.

Communication in Chiapas is a grotesque joke for a state that produces petroleum, electricity, coffee, wood, and cattle for the hungry beast. Only two-thirds of the municipal seats have paved-road access. Twelve thousand communities have no other means of transport and communication than mountain trails. Since the days of Porfirio Díaz, the railroad lines have serviced capitalism rather than the people.[3] The railroad line that follows the coast (there are only two lines: the other crosses the northern part of the state) dates back to the turn of the century, and its tonnage is limited by the old bridges that cross the canyons of the Southeast. The only port in Chiapas, Puerto Madero, is just one more way for the beast to extract the state's resources.

And education? It is the worst in the country. At the elementary school level, 72 out of every 100 children don't finish the first grade. More than half of the schools only offer up to a third-grade education, and half of the schools have only one teacher for all the courses offered. There are statistics, although they are kept secret of course, that show that many indigenous children are forced to drop out of school due to their families' need to incorporate them into the system of exploitation. In any indigenous community it is common to see children carrying corn and wood, cooking, or washing clothes during school hours. Of the 16,058 classrooms in 1989, only 96 were in indigenous zones.

And industry? Look, 40 percent of Chiapas' "industry" consists of nixtamal[4] mills, tortillas, and mills to make wood furniture. The large companies (petroleum and electricity), which represent 2 percent of the total industry, belong to the Mexican government (and soon to foreigners). Medium-size industry, 4 percent of the total industry, is made up of sugar refineries and fish, seafood, flour, milk, and coffee processing plants. In the state of Chiapas, 94 percent of the area's industry is micro-industry.

The health conditions of the people of Chiapas are a clear example of the capitalist imprint: 1.5 million people have no medical services at their disposal. There are 0.2 clinics for every 1,000 inhabitants, one-fifth of the national average. There are 0.3 hospital beds for every 1,000 Chiapanecos, one-third the amount in the rest of Mexico. There is one operating room per 100,000 inhabitants, one-half of the amount in the rest of Mexico. There are 0.5 doctors and 0.4 nurses per 1,000 people, one-half of the national average.

Health and nutrition go hand in hand in poverty. Fifty-four percent of the population of Chiapas suffers from malnutrition, and in the highlands and forest this percentage increases to 80 percent. A campesino's average diet consists of coffee, corn, tortillas, and beans.

This is what capitalism leaves as payment for everything that it takes away.

This part of the Mexican territory, which willingly annexed itself to the young independent republic in 1824, became part of the national geography when the petroleum boom reminded the country that there was a Southeast (82 percent of Pemex's petrochemical plants are in the Southeast; in 1990, two-thirds of public investment in the Southeast was in energy). Chiapas' experience of exploitation goes back for centuries. In times past, wood, fruits, animals, and men went to the metropolis through the veins of exploitation, just as they do today. Like the banana republics, but at the peak of neoliberalism and "libertarian revolutions," the Southeast continues to export raw materials, just as it did 500 years ago. It continues to import capitalism's principal product: death and misery.

One million indigenous people live in these lands and share a disorienting nightmare with mestizos and ladinos: their only option, five hundred years after

the "Meeting of Two Worlds," is to die of poverty or repression. The programs to improve the conditions of poverty, a small bit of social democracy which the Mexican state throws about and which, under the regime of Salinas de Gortari carries the name Pronasol, are a joke that brings bloody tears to those who live under the rain and sun.

Welcome! You have arrived in the poorest state in the country: Chiapas.

Suppose that you drive on to Ocosocoatla and from there down to Tuxtla Gutiérrez, the state capital. You don't stay long. Tuxtla Gutiérrez is only a large warehouse that stores products from other parts of the state. Here you find some of the wealth that will be sent to whatever destinations the capitalists decide. You don't stay long; you have just barely touched the lips of the wild beast's bloody jaws. You go on to Chiapas de Corzo without noticing the Nestle's factory that is there, and you begin to climb up into the mountains. What do you see? One thing is certain; you have entered another world, an indigenous world. Another world, but the same as that in which millions of people in the rest of the country live.

Three hundred thousand Tzotziles, 120,000 Choles, 90,000 Zoques, and 70,000 Tojolabales inhabit this indigenous world. The supreme government recognizes that "only" half of these 1,000,000 indigenous people are illiterate.

Continue along the mountain road, and you arrive in the region known as the Chiapas highlands. Here, more than 500 years ago, indigenous people were the majority, masters and owners of land and water. Now they are only the majority in population and in poverty. Drive on until you reach San Cristobal de las Casas, which 100 years ago was the state capital (disagreements among the bourgeoisie robbed it of the dubious honor of being the capital of the poorest state in Mexico). No, don't linger. If Tuxtla Gutiérrez is a large warehouse, San Cristobal is a large market. From many different routes the Tzotziles, Tzeltales, Choles, Tojolabales, and Zoques bring the indigenous tribute to capitalism. Each brings something different: wood, coffee, cloth, handicrafts, fruits, vegetables, corn. Everyone brings something: sickness, ignorance, jeers, and death. This is the poorest region of the poorest state in the country. Welcome to San Cristobal de las Casas, a "colonial city," according to the history books, although the majority of the population is indigenous. Welcome to Pronasol's huge market. Here you can buy or sell anything except indigenous dignity. Here everything is expensive except death. But don't stay too long; continue along the road, the proud result of the tourist infrastructure. In 1988 there were 6,270 hotel rooms, 139 restaurants, and 42 travel agencies in this state. This year, 1,058,098 tourists visited Chiapas and left 250 million pesos in the hands of restaurant and hotel owners.

Have you calculated the numbers? Yes, you're right: there are 7 hotel rooms for every 1,000 tourists, while there are only 0.3 hospital beds per 1,000 Chiapaneco citizens. Leave the calculations behind and drive on, noticing the three police officials in berets jogging along the shoulder of the road. Drive by the Public Security station and continue, passing hotels, restaurants, large stores, and heading toward the exit to Comitan. Leaving San Cristobal behind, you will see the famous San Cristobal caves, surrounded by leafy forest. Do you see the sign? No, you are not mistaken, this natural park is administered by . . . the army! Without leaving your uncertainty behind, drive on . . . Do you see them? Modern buildings, nice homes, paved roads . . . Is it a university? Workers' housing? No, look at the sign next to the cannons closely and read: "General Army Barracks of the 31st Military Zone." With the olive-green image still in your eyes, drive on to the intersection and decide not to go to Comitan so that you will avoid the pain of seeing that, a few meters ahead, on the hill that is called the "Foreigner," North American military personnel are operating and teaching their Mexican counterparts to operate radar. Decide that it is better to go to Ocosingo, since ecology and all that nonsense is very fashionable. Look at the trees, breathe deeply . . . Do you feel better? Yes? Then be sure to keep looking to your left, because if you don't, you will see, seven kilometers ahead, another magnificent construction with the noble symbol of SOLIDARITY on the facade. Don't look. I tell you, look the other way.

You don't notice that this new building is . . . a jail (evil tongues say that this is a benefit of Pronasol; now campesinos won't have to go all the way to Cerro Hueco, the prison in the state capital). No, brother, don't lose heart, the worst is always hidden: excessive poverty discourages tourism. Continue on, down to Huixta'n, up to Oxchuc, look at the beautiful waterfall where the Jatate River, whose waters cross the Lacandon Jungle, begins. Pass by Cuxulja and instead of following the detour to Altamirano, drive on till you reach Ocosingo: "The Door to the Lacandon Jungle."

Good, stay a while. Take a quick tour around the city . . . Principal points of interest? The two large constructions at the entrance to the city are brothels; next door is a jail; the building farther beyond, a church; this other one is a beef-processing plant; that other one, army barracks; over there is the court, the municipal building; and way over there is Pemex. The rest are small piled-up houses that crumble when the huge Pemex trucks and ranch pickup trucks pass by.

What does it look like? A Porfirista-type[5] large landed estate? But that ended seventy-five years ago! No, don't follow the road that goes to San Quintin, in front of the Montes Azules Reserve. Don't go to where the Jatate and Perlas Rivers join, don't go down there, don't walk for three eight-hour days, don't go to San Martin and see that it is a very poor and small community, don't approach that shed that is falling to pieces. What is it? A sometimes church, school, meeting room. Now it is a school. It is 11 A.M. No, don't go closer, don't look in, don't look at the four groups of children riddled with tapeworms and lice, half-naked, don't look at the four young indigenous teachers who work for miserable pay that they have to

walk three days, the same three days that you just walked, to collect. Don't notice that the only division between the classrooms is a small hall. Up to what grade do they teach here? Third. No, don't look at the posters, which are the only thing that the government has sent to these children. Don't look at them: they are posters about AIDS prevention.

Better for us to move on; let's return to the paved road. Yes, I know that it is in bad condition. Let's leave Ocosingo, continue to admire the countryside . . . The owners? Yes, ranch owners. What is produced? Cattle, coffee, corn . . . Did you see the National Indigenous Institute? Yes, the one as you leave the city. Did you see those pickup trucks? They are given on credit to indigenous campesinos. They only take unleaded gas because it's better for the environment. There is no unleaded gas in Ocosingo? Well, that's not a big thing. Yes, you are right, the government is worried about the campesinos. Of course evil tongues say that there are guerrillas in these mountains and that the government's financial aid is really to buy indigenous people's loyalty, but these are rumors; surely they are just trying to undermine Pronasol.[6] What? The Citizen's Defense Committee? Oh yes! It consists of a group of "heroic" ranchers, traders, and corrupt union bosses who organize small guards to threaten the people. No, I already told you that the Porfirista large-landed estate was done away with seventy-five years ago. It would be better for us to move on . . . At the next intersection take a left. No, don't go toward Palenque. Let's go to Chilón . . . Pretty, no? Yes.

Yajalon . . . it's very modern, it even has a gas station . . . Look, there's a bank, the municipal building, the courthouse, over there the army . . . It looks like another hacienda? Go ahead and look; you won't see those other large, modern buildings on the outskirts of town, along the road to Tila and Sabanilla, with their big beautiful SOLIDARITY signs, you won't see that they are part of . . . a jail.

Good, we have arrived at the intersection. Now to Ocosingo . . . and Palenque? Are you sure? Okay, let's go. Yes, the countryside is beautiful. Are those ranches? You're correct: they produce cattle, coffee, wood. Look, we're already at Palenque. A quick tour of the city? Okay. Those are hotels, over there restaurants, the municipal building, the courthouse, those are the Army barracks, and over there . . . What? No, I already know what you're going to tell me . . . Don't say it . . . Tired? Okay, we'll stop for a bit. You don't want to see the pyramids? No? Okay.

Xi'Nich? Ah . . . an indigenous march. Yes, it's going to Mexico City. How far? One thousand, one hundred and six kilometers. The results? The government receives their petitions. Yes, that's all. Are you still tired? More? Let's wait . . . To Bonampak? The road is very bad. Okay, let's go. Yes, the panoramic route . . . This is the Federal Military Reserve, that other one belongs to the navy, the one over there belongs to the Department of Government . . . Is it always like this? No, sometimes they top it off with a campesinos' protest march.

Tired? Do you want to go back? Okay. Other places? Different places? In what country? Mexico? You will see the same. The colors will change, the languages, the countryside, the names, but the people, the exploitation, the poverty and death, are the same. Just look closely in any state in the republic. Well, good luck . . . And if you need a tourist guide please be sure to let me know. I'm at your service. Oh! One more thing. It will not always be this way. Another Mexico? No, the same . . . I am talking about something else, about other winds beginning to blow, as if another wind is picking up . . .

TWO

Which tells the story of the governor, an apprentice to the viceroy, and his heroic fight against the progressive clergy and his adventures with the feudal cattle, coffee, and business lords. It also tells other equally fantastic tales.

ONCE UPON A TIME there was a viceroy made of chocolate with a peanut for a nose. The viceroy's apprentice, Governor Patrocinio González Garrido,[7] in the manner of the old monarchs who were put in power by the Spanish crown during the Conquest, has reorganized the geography of Chiapas. The assignment of spaces to the urban and rural categories is a somewhat sophisticated exercise of power, but when directed by Mr. González Garrido's denseness, it has reached exquisite levels of stupidity. The viceroy decided that cities with services and benefits should be for those who already have everything. And he decided, the viceroy that is, that the masses are fine out in the open, exposed to wind and rough weather, and that they only deserve space in the jails, which never cease to be uncomfortable. Because of this, the viceroy decided to construct jails on the outskirts of the cities so that the proximity of the undesirable and delinquent masses would not disturb the rich. Jails and army barracks are the principal works promoted by this governor in Chiapas. His friendship with ranchers and powerful businessmen is a secret to no one. Neither is his animosity for the three dioceses that regulate the state's Catholic life. The Diocese of San Cristobal, headed by Bishop Samuel Ruiz, is a constant menace to González Garrido's reorganizing project. Hoping to modernize the absurd system of exploitation and extraction that prevails in Chiapas, Patrocinio González comes up against the stubbornness of religious and secular figures who support and preach Catholicism's option for the poor.

With the hypocritical applause of Aguirre Franco, the bishop of Tuxtla Gutiérrez, and the mute approval of the bishop of Tapachula, González Garrido sustains and gives new life to the "heroic" conspiracies of ranchers and businessmen against the members of the Diocese of San Cristobal. "Don Samuel's teams," as they are called by some, are not made up of inexperienced believers:

before Patrocinio González Garrido had even dreamed of being state governor, the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas preached the right to freedom and justice. For one of the country's most backward bourgeoisie—the agricultural bourgeoisie—this could only mean one thing: rebellion. These rancher and business "patriots" and "believers" know how to prevent rebellion: the existence of privately financed, armed paramilitary groups trained by members of the federal army, public security police, and state law is well known by the campesinos who suffer from their threats, torture, and gunshots.

A few months ago, Father Joel Padrón from the parish of Simojovel was arrested. Accused by the region's ranchers of initiating and taking part in land takeovers, Father Joel was arrested by state authorities and held in the Cerro Hueco jail in the state capital. The mobilization of the members of the Diocese of San Cristobal (those of Tuxtla Gutiérrez and Tapachula were conspicuous by their absence) and a federal compromise succeeded in obtaining the parish priest Padrón's freedom.

While thousands of campesinos marched in Tuxtla Gutiérrez to demand Padrón's freedom, ranchers in Ocosingo sent their paramilitary forces to clear out property-owning campesinos. Four hundred men, armed by the ranchers, destroyed and burned houses, beat indigenous women and murdered a campesino, Juan, by shooting him in the face. After the expulsion, the paramilitary forces—composed mostly of workers from local ranches and small-property owners proud of taking part in raids with the young ranchers—drove along the region's roads in pickup trucks provided by their masters. Ostentatiously displaying their arms, drunk and intoxicated, they shouted, "Ranchers are number one!" and warned everyone that it was only the beginning. Undaunted, municipal authorities in Ocosingo and soldiers stationed in the region looked on passively at the gunmen's triumphant parade.

In Tuxtla Gutiérrez, almost 10,000 campesinos marched in favor of Father Padrón's release. In a corner of Ocosingo, Juan's widow buried her husband, victim of the proud ranchers. There was no march or protest petition for Juan's death. This is Chiapas.

Recently Viceroy González Garrido was the protagonist of a new scandal, which was uncovered because the press reported the story. With the viceroy's approval, Ocosingo's feudal lords organized the Committee for Citizen Defense, a blatant attempt to institutionalize their neo-Porfirista paramilitary forces that keep order in the countryside of Chiapas. Surely nothing would have happened had it not been for the discovery of a plot to assassinate the parish priest Pablo Iribarren and the nun María del Carmen, along with Samuel Ruiz, the bishop of San Cristobal. The plot was reported by the honest Chiapaneco press, which still exists, and reached national forums. There were retractions and denials; the viceroy declared that he maintains good relations with the Church and named a special committee to investigate the case. The investigation yielded no results, and all continues as before.

During the same days, government agencies made some horrifying statistics known: in Chiapas 14,500 people die every year, the highest mortality rate in the country. The causes? Curable diseases such as respiratory infections, enteritis, parasites, amoebas, malaria, salmonella, scabies, dengue, pulmonary tuberculosis, trachoma, typhus, cholera, and measles. Many say that the figure is actually over 15,000 because deaths in marginalized zones, the majority of the state, are not reported. During Patrocinio González Garrido's four-year term more than 60,000 Chiapanecos have died, most of them poor. The war against the people, directed by the viceroy and carried out by the feudal lords, consists of methods more subtle than bombardments. There is no mention in the press of this murderous plot, which claims lives and land just as in the days of the Conquest.

The Committee for Citizen Defense continues to carry out its proselytizing work, holding meetings to convince the rich and poor of the city of Ocosingo that they should organize and arm themselves so that the campesinos won't enter the city because they will destroy everything, without respecting the rich or the poor. The viceroy smiles with approval.

THREE

Which tells how the viceroy had a brilliant idea and put it into practice. It also tells how the empire decreed the death of socialism, and then put itself to the task of carrying out this decree to the great joy of the powerful, the distress of the weak, and the indifference of the majority. It tells of Zapata and how he is said to be still be alive. It also tells of other disconcerting events.

THE VICEROY IS WORRIED. The campesinos refuse to applaud the institutional pillage written into the new Article 27 of the Constitution.[8] The viceroy is enraged. The poor aren't happy with being exploited. They refuse to humbly accept the charity that Pronasol spreads around the Chiapaneco countryside. The Viceroy is desperate. He consults his advisers. His advisers tell him an old truth: jails and military bases aren't enough to ensure continued domination. It is also necessary to control people's thoughts. The viceroy is disturbed. He paces in his palace. Then he stops and smiles.

XEOCH Radio Station: Rap and lies for the campesinos.

IN OCOSINGO and Palenque, Cancue and Chilón, Altamirano and Yajalón, the indigenous people are celebrating. A new gift from the supreme government has

made life a little happier for the peons, small landowners, landless campesinos, and impoverished inhabitants of the *ejidos*. They have been given a local radio station that reaches the most isolated corners of eastern Chiapas.

The station's programming is fitting: marimbas and rap music proclaim the good news. The Chiapas countryside is being modernized. XEOCH transmits from the township of Ocosingo and can be found at 600 Mhz AM from four in the morning till ten at night. Its news shows abound with lies. They tell of the "disorientation" that "subversive" lay workers spread among the peasantry, the abundance of aid credits that are never received by the indigenous communities, and the existence of public works that have never been built. The viceroy is also given time on the air so that he can remind the population with threats that not all is lies and rap music; there are also jails and military bases and a penal code that is the most repressive in the Republic. The penal code punishes any expression of discontent. The laws against demonstrations, rebellion, inciting to riot, and so on demonstrate that the viceroy is careful to maintain everything in order.

There isn't any reason to fight. Socialism has died. Long live conformity, reform, the modern world, capitalism, and all of the cruelties that are associated with them! The viceroy and the feudal lords dance and smile euphorically in their palaces. Their joy is disconcerting for the few free thinkers who live in the area. Even they are incapable of understanding. They are without hope. It is true that one must fight, but the balance of forces isn't favorable. Now isn't the time. We must wait longer, maybe years. We must be alert against the adventurers. We must make sure that nothing happens in the cities or in the countryside, that everything continues as always. Socialism has died. Long live capitalism! Radio, the print media, and television proclaim it. It is repeated by some ex-socialists who are now amazingly changed.

Not everyone who hears the voices of hopelessness and conformity are carried away by hopelessness. There are millions of people who continue without hearing the voices of the powerful and the indifferent. They can't hear; they are deafened by the crying and blood that death and poverty are shouting in their ears. But when there is a moment of rest, they hear another voice. They don't hear the voice that comes from above; they hear the voice that is carried to them by the wind from below, a voice that is born in the indigenous heart of the mountains. This voice speaks to them about justice and freedom, it speaks to them about socialism, about hope . . . the only hope that exists in the world. The oldest of the old in the indigenous communities say that there once was a man named Zapata who rose up with his people and sang out: "Land and Freedom!" These old campesinos say that Zapata didn't die, that he must return. These old campesinos also say that the wind and the rain and the sun tell the campesinos when to cultivate the land, when to plant, and when to harvest. They say that hope

is also planted and harvested. They also say that the wind and the rain and the sun are now saying something different: that with so much poverty, the time has come to harvest rebellion instead of death. That is what the old campesinos say. The powerful don't hear; they can't hear, they are deafened by the brutality that the empire shouts in their ears. "Zapata," insists the wind, the wind from below, our wind.

The Second Wind: The Wind from Below

FOUR

Which tells how dignity and defiance joined hands in the Southeast, and how Jacinto Pérez's[9] *phantoms run through the Chiapaneco highlands. It also tells of a patience that has run out and of other happenings that have been ignored but have major consequences.*

THESE PEOPLE WERE BORN dignified and rebellious, brothers and sisters to the rest of Mexico's exploited people. They are not just the product of the Annexation Act of 1824,[10] but of a long chain of ignominious acts and rebellions. From the time when cassocks and armor conquered this land, dignity and defiance have lived and spread under these rains.

Collective work, democratic thinking, and subjection to the decisions of the majority are more than just traditions in indigenous zones. They have been the only means of survival, resistance, dignity, and defiance. These "evil ideas," as they are seen by landholders and businessmen, go against the capitalist precept of "a lot in the hands of a few."

It has mistakenly been said that the Chiapas rebellion has no counterpart, that it is outside the national experience. This is a lie. The exploited Chiapaneco's specialty is the same as that of exploited people from Durango, Veracruz, or the plateau of northern Mexico: to fight and to lose. If the voices of those who write history speak exclusively, it is because the voice of the oppressed does not speak . . . not yet.

There is no historic, national, or regional calendar that has documented each and every rebellion against this system that is imposed and maintained with blood and fire throughout the national territory. In Chiapas, the rebel voice is only heard when it shakes the world of the landowners and business people. Indeed, the phantom of indigenous barbarism strikes government-building walls and gains access with the help of revolution, trickery, and threats. If the rebellion in the Southeast fails, like the rebellions lost in the North, Center, and West, it is not the result of bad timing; it is because the wind is fruit of the land; it comes

and in time ripens, not in a book of laments, but in the ordered breasts of those who have nothing but dignity and rebelliousness.

And this wind from below, that of rebellion and dignity, is not just an answer to the wind from above. It is not just an angry response. Rather, it carries with it not just a call for the destruction of an unjust and arbitrary system but a new proposal: the hope of converting rebellion and dignity into freedom and dignity.

How will this new voice make itself heard in these lands and across the country? How will this hidden wind blow, this wind that now blows only in the mountains and canyons and hasn't yet descended to the valleys where money rules and lies govern? This wind will come from the mountains. It is already being born under the trees and is conspiring for a world so new that it is barely an intuition in the collective heart that inspires it . . .

FIVE

This chapter tells how the dignity of the indigenous people tried to make itself heard, but its voice only lasted a little while. It also tells how voices that spoke before are speaking again today, and that the Indians are walking forward once again, but this time with firm footsteps. They are walking together with other dispossessed peoples to take what belongs to them. The music of death that now plays only for those who have nothing will now play for everyone. It also tells of other frightful things that have happened and, they say, must happen.

THE INDIGENOUS MARCH called Xi'Nich, "the ant," composed of campesinos from Palenque, Ocosingo, and Salto de Agua, demonstrates the system's absurdity. These indigenous people had to walk 1,106 kilometers to make themselves heard. They had to go to the capital of the Republic in order for the central power to arrange a meeting with the viceroy. They arrived in Mexico City when capitalism was painting a frightful tragedy across the skies of Jalisco. They arrived at the capital of old New Spain, now Mexico, exactly 500 years after the foreign nightmare imposed itself in the night of this land. They arrived, and all the honest and noble people, of which there are still some, listened to them and the voices that oppress them today in the Southeast, North, Center, and West of the country also listened to them. They walked back, another 1,106 kilometers, their bags filled with promises. Again, nothing came of it . . .

In the municipal seat of Simojovel campesinos belonging to the CIOAC[11] organization were attacked by people paid by local ranchers. The campesinos in Simojovel have decided to stop being silent and to respond to the ranchers' threats. Campesinos surround the municipal seat. Nothing and no one enters or leaves without their consent. The federal army withdraws to its barracks, the police retreat, and the state's feudal lords demand arms in an attempt to restore

order and respect. Negotiating commissions come and go. The conflict appears to have resolved itself. But the causes persist. With the same outward appearances, everything returns to calm.

In the town of Betania, on the outskirts of San Cristobal de las Casas, indigenous people are regularly detained and harassed by judicial agents for cutting firewood for their homes—the agents say that they are only doing this to protect the environment. The indigenous people decide to stop being silent and kidnap three judicial officials. They take the Panamerican Highway and cut off communications to the east of San Cristobal. At the intersection between Ocosingo and Comitán, campesinos are holding the judiciaries, and they demand to speak to the viceroy before they will agree to unblock the road. Business comes to a halt, tourism collapses. Negotiating commissions come and go. The conflict appears to resolve itself but the causes persist. With the same outward appearances, everything returns to calm.

In Marques de Comillas, in the township of Ocosingo, campesinos cut wood to survive. The judicial officials arrest them and confiscate the wood for their commander. The indigenous people decide to stop being silent, and they take the agents' vehicles and kidnap the agents. The governor sends Public Security police, who in turn are kidnapped in the same way. The indigenous people hold on to the trucks, the wood, and the prisoners. They let the prisoners go. There is no response. They march to Palenque to demand solutions, and the army oppresses them and kidnaps their leaders. They hold on to the vehicles. Negotiating commissions come and go. The government lets the leaders go; the campesinos return the vehicles. The conflict appears to resolve itself, but the causes persist. With the same outward appearance, everything returns to calm.

In the municipal seat of Ocosingo, 4,000 indigenous campesinos from the organization ANCIEZ[12] march from different points of the city. Three marches converge in front of the Municipal Building. The municipal president doesn't know what it's all about and flees. On the floor of his office is a calendar indicating the date: April 10, 1992. Outside indigenous campesinos from Ocosingo, Oxchuc, Huixtán, Chilón, Yajalón, Sabanilla, Salto de Agua, Palenque, Altamirano, Las Margaritas, San Cristobal, San Andres, and Cancún dance in front of a giant image of Zapata, painted by one of them, recite poetry, sing, and speak. Only they are listening. The landowners, businessmen, and judicial officials are closed up in their homes and shops; the federal garrison appears deserted. The campesinos shout that Zapata lives and the struggle continues. One of them reads a letter addressed to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in which they accuse him of having brought all gains of the agrarian reform made under Zapata to an end, of selling the country with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and of bringing Mexico back to the times of Porfirio Díaz. They declare forcefully that they will not

recognize Salinas' reforms to Article 27 of the Political Constitution. At two o'clock in the afternoon the demonstration disperses, in an orderly fashion, but the causes persist. With the same outward appearances everything returns to calm.

Abasolo is an *ejido* in the township of Ocosingo. For years, campesinos took land that legally belonged to them. Three of this community's leaders have been put in jail and tortured by the governor. The indigenous people decide to stop being silent, and they take the San Cristobal—Ocosingo highway. Negotiating commissions come and go. The leaders are freed. The conflict appears to resolve itself, but the causes persist. With the same outward, appearance everything returns to calm.

Antonio dreams of owning the land he works on; he dreams that his sweat is paid for with justice and truth; he dreams that there is a school to cure ignorance and medicine to scare away death; he dreams of having electricity in his home and that his table is full; he dreams that his country is free and that this is the result of the people governing themselves; and he dreams that he is at peace with himself and with the world. He dreams that he must fight to obtain this dream, he dreams that there must be death in order to gain life. Antonio dreams, and then he awakens . . . Now he knows what to do, and he sees his wife crouching by the fire, hears his son crying. He looks at the sun rising in the east and, smiling, grabs his machete.

The wind picks up, he rises and walks to meet others. Something has told him that his dream is that of many, and he goes to find them.

The viceroy dreams that his land is agitated by a terrible wind that rouses everything; he dreams that all he has stolen is taken from him, that his house is destroyed, and that his reign is brought down. He dreams, and he doesn't sleep. The viceroy goes to the feudal lords, and they tell him that they have been having the same dream. The viceroy cannot rest. So he goes to his doctor, and together they decide that it is some sort of indigenous witchcraft and that they will only be freed from this dream with blood. The viceroy orders killings and kidnappings and he builds more jails and army barracks. But the dream continues and keeps him tossing and turning and unable to sleep.

Everyone is dreaming in this country. Now it is time to wake up . . .

The storm is here. From the clash of these two winds a storm will be born. Its time has arrived. Now the wind from above rules, but the wind from below is coming . . .

The prophecy is here: When the storm calms, when rain and fire again leave the country in peace, the world will no longer be the world, but something better.

NOTES

1. The exchange of pesos to dollars in 1989 was 3,000 pesos for one U.S. dollar.
2. Pemex stands for Petroleum of Mexico, a government-owned company.
3. Porfirio Díaz was dictator of Mexico from 1876 to 1911 when mestizos in Chiapas accumulated enormous wealth, and the local economy was opened to international trade.
4. *Nixtamal* is cornmeal cooked with lye to make tortillas.
5. Because Porfirio Díaz favored landowners, a Porfirista-type landed estate implies a very large spread of land with many workers, feudalistic in nature.
6. Pronasol stands for Programa Nacional de Socialización, the National Program for Socialization set up by Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1988 and active until 1994. Much like the World Bank Anti-Poverty Program, Pronasol focused on aid rather than development; it was was used as a tool to organize a new ruling party in Mexico, and as proof of Salinas's commitment to fighting poverty.
7. Patrocinio González Garrido, governor of Chiapas from 1988 to 1993 and minister of the interior during the Zapatista uprising, was forced to resign after being blamed for not having foreseen the rebellion.
8. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 recognized the autonomy of indigenous territories and mandated land distribution so that the indigenous and peasants would be ensured land parcels to work and sustain their families. Salinas amended this article, declaring the *ejidos* to be private property, and did not enforce the redistribution of the lands taken illegally by the large landowners, as they required more space for their cattle.
9. Jacinto Pérez, an indigenous anthropologist who authored many books, was educated at Harvard University. He served as Mexico's minister of culture and was the mayor of the municipality of Chenaló during the massacre at Acteal, which is within that municipality.
10. In the Annexation Act of 1824, Chiapas, then part of Guatemala, decided to become part of Mexico.
11. CIOAC—*Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos* (Independent Union of Agricultural Workers and Peasants) serves as a national watchdog organization for and by the working class. It keeps an eye on industrial development to ensure the well-being of the worker.
12. ANCIEZ stands for Asociación Nacional de Campesinos Indigenas Emiliano Zapata (National Association of Indigenous Peasants Emiliano Zapata). It was founded in 1991 and disbanded in 1993, when the EZLN was formed.

Bullet proof thing.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
The Communist Manifesto [1848]
trans. Samuel Moore (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967).

A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcize this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police spies.[7]

Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communistic by its opponents in power? Where the Opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?

Two things result from this fact:

I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European Powers to be itself a Power.

II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a Manifesto of the party itself.

To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following Manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

1

Bourgeois and Proletarians*

THE history of all hitherto existing society† is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master‡ and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

*By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern Capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live. [*Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

†That is, all *written* history. In 1847, the pre-history of society, the social organization existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown. Since then, Haxthausen discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Maurer proved it to be the social foundation from which all Teutonic races started in history, and by and by village communities were found to be, or to have been the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland. The inner organization of this primitive Communistic society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's crowning discovery of the true nature of the *gens* and its relation to the *tribe*. With the dissolution of these primeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic classes. I have attempted to retrace this process of dissolution in: *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigenthums und des Staats* (*The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*), 2nd edition, Stuttgart 1886. [*Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

‡Guild-master, that is, a full member of a guild, a master within, not a head of a guild. [*Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.

The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.

From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed.

The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development.

The feudal system of industry, under which industrial production was monopolized by closed guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class; division of labour between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labour in each single workshop.

Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. Even manufacture no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionized industrial production. The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern Industry, the place of the industrial middle class, by industrial millionaires, the leaders of whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois.

Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.

We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.

Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the medieval commune;* here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there taxable 'third estate' of the

*'Commune' was the name taken, in France, by the nascent towns even before they had conquered from their feudal lords and masters local self-government and political rights as the 'Third Estate'. Generally speaking, for the economical development of the bourgeoisie, England is here taken as the typical country; for its political development, France. [*Note by Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

This was the name given their urban communities by the townsmen of Italy and France, after they had purchased or wrested their initial rights of self-government from their feudal lords. [*Note by Engels to the German edition of 1890.*]

monarchy (as in France), afterwards, in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, corner-stone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors', and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment'. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers.

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.

The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the Middle Ages, which Reactionists so much admire, found its fitting complement

in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades.

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the

remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of pro-

duction, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected, provinces with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground – what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?

We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.

Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economical and political sway of the bourgeois class.

A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like

the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity – the epidemic of overproduction. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons – the modern working class – the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed – a class of labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital. These labourers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for his maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and therefore also of labour, is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of labour increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by increase of the work exacted in a given time or by increased speed of the machinery, etc.

Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory,

are organized like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.

The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex.

No sooner is the exploitation of the labourer by the manufacturer, so far, at an end, that he receives his wages in cash, than he is set upon by the other portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker, etc.

The lower strata of the middle class – the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants – all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialized skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the work-people of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks

not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.

At this stage the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.

But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the wages of the workers ever more fluctuating. The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (Trades Unions) against the

bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots.

Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years.

This organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the Ten Hours bill in England was carried.

Altogether collisions between the classes of the old society further, in many ways, the course of development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times, with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its

own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.

Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling classes are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.

Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend not their present, but their future interests, they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.

The 'dangerous class', the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family relations; modern industrial labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.

All the preceding classes that got the upper hand sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle.

The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.

In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an overriding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

The essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labour. Wage labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the

labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000).

1

BLOWBACK

Northern Italian communities had, for years, complained about low-flying American military aircraft. In February 1998, the inevitable happened. A Marine Corps EA-6B Prowler with a crew of four, one of scores of advanced American jet fighters and bombers stationed at places like Aviano, Cervia, Brindisi, and Sigonella, sliced through a ski-lift cable near the resort town of Cavalese and plunged twenty people riding in a single gondola to their deaths on the snowy slopes several hundred feet below. Although marine pilots are required to maintain an altitude of at least one thousand feet (two thousand, according to the Italian government), the plane had cut the cable at a height of 360 feet. It was traveling at 621 miles per hour when 517 miles per hour was considered the upper limit. The pilot had been performing low-level acrobatics while his copilot took pictures on videotape (which he later destroyed).

In response to outrage in Italy and calls for vigorous prosecution of those responsible, the marine pilots argued that their charts were inaccurate, that their altimeter had not worked, and that they had not consulted U.S. Air Force units permanently based in the area about local hazards. A court-martial held not in Italy but in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, exonerated everyone involved, calling it a "training accident." Soon after, President Bill Clinton apologized and promised financial

compensation to the victims, but on May 14, 1999, Congress dropped the provision for aid to the families because of opposition in the House of Representatives and from the Pentagon.[1]

This was hardly the only such incident in which American service personnel victimized foreign civilians in the post–Cold War world. From Germany and Turkey to Okinawa and South Korea, similar incidents have been common—as has been their usual denouement. The United States government never holds politicians or higher-ranking military officers responsible and seldom finds that more should be done beyond offering pro forma apologies and perhaps financial compensation of some, often minimal sort.

On rare occasions, as with the Italian cable cutting, when such a local tragedy rises to the level of global news, what often seems strangest to Americans is the level of national outrage elsewhere over what the U.S. media portray as, at worst, an apparently isolated incident, however tragic to those involved. Certainly, the one subject beyond discussion at such moments is the fact that, a decade after the end of the Cold War, hundreds of thousands of American troops, supplied with the world's most advanced weaponry, sometimes including nuclear arms, are stationed on over sixty-one base complexes in nineteen countries worldwide, using the Department of Defense's narrowest definition of a "major installation"; if one included every kind of installation that houses representatives of the American military, the number would rise to over eight hundred.[2] There are, of course, no Italian air bases on American soil. Such a thought would be ridiculous. Nor, for that matter, are there German, Indonesian, Russian, Greek, or Japanese troops stationed on Italian soil. Italy is, moreover, a close ally of the United States, and no conceivable enemy nation endangers its shores.

All this is almost too obvious to state—and so is almost never said. It is simply not a matter for discussion, much less of debate in the land of the last imperial power. Perhaps similar thinking is second nature to any imperium. Perhaps the Romans did not find it strange to have their troops in Gaul, nor the British in South Africa. But what is unspoken is

no less real, nor does it lack consequences just because it is not part of any ongoing domestic discussion.

I believe it is past time for such a discussion to begin, for Americans to consider why we have created an empire—a word from which we shy away—and what the consequences of our imperial stance may be for the rest of the world and for ourselves. Not so long ago, the way we garrisoned the world could be discussed far more openly and comfortably because the explanation seemed to lie at hand—in the very existence of the Soviet Union and of communism. Had the Italian disaster occurred two decades earlier, it would have seemed no less a tragedy, but many Americans would have argued that, given the Cold War, such incidents were an unavoidable cost of protecting democracies like Italy against the menace of Soviet totalitarianism. With the disappearance of any military threat faintly comparable to that posed by the former Soviet Union, such "costs" have become easily avoidable. American military forces could have been withdrawn from Italy, as well as from other foreign bases, long ago. That they were not and that Washington instead is doing everything in its considerable powers to perpetuate Cold War structures, even without the Cold War's justification, places such overseas deployments in a new light. They have become striking evidence, for those who care to look, of an imperial project that the Cold War obscured. The by-products of this project are likely to build up reservoirs of resentment against all Americans—tourists, students, and businessmen, as well as members of the armed forces—that can have lethal results.

For any empire, including an unacknowledged one, there is a kind of balance sheet that builds up over time. Military crimes, accidents, and atrocities make up only one category on the debit side of the balance sheet that the United States has been accumulating, especially since the Cold War ended. To take an example of quite a different kind of debit, consider South Korea, a longtime ally. On Christmas Eve 1997, it declared itself financially bankrupt and put its economy under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund, which is basically an institutional surrogate of the United States government. Most Americans

were surprised by the economic disasters that overtook Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia in 1997 and that then spread around the world, crippling the Russian and Brazilian economies. They could hardly imagine that the U.S. government might have had a hand in causing them, even though various American pundits and economists expressed open delight in these disasters, which threw millions of people, who had previously had hopes of achieving economic prosperity and security, into the most abysmal poverty. At worst, Americans took the economic meltdown of places like Indonesia and Brazil to mean that beneficial American-supported policies of "globalization" were working—that we were effectively helping restructure various economies around the world so that they would look and work more like ours.

Above all, the economic crisis of 1997 was taken as evidence that our main doctrinal competitors—the high-growth capitalist economies of East Asia—were hardly either as competitive or as successful as they imagined. In a New Year's commentary, the columnist Charles Krauthammer mused, "Our success is the success of the American capitalist model, which lies closer to the free market vision of Adam Smith than any other. Much closer, certainly, than Asia's paternalistic crony capitalism that so seduced critics of the American system during Asia's now-burst bubble."[3]

As the global crisis deepened, the thing our government most seemed to fear was that contracts to buy our weapons might now not be honored. That winter, Secretary of Defense William Cohen made special trips to Jakarta, Bangkok, and Seoul to cajole the governments of those countries to use increasingly scarce foreign exchange funds to pay for the American fighter jets, missiles, warships, and other hardware the Pentagon had sold them before the economic collapse. He also stopped in Tokyo to urge on a worried Japanese government a big sale not yet agreed to. He wanted Japan to invest in the theater missile defense system, or TMD, antimissile missiles that the Pentagon has been trying to get the Japanese to buy for a decade. No one knew then or knows now whether the TMD will even work—in fifteen years of intercept attempts

only a few missiles in essentially doctored tests have hit their targe
but it is unquestionably expensive, and arms sales, both domestic
foreign, have become one of the Pentagon's most important mission

I believe the profligate waste of our resources on irrelevant weap
systems and the Asian economic meltdown, as well as the continu
trail of military "accidents" and of terrorist attacks on American ins
lations and embassies, are all portents of a twenty-first-century crisi
America's informal empire, an empire based on the projection of m
tary power to every corner of the world and on the use of American c
tal and markets to force global economic integration on our terms
whatever costs to others. To predict the future is an undertaking
thoughtful person would rush to embrace. What form our imperial c
is likely to take years or even decades from now is, of course, impossi
to know. But history indicates that, sooner or later, empires do reach s
moments, and it seems reasonable to assume that we will not mira
lously escape that fate.

What we have freed ourselves of, however, is any genuine conscic
ness of how we might look to others on this globe. Most Americans
probably unaware of how Washington exercises its global hegemc
since so much of this activity takes place either in relative secrecy
under comforting rubrics. Many may, as a start, find it hard to beli
that our place in the world even adds up to an empire. But only when
come to see our country as both profiting from and trapped within
structures of an empire of its own making will it be possible for us
explain many elements of the world that otherwise perplex us. With
good explanations, we cannot possibly produce policies that will br
us sustained peace and prosperity in a post–Cold War world. What
gone wrong in Japan after half a century of government-guided grov
under U.S. protection? Why should the emergence of a strong Ch
be to anyone's disadvantage? Why do American policies toward hum
rights, weapons proliferation, terrorism, drug cartels, and the envir
ment strike so many foreigners as the essence of hypocrisy? Sho
American-owned and -managed multinational firms be instrumer

beneficiaries, or adversaries of United States foreign policy? Is the free flow of capital really as valuable as free trade in commodities and manufactured goods? These kinds of questions can only be answered once we begin to grasp what the United States really is.

If Washington is the headquarters of a global military-economic dominion, the answers will be very different than if we think of the United States as simply one among many sovereign nations. There is a logic to empire that differs from the logic of a nation, and acts committed in service to an empire but never acknowledged as such have a tendency to haunt the future.

The term "blowback," which officials of the Central Intelligence Agency first invented for their own internal use, is starting to circulate among students of international relations. It refers to the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people. What the daily press reports as the malign acts of "terrorists" or "drug lords" or "rogue states" or "illegal arms merchants" often turn out to be blowback from earlier American operations.

It is now widely recognized, for example, that the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which resulted in the deaths of 259 passengers and 11 people on the ground, was retaliation for a 1986 Reagan administration aerial raid on Libya that killed President Muammar Khadaffi's stepdaughter. Some in the United States have suspected that other events can also be explained as blowback from imperial acts. For example, the epidemic of cocaine and heroin use that has afflicted American cities during the past two decades was probably fueled in part by Central and South American military officers or corrupt politicians whom the CIA or the Pentagon once trained or supported and then installed in key government positions. For example, in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the U.S. government organized a massive campaign against the socialist-oriented Sandinista government. American agents then looked the other way when the Contras, the military insurgents they had trained, made deals to sell cocaine in American cities in order to buy arms and supplies.[4]

If drug blowback is hard to trace to its source, bomb attacks, whether

on U.S. embassies in Africa, the World Trade Center in New York Ci or an apartment complex in Saudi Arabia that housed U.S. serviceme are another matter. One man's terrorist is, of course, another man's fre dom fighter, and what U.S. officials denounce as unprovoked terrori attacks on its innocent citizens are often meant as retaliation for prev ous American imperial actions. Terrorists attack innocent and und fended American targets precisely because American soldiers and sailo firing cruise missiles from ships at sea or sitting in B-52 bombers extremely high altitudes or supporting brutal and repressive regimes fro Washington seem invulnerable. As members of the Defense Scienc Board wrote in a 1997 report to the undersecretary of defense for acqu sition and technology, "Historical data show a strong correlation betwee U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terroris attacks against the United States. In addition, the military asymmetr that denies nation states the ability to engage in overt attacks against th United States drives the use of transnational actors [that is, terrorist from one country attacking in another]."[5]

The most direct and obvious form of blowback often occurs when th victims fight back after a secret American bombing, or a U.S.-sponsore campaign of state terrorism, or a CIA-engineered overthrow of a foreigr political leader. All around the world today, it is possible to see the groundwork being laid for future forms of blowback. For example, i is estimated that from the Gulf War of 1991 through 1998, the U.S.-sponsored blockade of Saddam Hussein's Iraq has helped contribute tc the deaths of an estimated half million Iraqi civilians due to disease, malnutrition, and inadequate medical care. President Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, takes pride in the thought that this blockade has been "unprecedented for its severity in the whole of world history." By 1999, it had still not brought down Saddam Hussein, the single-minded goal of American policy in the area, but it had ensured that surviving Iraqis were likely to hold a grudge against the American government and its citizens. At the same time, the slipping of "CIA paramilitary covert operators" onto the United Nations teams of postwar weapons inspectors in Iraq, who were charged with uncovering Saddam

Hussein's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, has ensured that one of the most promising experiments in nonproliferation controls has been tainted forever.[6]

Blowback itself can lead to more blowback, in a spiral of destructive behavior. A good illustration of this lies in the government's reaction to the August 7, 1998, bombings of American embassy buildings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, with the loss of 12 American and 212 Kenyan and Tanzanian lives and some 4,500 injured. The U.S. government promptly placed the blame on Osama bin Laden, a Saudi who had long denounced his country's rulers and their American allies. On August 20, the United States retaliated by firing nearly eighty cruise missiles (at a cost of $750,000 each) into a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan, and an old mujahideen camp site in Afghanistan. (One missile went four hundred miles off course and landed in Pakistan.) Both missile targets had been identified by American intelligence as enterprises or training areas associated with bin Laden or his followers. It was soon revealed, however, that the intelligence on both places had been faulty and that neither target could be connected with those who were suspected of attacking the embassies. On September 2, 1998, the U.S. secretary of defense said that he had been unaware that the plant in Khartoum made medicines, not nerve gas, when he recommended that it be attacked. He also admitted that the plant's connection to bin Laden was, at best, "indirect."[7] Nonetheless, President Clinton continued to insist that he had repelled an "imminent threat to our national security," and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called Sudan a "viper's nest of terrorists."

Government spokesmen continue to justify these attacks as "deterring" terrorism, even if the targets proved to be irrelevant to any damage done to facilities of the United States. In this way, future blowback possibilities are seeded into the world. The same spokesmen ignore the fact that the alleged mastermind of the embassy bombings, bin Laden, is a former protégé of the United States. When America was organizing Afghan rebels against the USSR in the 1980s, he played an important role in driving the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and only turned

against the United States in 1991 because he regarded the stationing of American troops in his native Saudi Arabia during and after the Persian Gulf War as a violation of his religious beliefs. Thus, the attacks on our embassies in Africa, if they were indeed his work, are an instance of blowback rather than unprovoked terrorism. Instead of bombing sites in Sudan and Afghanistan in response, the United States might better have considered reducing or removing our large-scale and provocative military presence in Saudi Arabia.

There are more effective—and certainly less destructive—ways of dealing with the threat of "terrorism" than instant military retaliation. In 1994, patient and firm negotiations finally resulted in the Sudan's turning over the terrorist known as Carlos to the French government for trial; and in September 1998, Libya finally agreed to surrender to a Dutch court the two men charged with bombing the Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland. The latter agreement came about through a multilateral reliance on international law and an economic embargo of Libya and so avoided the spiral of blowback and retaliation that is undoubtedly not yet at an end in the case of bin Laden.

Needless to say, blowback is not exclusively a problem faced by Americans. One has only to look at Russia and its former satellites today to see exactly how devastating imperial blowback can be. The hostage crisis of 1996–97 at the Japanese embassy in Lima, in which a handful of Peruvian revolutionaries took virtually the entire diplomatic corps hostage, was probably blowback from Japan's support for the antiguerrilla policies of President Alberto Fujimori and for the operations of Japanese multinational corporations in Peru. Israel's greatest single political problem is the daily threat of blowback from the Palestinian people and their Islamic allies because of Israeli policies of displacing Palestinians from their lands and repressing those that remain under their jurisdiction. The United States, however, is the world's most prominent target for blowback, being the world's lone imperial power, the primary source of the sort of secret and semisecret operations that shore up repressive regimes, and by far the largest seller of weapons generally.

It is typical of an imperial people to have a short memory for its less

pleasant imperial acts, but for those on the receiving end, memory can be long indeed. Among the enduring sources of blowback, for instance, are the genocidal cruelties some nations have perpetrated during wartime. Japan to this day is trying to come to grips with the consequences of its actions in China during World War II. Japanese reactionaries are still reluctant to face atrocities committed in China and Korea: the rape of Nanking, conscription of conquered women to serve as prostitutes for frontline troops, and gruesome medical experimentation on prisoners of war are but the better known of these. But given the passage of time and some payment of compensation, many Chinese would probably accept a sincere apology for these events. However, Japanese armies also terrorized and radicalized an essentially conservative peasant population and thereby helped bring the Chinese Communist Party to power, leading to thirty million deaths during the Great Leap Forward and savaging Chinese civilization during the Cultural Revolution. There are many educated Chinese who can never forgive Japan for contributing to this outcome.

Today, we know of several similar cases. In pursuing the war in Vietnam in the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger ordered more bombs dropped on rural Cambodia than had been dropped on Japan during all of World War II, killing at least three-quarters of a million Cambodian peasants and helping legitimize the murderous Khmer Rouge movement under Pol Pot. In his subsequent pursuit of revenge and ideological purity Pol Pot ensured that another million and a half Cambodians, this time mainly urban dwellers, were murdered.

Americans generally think of Pol Pot as some kind of unique, self-generated monster and his "killing fields" as an inexplicable atavism totally divorced from civilization. But without the United States government's Vietnam-era savagery, he could never have come to power in a culture like Cambodia's, just as Mao's uneducated peasant radicals would never have gained legitimacy in a normal Chinese context without the disruption and depravity of the Japanese war. Significantly, in its calls for an international tribunal to try the remaining leaders of the

Khmer Rouge for war crimes, the United States has demanded that such a court restrict its efforts to the period from 1975 to 1979—that is, after the years of carpet bombing were over and before the U.S. government began to collaborate with the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese Communists, who invaded Cambodia in 1978, drove the Khmer Rouge from power, and were trying to bring some stability to the country.

Even an empire cannot control the long-term effects of its policies. That is the essence of blowback. Take the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, in which Soviet forces directly intervened on the government side and the CIA armed and supported any and all groups willing to face the Soviet armies. Over the years the fighting turned Kabul, once a major center of Islamic culture, into a facsimile of Hiroshima after the bomb. American policies helped ensure that the Soviet Union would suffer the same kind of debilitating defeat in Afghanistan as the United States had in Vietnam. In fact, the defeat so destabilized the Soviet regime that at the end of the 1980s it collapsed. But in Afghanistan the United States also helped bring to power the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic movement whose policies toward women, education, justice, and economic well-being resemble not so much those of Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran as those of Pol Pot's Cambodia. A group of these mujahideen, who only a few years earlier the United States had armed with ground-to-air Stinger missiles, grew bitter over American acts and policies in the Gulf War and vis-à-vis Israel. In 1993, they bombed the World Trade Center in New York and assassinated several CIA employees as they waited at a traffic light in Langley, Virginia. Four years later, on November 12, 1997, after the Virginia killer had been convicted by an American court, unknown assailants shot and killed four American accountants, unrelated in any way to the CIA, in their car in Karachi, Pakistan, in retaliation.

It is likely that U.S. covert policies have helped create similar conditions in the Congo, Guatemala, and Turkey, and that we are simply waiting for the blowback to occur. Guatemala is a particularly striking example of American imperial policies in its own "backyard." In 1954, the Eisenhower administration planned and the CIA organized and

funded a military coup that overthrew a Guatemalan president whose modest land reform policies were considered a threat to American corporations. Blowback from this led to a Marxist guerrilla insurgency in the 1980s and so to CIA- and Pentagon-supported genocide against Mayan peasants. In the spring of 1999, a report on the Guatemalan civil war from the U.N.-sponsored Commission for Historical Clarification made clear that "the American training of the officer corps in counter-insurgency techniques" was a "key factor" in the "genocide. . . . Entire Mayan villages were attacked and burned and their inhabitants were slaughtered in an effort to deny the guerrillas protection."[8] According to the commission, between 1981 and 1983 the military government of Guatemala—financed and supported by the U.S. government—destroyed some four hundred Mayan villages in a campaign of genocide in which approximately two hundred thousand peasants were killed. José Pertierra, an attorney representing Jennifer Harbury, an American lawyer who spent years trying to find out what happened to her "disappeared" Guatemalan husband and supporter of the guerrillas, Efraín Bámaca Velásquez, writes that the Guatemalan military officer who arrested, tortured, and murdered Bámaca was a CIA "asset" and was paid $44,000 for the information he obtained from him.[9]

Visiting Guatemala in March 1999, soon after the report's release, President Clinton said, "It is important that I state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in violence and widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake. . . . The United States will no longer take part in campaigns of repression."[10] But on virtually the day that the president was swearing off "dirty tricks" in other people's countries, his government was reasserting its support for Turkey in its war of repression against its Kurdish minority.

The Kurds constitute fifteen million people in a Turkish population estimated at fifty-eight million. Another five million Kurds live largely within reach of Turkey's borders in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The Turks have discriminated against the Kurds for the past seventy years and have conducted an intense genocidal campaign against them since 1992, in the

process destroying some three thousand Kurdish villages and hamlets the backward southeastern part of the country. Former American ambassador to Croatia Peter W. Galbraith comments that "Turkey routinely jails Kurdish politicians for activities that would be protected speech in democratic countries."[11] The Europeans have so far barred Turkey from the European Union because of its treatment of the Kurds. Because of its strategic location on the border of the former Soviet Union, however, Turkey was a valued American ally and NATO member during the Cold War, and the United States maintains the relationship unchanged even though the USSR has disappeared.

After Israel and Egypt, Turkey is the third-highest recipient of American military assistance. Between 1991 and 1995, the United States supplied four-fifths of Turkey's military imports, which were among the largest in the world. The U.S. government, in turn, depends on the NATO base at Incirlik, Turkey, to carry out Operation Provide Comfort set up after the Gulf War to supply and protect Iraqi Kurds from repression by Saddam Hussein—at the same time that the United States acquiesces in Turkish mistreatment of its far larger Kurdish population. One obvious reason is that communities like Stratford and Bridgeport, Connecticut, where Black Hawk and Comanche helicopters are made depend for their economic health on continued large-scale arms sales to countries like Turkey. At the time of the Gulf War, a senior adviser to the Turkish prime minister said to John Shattuck, assistant secretary of state for human rights, "If you want to stop human rights abuses do two things—stop IMF credits and cut off aid from the Pentagon. But don't sell the weapons and give aid and then complain about the Kurdish issue. Don't tell us about human rights while you're selling these weapons."[1]

The capture in February 1999 of the Kurdish guerrilla leader Abdullah Ocalan exposed the nature of American involvement with Turkey, in this case via a CIA gambit that holds promise as a rich source of future blowback. The CIA term for this policy is "disruption," by which it means the harassment of terrorists around the world. The point is to flush them out of hiding so that cooperative police forces or secret services can then arrest and imprison them. According to John Diamond

the Associated Press, "The CIA keeps its role secret, and the foreign countries that actually crack down on the suspects carefully hide the U.S. role, lest they stir up trouble for themselves." There are no safeguards at all against misidentifying "suspects," and "the CIA sends no formal notice to Congress." Disruption is said to be a preemptive, offensive form of counterterrorism. Richard Clarke, President Clinton's antiterrorism czar, likes it because he can avoid "the cumbersome Congressional reporting requirements that go with CIA-directed covert operations" and because "human rights organizations would have no way of identifying a CIA role." The CIA has carried out disruption operations in at least ten countries since September 1998. In the case of Ocalan's capture, the United States "provided Turkey with critical information about Ocalan's whereabouts." This was the first time some of the details of a "disruption" campaign were made public.[13]

In many other countries there are milder or subtler versions of these kinds of covert manipulations that may lead to future blowback. To take but one example, the U.S. State Department recently published volume 22 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, the official chronicle of American foreign policy, in this case devoted to relations between the United States, China, Korea, and Japan thirty-five or more years ago. Nonetheless, the government refused to declassify some 13.5 percent of the documents that should have been included in the section on Japan, particularly materials relating to military operations and U.S. bases in that country. For the first time, the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, charged by law with supervising the editing and publication of this venerable series, wrote in the Preface that volume 22 "does not constitute a 'thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy decisions.' " The State Department, surely under instructions from the CIA and the Department of Defense, took the unusual step of holding back key documents—undoubtedly involving among other matters secret CIA payments to the conservative, long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its leading politicians, as well as the presence

of nuclear arms at American bases in Japan, fearing that their public tion might result in the kind of blowback of which a poor Third Wor country like Guatemala would be incapable, but which Japan might we undertake.

In a sense, blowback is simply another way of saying that a natic reaps what it sows. Although people usually know what they have sow our national experience of blowback is seldom imagined in such tern because so much of what the managers of the American empire hav sown has been kept secret. As a concept, blowback is obviously most eas to grasp in its most straightforward manifestation. The unintended cor sequences of American policies and acts in country X are a bomb a an American embassy in country Y or a dead American in country Z Certainly any number of Americans have been killed in that fashior from Catholic nuns in El Salvador to tourists in Uganda who just hap pened to wander into hidden imperial scenarios about which they knev nothing. But blowback, as demonstrated in this book, is hardly restricte to such reasonably straightforward examples.

From the hollowing out of key American industries due to Japan' export-led economic policies to refugee flows across our southern bor ders from countries where U.S.-supported repression has created genoci dal conditions or where U.S.-supported economic policies have led t unbearable misery, blowback can hit in less obvious and more subtle way and over long periods of time. It can also manifest itself domestically ir ways that are often not evident, even to those who created or carried ou the initial imperial policies.

Because we live in an increasingly interconnected international sys tem, we are all, in a sense, living in a blowback world. Although the tern originally applied only to the unintended consequences for *Americans* o American policies, there is every reason to widen its meaning. Whether for example, any unintended consequences of the American policies that fostered and then heightened the economic collapse of Indonesia in 1997 ever blow back to the United States, the unintended consequences for Indonesians have been staggering levels of suffering, poverty, and loss

of hope. Similarly, the unintended consequences of American-supported coups and bombing in Cambodia in the early 1970s were unimaginable chaos, disruption, and death for Cambodians later in the decade.

Our role in the military coup in Chile in 1973, for example, produced little blowback onto the United States itself but had lethal consequences for liberals, socialists, and innocent bystanders in Chile and elsewhere. On the nature of American policies in Chile, journalist Jon Lee Anderson reports, "The plan, according to declassified United States government documents, was to make Chile ungovernable under [elected socialist president Salvador] Allende, provoke social chaos, and bring about a military coup. . . . A CIA cable outlined the objectives clearly to the station chief in Santiago: 'It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. . . . We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that United States Government and American hand be well hidden.' "[14]

No ordinary citizen of the United States knew anything about these machinations. The coup d'état took place on September 11, 1973, resulting in the suicide of Allende and the seizure of power by General Augusto Pinochet, whose military and civilian supporters in their seventeen years in power tortured, killed, or "disappeared" some four thousand people. Pinochet was an active collaborator in Operation Condor, a joint mission with the Argentine militarists to murder exiled dissidents in the United States, Spain, Italy, and elsewhere. This is why, when Pinochet traveled to England in the autumn of 1998 for medical treatment, Spain tried to extradite him to stand trial for genocide, torture, and state terrorism against Spanish citizens. On October 16, 1998, the British police arrested Pinochet in London and held him pending his possible extradition.

Although few Americans were affected by this covert operation, people around the world now know of the American involvement and were deeply cynical when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright opposed Pinochet's extradition, claiming that countries like Chile undertaking a "transition to democracy" must be allowed to guarantee immunity from

prosecution to past human rights offenders in order to "move forward. America's "dirty hands" make even the most well-intentioned stateme about human rights or terrorism seem hypocritical in such circu stances. Even when blowback mostly strikes other peoples, it has its cc rosive effects on the United States by debasing political discourse a making citizens feel duped if they should happen to take seriously wh their political leaders say. This is an inevitable consequence not just blowback but of empire itself.

What, then, of the very idea of an American empire or, for that ma ter, American imperialism? "Hegemony," "empire," and "imperialisn have often been used as epithets or fighting words. They lie at the hea of Marx's and, especially, Lenin's condemnation of capitalism. Durir the Cold War, Communists asserted that imperialism was one of th "contradictions" of capitalism and hence a root cause of class struggl revolution, and war. However, the terms also evoke images of the Roma and British empires, as well as of the Pax Romana and the Pax Britannic that were said to have accompanied them. Imperialism is further assoc ated with the racism and exploitation that accompanied Europea American, and Japanese colonialism in the nineteenth and twentiet centuries and with the violent reactions to it that dominated the nor Western world in the wake of the Second World War.

In speaking of an "American empire," however, I am not usin the concept in these traditional senses. I am not talking about th United States' former colony in the Philippines, or about such depen dent territories as Puerto Rico; nor when I use the term "imperialism in this book do I mean the extension of one state's legal dominio over another; nor do I even want to imply that imperialism must hav primarily economic causes. The more modern empires I have in min normally lie concealed beneath some ideological or juridical concept— commonwealth, alliance, free world, the West, the Communist bloc— that disguises the actual relationships among its members.

According to Milovan Djilas, Stalin pithily described the origin of such new empires in a conversation he had with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia in the Kremlin in April 1945 in this way: "This war is not as in the past.

Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own social system as far as his army has power to do so. It cannot be otherwise."[16] Imposing one's own social system is precisely what the former Soviet Union proceeded to do in the territories it occupied in Eastern Europe and what the United States did in the territories it occupied in East Asia, particularly Japan and South Korea. Over the forty years of the Cold War these original "satellites" became the cores of Soviet and American new-style empires, only one of which—the American empire—still remains today. The nature of that remaining empire and how it has changed over time is the subject of this book.

In 1917, the Soviet Union inherited an older czarist empire in Europe and central Asia, a multinational union of peoples based on conquest and a particular civilization, similar to the former Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires. This imperial past undoubtedly colored the nature of the Soviet Union then taking shape, but in talking about the Cold War Soviet empire, I am referring mainly to the seven "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe that formed the heart of the Communist camp until its collapse in 1989: East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Albania, and Bulgaria. Its American equivalent was not NATO—Western Europe's American-inspired and American-supported defensive reaction to the massive armies and armaments the Soviet Union had mobilized to defeat the Third Reich—but the system of satellites the United States created in East Asia. These included at one time regimes in Japan, South Korea, Thailand, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

Over time, and with the development of a nuclear arms race between the United States and the USSR, the two empires based on satellite regimes created after World War II expanded into much more extensive alignments based on ideology, economic interactions, technology transfers, mutual benefit, and military cooperation. For the Soviet Union this was the world that for a brief moment during the 1950s stretched from Moscow to Hanoi in the east and to Havana in the west and that even included, at least formally, China. For the United States it came to include most of the rest of the world—places where the United States

assumed responsibility for maintaining some ill-defined "favorable" military environment (what the Pentagon now likes to call "stability") anywhere we insisted on free access for our multinational corporations and financiers (what our economists now call "globalization").

There was, I believe, far more symmetry between the postwar policies of the Soviet Union and the United States than most Americans are willing to recognize. The USSR in Eastern Europe and the United States in East Asia created their satellite systems for essentially the same reasons. In the course of the Cold War, the USSR intervened militarily to hold its empire together in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The United States intervened militarily to hold its empire together in Korea and Vietnam (where it killed a great many more people in losing than the USSR did in its two successful interventions).

The richest prize in the Soviet empire was East Germany; the richest prize in the American empire is still Japan. Today, much like East Germany before the Berlin Wall came down, Japan remains a rigged economy brought into being and maintained thanks to the Cold War. Its people seem increasingly tired of the American troops stationed on their soil for the last half century and of the gray, single-party regimes that presided in Tokyo for almost all of those years. East Germany's dreary leaders Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker can appear almost dynamic when compared to the prime ministers Japan's Liberal Democratic Party has put in office since 1955.

Just as the two satraps of the German Democratic Republic faithfully followed every order they ever received from Moscow, each and every Japanese prime minister, as soon as he comes into office, gets on an airplane and reports to Washington. And as in the former East Germany, so Japanese voters long ago discovered that as long as they continue to be allied with the United States, nothing they do ever seems to change their political system. Many ordinary Japanese have learned to avoid politics like the plague, participating only in local elections, where a surprising number vote Communist both to register a protest and because the party is competent and honest. In Japan, political idealists tend to become nihilists, not unlike their German brethren before 1989.

The Soviet Union started setting up its satellites largely because it could not compete with the largesse of the United States' Marshall Plan for the rebuilding of war-torn Europe. (This, of course, reflected a major outcome of World War II: much of the Soviet Union had been reduced to rubble, while the United States emerged unscathed.) The USSR quickly recognized that in the conflict between democracy and totalitarianism developing in postwar Europe, it was on the less popular side. In Eastern Europe it could not bring its supporters to power through the ballot box, and so it ruthlessly ousted local democrats. In a Czech coup in February 1948 and elsewhere it imported Stalinism, claiming it was merely a version of socialism.

The Soviet Union had a defensive need to secure its Western approaches. By contrast, after Japan's defeat no regime in East Asia was capable of threatening the United States itself, least of all a China devastated by war and revolution. We therefore built our system of satellites for more genuinely imperialist reasons, although the government argued that our efforts were necessary due to the natural aggression of Sino-Soviet communism and the possibility that the fall of any country, however minor, to communism would lead other countries to topple like a set of "dominoes," until the chain reaction might reach the heartland of capitalism itself.

The American decision to create satellites in East Asia followed in part from the Communist revolution in China, which meant that American plans for a new postwar international order in East Asia based on an alliance with China, its wartime ally, were no longer viable. Although unwilling to go to war against the popular forces of Chinese communism to prop up the failing Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, we reversed our policies for occupied Japan, giving up on further efforts to democratize the country and committing ourselves instead to its swift economic rehabilitation. Japan, the former implacable enemy, replaced China as America's primary East Asian ally. The U.S. government now devoted its energies to defending Japan and building it up as an East Asian alternative to the Chinese revolution. Even though we did not try to "roll back" that revolution, President Truman's decision in 1950 to

order the Seventh Fleet to defend Taiwan and police the Taiwan Strait, and General Douglas MacArthur's decision to march north to the Chinese border during the Korean War, nonetheless ensured Chinese hostility for at least two decades.

Needless to say, the United States did not consult the defeated Japanese people about these decisions or about the decision to cultivate the remnants of that country's unquestionably anti-Communist wartime establishment. Our reliance in some cases on literal war criminals—for example, Nobusuke Kishi, former minister of munitions in Tojo's wartime cabinet, who became the country's prime minister in 1957—and on a CIA-financed single-party regime were the mirror image of Soviet policies in the former German Democratic Republic. Such policies actually led to an anti-American revolt in 1960. In the largest mass demonstrations in postwar Japanese history, protesters surrounded the parliament building and demanded that lawmakers not ratify a renewal of the Japanese-American Security Treaty. The situation became so tense that President Dwight D. Eisenhower was forced to cancel a proposed visit. (The first sitting American president ever to visit Tokyo would be Gerald Ford.) Using its rigged majority, the conservative party forced through ratification, keeping American troops in Japan, and the political system never again fully regained the trust of the public. For thirty years, the Liberal Democratic Party successfully prevented any alteration in political power and dutifully legitimated Japan's status as a satellite of the United States. Unfortunately, it did little else, leaving the actual governance of the country to the state bureaucracy, ensuring that any impulses the citizenry might have had toward self-government would atrophy. By the 1990s Japan was the world's second-richest country, but with a government remarkably similar to that of the former East Germany.

In order to support Britain, France, and Holland in the face of fears that the rest of Europe might "go Communist," the United States abandoned its wartime promises to help liberate those nations' colonies. Instead, the United States came to support or replace the former imperialists in wars intended to secure their prewar possessions. This meant that in East Asia, except in our own colony, the Philippines, we wound

up on the wrong side of history. (Even in the Philippines, which we granted formal independence on July 4, 1946, we kept enormous military base complexes until the Filipinos expelled us in 1992.)

Unlike in Europe, the main Cold War conflicts in East and Southeast Asia were not between democracy and totalitarianism but between European colonialism and national independence movements. The reluctance of the main European powers to give up their colonies led to wars of national liberation in Indochina against the French, in Malaya against the British, and in Indonesia against the Dutch, in all of which the United States supported the side of imperialism. The Dutch were finally driven from Indonesia; the British, after a decade-long war, finally acquiesced in Malaya's independence, followed by its becoming two independent countries, Malaysia and Singapore. After the French were defeated militarily in Vietnam, the United States fought an incredibly bloody and prolonged conflict before it, too, was forced to abandon its imperial role there. The United States also supported a long counterinsurgency struggle in the Philippines against a guerrilla movement that considered the postindependence Filipino government a creature of the Americans. Only after our defeat in Vietnam did we begin to adjust to the idea that East Asia was different from Europe. Nixon's opening to China was the first sign that some understanding of East Asian history was finally starting to penetrate Washington minds.

The problem for the United States was that national Communist parties had filled a leadership vacuum in colonial East Asia. To prevent much of that region, possibly even Japan, from coming under the influence of nationalistic Communist parties, the U.S. government from time to time used the sort of brutal methods to which the USSR had resorted in Eastern Europe to hang on to its sphere of influence. The clearest example of this was the role it played in South Korea after 1945, a history that has been almost totally suppressed in the United States.

South Korea has been occupied by American forces virtually continuously since the end of World War II. It was the scene of the most important armed conflict of the early Cold War years, the place where the United States and China fought each other to a standstill and froze

relations with each other for two decades. Thanks to the United States and the Soviet Union, which in 1945 divided the country for their own convenience, a half century later Korea remains the last place on earth whose borders are determined by where the armies of World War II stopped. South Korea's rise during the 1960s as a "miracle economy" and its spectacular financial collapse of 1997 were directly related to its status as a satellite of the United States.

South Korea was the first place in the postwar world where the Americans set up a dictatorial government. With the exception of its authoritarian president, Syngman Rhee, it consisted largely of former Korean collaborators with the Japanese colonialists. Despite opposition from the Korean people, America's need for a staunchly anti-Communist regime took precedence, given the occupation of North Korea by the USSR. In 1960, after Koreans searching for democracy overthrew Rhee, the U.S. government threw its support behind Park Chung-hee, the first of three army generals who would rule from 1961 to 1993. The Americans tolerated a coup d'état by General Chun Doo-hwan in 1979 and covertly supported his orders that led to the killing of several hundred, maybe several thousand, Korean civilians at Kwangju in 1980 (probably far more people than the Chinese Communists killed in and around Tiananmen Square in 1989). In order to keep South Korea firmly under its control, during the 1980s the Americans sent as successive ambassadors two senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Lilly and Donald Gregg. Nowhere else did the United States so openly turn over diplomatic relations to representatives of its main clandestine services organization.

South Korea is today probably closer to a genuine parliamentary democracy than any country in East Asia, but no thanks to the American State Department, the Pentagon, or the CIA. It was the Korean people themselves, particularly the students of the country's leading universities, who through demonstrations and street confrontations in 1987 finally brought a measure of democracy to their country. After the democratically elected government of Kim Young-sam took office in 1993, President Kim felt sufficiently secure to put the two surviving dictators,

Chun and Roh Tae Woo, on trial. They were convicted of state terrorism, sedition, and corruption. The American press gave the trials only the most minimal coverage, while the U.S. government ignored them as a purely internal Korean affair.

The rule of Syngman Rhee and the U.S.-backed generals was merely the first instance in East Asia of the American sponsorship of dictators. The list is long, but it deserves reiteration simply because many in the United States fail to remember (if they ever knew) what East Asians cannot help but regard as a major part of our postwar legacy. U.S.-sponsored Asian dictators include:

- Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan. (Taiwan started to democratize only in the 1980s after the Carter administration had broken relations with it.)
- Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines (brought down by Corazon Aquino and her People Power movement after Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush had hailed him as a democrat).
- Ngo Dinh Diem (assassinated on American orders), General Nguyen Khanh, General Nguyen Cao Ky, and General Nguyen Van Thieu in Vietnam.
- General Lon Nol in Cambodia.
- Marshals Pibul Songgram, Sarit Thanarat, Praphas Charusathien, and Thanom Kittikachorn in Thailand (where they were essentially caretakers for the huge American air bases at Udorn, Takli, Korat, and Ubon).
- General Suharto in Indonesia (brought to power with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency and overthrown with the help of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency).

Several others had careers too brief or obscure to remember clearly (for example, General Phoumi Nosavan in Laos). These men belong to

the same category of petty tyrants that the former Soviet Union used to staff its satellites in Eastern Europe from 1948 to 1989 (although the Russians usually chose obedient members of the local Communist Party apparatus over militarists).

The U.S. government used economics, as well as authoritarian regimes, as a tool of empire building. Our most effective, nonmilitary policies in East Asia were to trade access to our markets for East Asian toleration of the indefinite billeting of our soldiers, aircraft, and ships in their countries. Admittedly, following the Vietnam War, the United States briefly toyed with the idea of letting its empire in East Asia go. President Jimmy Carter explored withdrawing our troops from South Korea, particularly since North and South Korea were at that point nearly indistinguishable in terms of human rights abuses and Stalinist-style development policies. But he was forestalled in 1979 by the assassination of the South Korean dictator, General Park Chung-hee, and by his inability politically to cast off one satellite just as another one, Iran, was in open rebellion against the United States. When, in the final days of the Carter administration, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to prop up its own puppets there, any talk of giving up our empire evaporated.

During the 1980s, the last decade of the Cold War, the parallelism between the policies of the United States and the USSR continued but with a new geographical focus. Both sought to shore up or establish puppet regimes in territories that were on their borders or in adjacent regions that had long been claimed as spheres of influence. The USSR was preoccupied with Afghanistan; the United States, with Central America. Both superpowers utilized the rhetoric of the Cold War to justify their aggressive actions against much smaller states—anticapitalism for the USSR in Afghanistan, anticommunism for the United States in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, and the island of Grenada—even though capitalism in Afghanistan and communism in Central America were both essentially absurd ideas. Propaganda apparatuses in the United States and the USSR effectively disguised from their own peoples the true roots of revolt in both regions—a religious revival in

Afghanistan, opposition to oligarchies that had long fronted for American corporations in Central America.

President Reagan and his CIA director, William Casey, claimed they were trying to halt the erosion of the "free world" in the wake of the Vietnam War. Whether this was truly their strategy or merely political rhetoric has never been clear, but what could not be clearer was that, in 1981, the United States launched Vietnam-style operations in Central America and put large sums of money, often covertly raised, into supporting an insurgency against a Sandinista government in Nicaragua sympathetic to Castro's Cuba. At the same time, superpower détente, arms control talks, and Sino-American rapprochement virtually eliminated any real threat of war between hostile camps in Europe or East Asia. While the American demonization of Castro's Cuba ratcheted upward and the government argued vociferously that Cuban-inspired insurgencies were the hemisphere's greatest threat, the Cold War was already essentially over. The superpowers continued it only as propaganda cover for their respective neighborhood imperialisms.

It is not necessary to detail here the many American covert operations in Latin America. Americans supported a series of activities that ranged from the widespread use of paramilitary death squads in countries like El Salvador to military-directed genocidal campaigns in Guatemala, seriously compromising American rhetoric about human rights for the rest of the century. Similar largely covert operations continued throughout the 1980s and probably still continue. Although the CIA has done everything in its power to hide the American hand in these imperial policing actions, a pattern has developed in the revelation of American-sponsored atrocities and their ensuing blowback. An American regional newspaper—the *Baltimore Sun* in the case of Honduran death squads, the *San Jose Mercury News* in the case of the cocaine trade of our Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, the "Contras"—publishes a report based on the research of its staff reporters. The report offers evidence that an agency of the United States condoned war crimes against civilians in Central America and lied to Congress when asked about it or turned a deaf ear to evidence that "assets" under our control were engaged in activities

such as drug smuggling that were extremely deleterious to the welfare c Americans. The establishment press—the *Washington Post*, the *New Yo Times*, or the *Los Angeles Times*—then accuses the regional paper c sloppy journalism; the publisher of the regional paper apologizes and fir the reporters who filed the story.

Meanwhile, the CIA orders its inspector general to investigate th charges. He duly releases a report saying that not a shred of evidence ca be found in the official files to support the story. Months or even yea later, a research organization, such as the National Security Archive a George Washington University, discovers that there was a second inter nal report by the inspector general. The second report still disputes th newspaper account but also acknowledges that the substance of it charges was accurate. As the CIA's internal response to the *Baltimor Sun*'s report put it in the gingerly and euphemistic language of imperial ism, "CIA reporting to Congress in the early 1980s underestimate Honduran involvement in abuses."[17]

The United States now faces an agenda of problems that simply woul not exist except for the imperial commitments and activities, open an covert, that accompanied the Cold War. The most common governmen argument for such continued imperialist activism in the wake of tha half-century-long superpower confrontation is still a version of the ol "domino theory," discredited during the Vietnam War: America's armed forces and covert warriors—for the sake of the world's good—have n choice but to hold off "instability" wherever it may threaten. The Department of Defense's East Asia Strategy Report of 1998 explains the one hundred thousand troops "forward deployed" in Okinawa and South Korea as necessary to maintain "stability" in the region. But instability, a nebulous concept at best, is the normal state of affairs in an international system of sovereign states. Instability as such does not threaten the security of the United States, particularly when there is no superpower rival eager to exploit it.

Actual military intervention in brutal civil wars or civil strife in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo has been justified as "deterrence by example." Even though the United States may have no obvious or

vital interest in the outcome of ethnic, religious, or internecine struggles in such places, advocates of military activism argue that it is a good thing for us to intervene because it shows allies and adversaries alike that we will not be "bullied" or "blackmailed." Such interventions, it is thought, will cause others to respect our power and authority—and hesitate to plunge into similar bloody strife in their own areas. But deterrence by example does not work. As foreign policy analyst Barbara Conry puts it, "The aborted U.S. intervention in Haiti . . . is not going to lead to a rash of military dictatorships any more than strong American responses to Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein deterred Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic from pursuing his aims in Bosnia."[18]

Not only are such military interventions often ineffective, but the use of military force in the name of democracy or human rights regularly makes a mockery of these very principles. More serious yet, an injudicious intervention can create threats where none existed before, as was the case in Truman's intervention in the Chinese civil war and in General MacArthur's menacing of China's borders during the Korean War.

Thirty years ago the international relations theorist Ronald Steel noted, "Unlike Rome, we have not exploited our empire. On the contrary, our empire has exploited us, making enormous drains on our resources and energies."[19] Our economic relations with our East Asian satellites have, for example, hollowed out our domestic manufacturing industries and led us into a reliance on finance capitalism, whose appearance has in the past been a sign of a hitherto healthy economy entering decline. An analogous situation literally wrecked the former USSR. While fighting a losing war in Afghanistan and competing with the United States to develop ever more advanced "strategic weaponry," it could no longer withstand pent-up desires in Eastern Europe for independence.

The historian Paul Kennedy has dubbed this condition "imperial overstretch." In an analysis of the United States in his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, he wrote that it too

> cannot avoid confronting the two great tests which challenge the *longevity* of every major power that occupies the "number one" position in world affairs: whether, in the military/strategic realm, it can preserve a reasonable balance between the nation's perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain these commitments; and whether, as an intimately related point, it can preserve the technological and economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of the ever-shifting patterns of global production. This test of American abilities will be the greater because it, like Imperial Spain around 1600 or the British Empire around 1900, is the inheritor of a vast array of strategical commitments which had been made decades earlier, when the nation's political, economic, and military capacity to influence world affairs seemed so much more assured.[20]

I do not believe that America's "vast array of strategical commit ments" were made in past decades largely as the result of attempts t exploit other nations for economic gain or simply to dominate ther politically and militarily. Although the United States has in the pas engaged in imperialist exploitation of other nations, particularly in Lati America, it has also tried in various ways to liquidate many such com mitments. The roots of American "imperial overstretch" today are no the same as those of past empires. Instead they more closely resembl those that brought down the Soviet Union.

Many Americans do not care to see their country's acts, policies, o situations compared with the Soviet Union's; some condemn such a comparison because it commits the alleged fallacy of "moral equiva lence." They insist that America's values and institutions are vastly mor humane than those of Stalin's Russia. I agree. Throughout the years o the Cold War, the United States remained a functioning democracy with rights for its citizens unimaginable in the Soviet context (even if it more recent maintenance of the world's largest prison population sug gests that it should be cautious in criticizing other nations' systems o

criminal justice). Comparisons between the United States and the former Soviet Union are useful, however, because those two hegemons developed in tandem, challenging each other militarily, economically, and ideologically. In the long run, it may turn out that, like two scorpions in a bottle, they succeeded in stinging each other to death. The roots of both modern empires lay in World War II and in their subsequent contest to control the forces that the war unleashed. A stress on the costs of the Cold War to the United States also draws attention to the legacies of that struggle. America's role as the planet's "lone superpower"—as leader of the peace-loving nations and patron of such institutions as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization—is made much more difficult by the nature of the harvest we continue to reap for imprudent, often secret operations undertaken in the past.

The most important of our Cold War legacies may be in East Asia. The wealth of that region today has fundamentally altered the world balance of power. Starting with Japan, many East Asian countries adapted to the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War years and took advantage of its conditions to engineer their own self-sustaining economic growth. Even though the high-speed economic growth of some countries in the area stalled or even collapsed with the economic crisis of 1997, that in no way alters the basic shift in manufacturing's global center of gravity to East Asia.

The American political and intellectual establishments remain mystified by and hostile to the economic achievements of Asians, just as the Soviet establishment remained mystified by and hostile to the economic achievements of Anglo-American and Western European capitalism. It is time to realize, however, that the real dangers to America today come not from the newly rich people of East Asia but from our own ideological rigidity, our deep-seated belief in our own propaganda. As sociologists Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver warn, "There are no credible aggressive new powers that can provoke the breakdown of the U.S.-centered world system, but the United States has even greater capabilities than Britain did a century ago to convert its declining hegemony into an exploitative domination. If the system eventually breaks down,

it will be primarily because of U.S. resistance to adjustment and accommodation. And conversely, U.S. adjustment and accommodation to the rising economic power of the East Asian region is an essential condition for a non-catastrophic transition to a new world order."[21]

The United States today desperately needs a new analysis of its role in a post–Cold War world and of the sorts of policies that might prevent another major war, like its last three, in East Asia. Some of the significant changes to come in East Asia are already visible: China's increasing attempt to emulate high-growth economies elsewhere in Asia; the reunification of Korea; Japan's need to overcome its political paralysis America's confusion over how to adjust to a self-confident China and to a more independent Japan; the growing importance of Southeast Asia as a new economic center of gravity. American policy making needs to be taken away from military planners and military-minded civilians, including those in the White House, who today dominate Washington policy making toward the area. American ambassadors and diplomats in Asia should have at least an elementary knowledge of East Asian history, languages, and aspirations. The United States desperately needs options for dealing with crises other than relying on the carrier task force, cruise missiles, and the unfettered flow of capital, just as it needs to overcome the complacency and arrogance that characterize American official attitudes toward Asia today.

Terrorism by definition strikes at the innocent in order to draw attention to the sins of the invulnerable. The innocent of the twenty-first century are going to harvest unexpected blowback disasters from the imperialist escapades of recent decades. Although most Americans may be largely ignorant of what was, and still is, being done in their names, all are likely to pay a steep price—individually and collectively—for their nation's continued efforts to dominate the global scene. Before the damage of heedless triumphalist acts and the triumphalist rhetoric and propaganda that goes with them becomes irreversible, it is important to open a new discussion of our global role during and after the Cold War. There is no place more appropriate to begin a reconsideration of America's imperial policies than with American behavior in East Asia.